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INTRODUCTION
SECTION I
SECTION II
SECTION III
SUMMARY
SECTION –III
IMPERATIVES FOR A SECOND BIRTH
As we approach the coming period
of transition, we have got to clear the deck to reveal the truth,
expose misconceptions, and lay the ground for conscience clearing,
and remedial action, to see that justice is done. In this sense, I
herein discuss the issue of Human Rights in Transition. Closely
linked to Human Rights, is the notion of Justice when dealing with
issues of: identity, religion and politics, sustainable democracy,
sustainable economic development, the armed forces, and
self-determination.
This section sees the Sudanese
second birth in the cradle of human rights, it discusses Human
rights, and justice concerning the above mentioned aspects, in the
coming period of Transition.
Chapter
1: Human Rights in Transition
Chapter 2: Transition and Justice.
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TRANSITION IN SUDAN
Universal religions and secular
ideologies have dealt extensively with the issue of Human Rights.
During the first half of the 20th century, the West has
experienced the worst ever violations of Human Rights. Small wonder,
therefore, that at the end of the bloodiest experience in the whole
of human history, the issue of Human Rights loomed so large and bred
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 10 December 1948.
It declared the dignity and equality of human kind, and in 30
articles, spelt out their universal rights.
Then in 1966, the International
Community issued the International Agreement on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights as detailed in 31 articles. And the International
Agreement on Civil and Political Rights, which in 53 articles spelt
out the details.
Subsequently,
many agreements on specific aspects have been issued, for example,
the universal declaration on abolition of discrimination against
women in November 1967, and so on. Those documents have since
provided the definition of universally recognized Human Rights and
the criteria for the civilized behavior of States and societies.
Modern states of the UN have extensively signed them, and as
extensively violated them.
The Sudan, after independence,
signed many of them and lodged reservations.
During the nine years of democratic governments, their violation was
the exception. During the thirty-two years of despotic governments,
their violation was the rule. However, the Sudan suffered a marathon
civil war, during which both sides to the conflict violated Human
Rights.
An objective survey of Human
Rights’
violations in the Sudan would support the following four
conclusions:
1. That
abuse of Human Rights during the despotic regimes exceeds by far,
such violations during democracy.
2. That
violations of Human Rights in the three despotic regimes indicate a
rising graph: from bad, to worse, to worst.
3. Violations
of Human Rights involved all Sudanese citizens, but its incidence on
Southern regions and other marginalized regions was worse.
4. The
civil war introduced its own dimension of Human Rights violations,
in which all parties to the armed conflict were involved.
HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN SUDAN
Following is a list of Human
Rights violations in chronological order. It is not an exhaustive
list, but includes events which had a durable effect on national
memory:
1. The bloody
events of August 1955.
2. The mass
death of the prisoners of Kosti prison cell.
3. The coup d’etat
of November 1958.
4. Arbitrary
arrests and torture.
5. The armed
attack on civilians during the MULID celebration in 1961.
6. Cultural
persecution.
7. The
persecution of Southern civilians in JUBA and WAW, in 1965.
8. The
dissolution of the Communist Party and the expulsion of its members
of Parliament.
9. Holding the
uncontested elections in the South, 1965.
10. The
illegal dissolution of the constituent assembly, 1968.
11. The murder
of SAYED WILLIAM DENG, 1968.
12. The coup d’etat
of May 1969.
13. The ABA
and WADNUBAWI massacres, and the murder of IMAM AL HADI AL MAHDI and
his followers in AL KURMUK, 1970.
14. Torture,
arbitrary arrests, confiscation of property.
15. Show
trials and tampering with the judiciary, during the second
despotism.
16. Betrayal
of own constitutional Human Rights provisions, particularly 1972
agreement.
17. Events of
1975 coup attempt and after.
18. Cultural
persecution.
19. The events
and repression which followed.
20. Murder of
SAYED MAHMOUD MOHAMMAD TAHA, 1985.
21.
Amputations, floggings, in demagogic application of Islamic
punishments.
22. Shooting
down of civilian planes: August 1986, May 1987.
23. AL DIAIN
incident, 1988.
24. The
revival of inter-tribal slavery, 1988.
25. The June
1989 coup d’etat.
26. The
extra-judicial execution of 28 officers 1990.
27. Torture,
arbitrary arrests, persecution of women.
28. Violations
of the rules of war by parties to the conflict.
29. Inhuman
treatment of the displaced peoples.
30. The use of
food aid and its denial as a weapon in civil war.
31.
Kidnappings, abductions, forced labor.
32. Forced
conscription.
33.
Persecution of civilians in war affected areas.
34. Economic
persecution.
35.
Educational persecution.
36.
Sponsorship of terrorism.
37. Show
trials and tampering with the judiciary.
38. Cultural
persecution.
39. Religious
persecution.
40.
Allegations of revival of slavery during NIF regime.
41. The cruel
treatment of Prisoners of war.
42. The
subversion of education for military purposes.
43. The use of
food as a weapon.
There is a
perception, advocated by many, that the story of human rights
violations is a one sided track of Northern oppression and Southern
victimization. I have already outlined the misdeeds of the different
regimes, which governed the Sudan since independence. Northern
political forces, which dominated these governments, bear
responsibility for them.
However, to
put the matter in objective perspective, I offer the following
observations: -
FIRST:
Much of Northern policies towards the south were negatively
influenced by the southern policy initiated by the British colonial
administration.
Much Southern perception of the
situation sees and condemns the Northern reactions without
sufficiently recognizing British culpability.
SECOND:
Apart from the issue of Northern bad faith, Southern political
ineptness is responsible for failure to represent Southern interests
strongly enough especially under democratic conditions. The
challenge in Democracy is to be able to organize to serve political
ideas and/or interests. Southern society has produced effective
military organizations, not so political organizations which are the
bread and butter of a democracy. The first Southern party after
independence, the Liberal Party was a fragile organization, which
had little political clout and allowed its members to be manipulated
by other parties. SANU, which had in SAYED WILLIAM DENG an able
Statesman, was undermined by the armed military wing, ANYANYA, and
after the death of SAYED WILLIAM, no effective leadership or
organization succeeded him. The Southern Front, which was composed
of a group of competent intellectuals, had not been able to evolve a
pattern of leadership and organization. Association with the Nimeiri
regime arrested its political evolution. This frustrated and
disappointed all those who did political business with it! The
numerous parties, which were formed after the 1985 uprising, were
locally based quasi-tribal grouping that served as electoral
agencies. Even then, they were prone to fragmentation on a personal
and tribal basis.
The SPLM/A is an effective
organization, but clearly the political identity is absorbed in the
military. Its ability to develop a cohesive effective political
organization without a military backbone is a future challenge.
Unless Southern political opinion forms effective political
organization, or joins Northern parties on equitable terms, Southern
interests will not be guaranteed under democratic conditions.
THIRD:
As a corollary of failure to form effective organizations of
political assertion, and more success with military organization,
Southern political expression tends to resort hastily to violent
means. Violence may be justified in certain circumstances, but to be
the norm, it is self-defeating, because it may lead to effective
countervailing reaction, and because it becomes a means of settling
internal disputes and so fragmentation. The hasty and massive resort
to violence in August 1955 did a disservice to Southern interests
and stamped South / North relations with a negative character. The
same may be said about the shooting down of the two civilian planes
immediately after top level negotiations between the Prime Minister
of Sudan and the SPLM/A chairman in July 1986. Negotiations, which
did not make a breakthrough, but kept the door open for further
development of the peace process. The failure to recognize the
political and constitutional change, which took place on 6th
April 1985, was a political blunder.
FOURTH:
There is a tendency among many Sudanese intellectuals to lump the
governments which governed the Sudan together making little
distinction between legitimately constituted governments, and the
police States created by coups d’etat. Amongst Southern
intellectuals and politicians, this failure to distinguish between
the two categories of government, portrays the North as one culpable
entity united in oppressing the South. No doubt there are common
Northern misconceptions about the South, but substantial Southern
political opinion branded together two types of Northern dominated
governments in an unjustified way. In this context, a well respected
Southern intellectual- Politician SAYED ABEL ALIER called his book
on the Southern problem “A String of Broken Promises “. The
reality is:
·
The promise by the
political leaders to consider federal status for the South (in 1955)
when the country’s constitution is drafted went unfulfilled because
the constitution making process was aborted by the 17th November
coup d’etat.
·
The
recommendation of the Twelve- man Committee and the All-party
Conference (1967) were rendered fruitless by the 1969 coup d’etat.
In both cases, the Northern party
to the agreements and the politicians concerned were immobilized by
the new military government. The 1972 peace agreement was reached
with Nimeiri. It was essentially reached with an illegally
constituted government, and with a “leader" who systemically broke
all deals with Northerners and Southerners alike.
More to the point:
n
All peace
initiatives and tendencies to resolve the civil war by political
agreement were associated with democratic governments, namely, the
Round Table Conference 1965, the Twelve Man Committee 1966, The All
Party Peace Conference 1967, The KOKADAM Declaration 1986, The
Sudanese initiative 1988, The Palace Transition Program 1989, and
the scheduled constitutional conference for 18 September 1989. Even
the June 1995 ASMARA Resolutions were reached between the SPLM/A and
the coalition of political forces, which constituted the government
in the third democracy.
n
All war
initiatives were associated with the despotic governments, namely,
1963, 1975, 1983, 1991. The Addis agreement of 1972 was reached
during the second despotic regime, however, it was based on the
homework of the previous democratic government, and the regime which
signed it, proved that it was not consistent with its character by
soon breaking it, and preparing the country for a far worse civil
war 1983 than the one it ended in 1972.
POLICY TOWARDS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
I call for a policy, which is both
effective and legitimate in terms of human rights criteria.
FIRST OF ALL:
That policy should aim at exposing the facts so that the truth is
established in an officially sanctioned way so that the findings
form an authoritative version of events over above partisan
considerations.
SECONDLY,
That policy must in a viable way represent the will of the people.
THIRDLY,
as we shall see, each country will
be affected by its own specific conditions which influence how it
deals with the issue, particularly between conditions which
necessitate measures of clemency, and conditions which demand
prosecution and punishment. In the first case, that of clemency, the
policy should be consistent with the limits imposed on the State by
international law. In the second case, that of prosecution and
punishment, international standards related to truth, treatment of
offenders, and penalties, international standards should be
respected.
Establishing the truth has a
therapeutic effect because in the words of Roger Errera, member of
the French consiel d’etat “memory is the ultimate form of justice
“. It is also a deterrent because “telling the truth about
the past undermines the mental foundation of human rights abuses”.
An important aspect of any
effective policy is to establish a qualified mechanism, for example,
a TRUTH and impeachment commission, which should find the
facts and decide upon their impeachability.
The violations should be
investigated under six categories:
·
Political and constitutional
violations.
·
War crimes.
·
Crimes against humanity.
·
Crimes against individuals.
·
Cultural oppression.
Legislation should regulate the
composition of the truth and impeachment commission, its terms of
reference, the time frame, and its procedures.
Apart from that issue,
constitutional and political violations should be dealt with by a
special court to try the offenders of the May 1969, and June 1989
Juntas.
The truth about the November 1958
coup d’etat will be uncovered by the truth and impeachment
commission, but there should be no prosecution for three reasons: -
FIRSTLY:
The November Junta negotiated the
terms of democratic transformation with the representatives of the
people. Those terms involved amnesty for the coup making.
SECONDLY,
the November Junta was the least abusive of human rights among the
three Juntas.
THIRDLY,
all the November offenders are now dead – accountable to the
Ultimate Judge.
The special court to try the May
1969, and June 1989, offenders should be established by law which
would empower it to prosecute and punish them.
The May offenders have managed to
escape the punishment that they deserve, because they were tried by
an ordinary court of law and because the June 1989 coup decided to
offer them amnesty.
Our own experience in the Sudan
shows that prosecution of coup makers especially for violating the
constitution cannot be decided on abstract principles of justice.
The balance of power and the mode of transfer of power influence
accountability.
General ABBOUD still had official
army support when he decided to respond to the call for democracy.
When his military commanders offered the representatives of the
people to hand over power and allow democratic transformation to
take place in exchange for amnesty and temporary nominal power for
ABBOUD, the representatives of the people unanimously accepted the
deal. Not so with Nimeiri. Responding to the popular uprising of
April 1985, and the specific call for the armed forces to support
the call for democracy, the whole military establishment decided to
expel Nimeiri and terminate his regime without any conditions.
Consequently, the offenders of the
May 1969 Junta were put on trial. Whatever plans we may envisage for
the June 1989 Junta what actually happens to them cannot be decided
before hand on moral and legal grounds only.
S. HUNTINGTON made a study of
democratic transformation in scores of countries. Some
transformation into genuine democracy developed in terms of the
regime’s own decision to democratize. In the case of BRAZIL, for
example, the decision to democratize was the regime’s own decision
without pressure. In many other cases, democratization is the result
of an agreement between the regime and the opposition. In a few
cases. Democracy comes as a result of the overthrow of the despotic
regime. He offered the following guide lines for the would be
democratizes:
If transformation or transplacement
occurred: Do not attempt
to prosecute authoritarian officials for human rights abuses. The
political costs of such an effort will outweigh any moral gains.
If the regime is overthrown:
Prosecute the leaders of
the authoritarian regime promptly (within a year of your coming to
power) while making clear that you will not prosecute middle and
lower ranking officials.
Devise
a means to achieve full and dispassionate public accounting of how
and why the crimes were committed.
Recognize
that on this issue, each alternative presents grave problems, and
that the least unsatisfactory course may well be: do not
prosecute, do not punish, do not forgive, and above all do not
forget.[1]
However, there can be no specific
policy to be decided in anticipation: In Latin America, for example,
almost all-democratic transformations, except in Argentine, have
been accompanied by a law of amnesty. In Africa provisions for
amnesty have also accompanied most of democratic transformations.
The two exceptions being Sudan after the overthrow of Nimeiri in
1985, and Ethiopia after the overthrow of Mengistu in 1991.
There are two conclusions, which
emerge:
If the despotic regime is
overthrown, there is the widest scope for prosecutions and
punishments. No political limits exist to the quest for justice and
retribution.
If democratization comes as a
result of transplacement, i.e. negotiated agreement, some form of
clemency is inevitable. “The issue here is how to settle a past
account without upsetting the present transition “. (KADAR ASMAL,
Chairman of ANC commission, South Africa).
Whatever the mode of
transformation, an authentic version of the TRUTH about the past
must be established.
Certain crimes against individuals,
and compensation for certain violations should not fall within the
terms of amnesty.
However, to day, there is an
emerging international aspect to transitional justice.
One hundred and twenty States have
voted in July 1998 to set up a permanent International Criminal
Court to deal with human rights violations in four categories of
abuse, they are: crimes of aggressive war-making, war crimes, crimes
against Humanity and crimes against Human Rights.
Such a mechanism, when it
materializes will open new horizons and subject human rights
offenders to prosecution and punishment whatever the internal
arrangements of their position may be! Also, the international human
rights constituency has grown enormously with at least 800
internationally active agencies at work. They investigate and
publish information about human rights abuses everywhere. Some of
them are sure to seek to prosecute offenders if a mechanism is
available.
In December 1998, the UMMA Party
appointed a committee to study the entire alternative National and
International possibilities. Action should begin even before
transition arrives.
TRANSITION AND JUSTICE
International charters, and
agreements on Human Rights have a very wide range indeed. The NDA’s
ASMARA Resolutions of June 1995 have made a decisive contribution to
policies and institutions, which should embody a rebirth of the
Sudan, and realize the aspiration of all its peoples. Without
repeating those resolutions, I shall comment on the most Important
aspects of Sudanese renewal, under the following eight headings:
1) Sudanese identity, the
cultural character.
2) Religion and politics.
3) Sustainable democracy.
4) Sustainable economic
development.
5) The armed forces.
6) Decentralization.
7) International relations.
8) Self-determination.
It is a basic conflict over these
issues which led to polarization, violence, and violations in human
rights. Unless the cause is uprooted, the effect will soon follow.
Therefore an approach to Human
Rights in the TRANSITION in Sudan should transcend the static
concept of fact-finding, rectification, and redress for the past
abuses, and espouse the dynamic concept of sustainable Human Rights.
SUDANESE
IDENTITY
THE CULTURAL
CHARTER
Modern Sudanese history was
dominated by two views relating to the cultural dimensions, namely:
1) That the
development of a modern society, modern state, and national unity is
only possible at the cost of transcending inherited cultures, i.e.,
a policy of cultural negation. .
2) That to achieve
National unity, and deter alien acculturation, and build our
authentic identity, the dominant culture should absorb all other
cultural identities i.e., a policy of cultural domination.
Modern history has proven that
attempts to uproot inherited cultures are failures, and indeed
counter productive, for example, Turkey and ALGERIA. The attempt to
impose a dominant culture on other cultures has been resisted,
caused polarization, and civil wars.
International consciousness about
cultural affairs has by-passed such concepts. The reports of the
South Commission1990, mentioned neglect of the cultural aspect as
one of the reasons why development plans have failed. The report of
the International Commission on Culture and Development 1996, cited
the creativity of Human cultural diversity, and advocated Human
cultural rights as the latest addition to the Human Rights
portfolio.
A Sudanese cultural charter is
being worked out to the satisfaction of all Sudan’s cultural
communities.
The following eight points are
suggested for the charter:
n
To
recognize Sudan’s cultural and religious pluralism, to establish a
cultural map for the Sudan, to guarantee the cultural rights of all
the Sudanese communities and to establish mutual recognition and
coexistence between the cultural communities.
n
Development
plans, the media, and educational programs should recognize the
cultural diversity of the Sudan, encourage cultural development, and
accommodate the different cultures in a balanced way.
n
Cultural
policy should be decentralized to make room for regional cultural
identities without compromising the principle of citizenship as the
basis for constitutional rights and duties, and without violating
rights and obligations to the center.
n
Inherited
cultures are not and should not be conceived as static. Recognizing
the importance of cultural identity should not mean the rejection of
cultural contact and exchange.
n
Certain
universal principles and values should be assimilated by all
cultures, they are, democracy, social justice, the pursuit of
knowledge, scientific knowledge, and the values common to
civilizations.
n
To
encourage the enlightened expressions of Islam and Christianity, to
avoid all compulsion in religious matters, to encourage dialogue
between the faiths, and to make room for African spiritual values
which give great concern for relations between MAN and NATURE,
between the rational and the instinctive, and between contemporary
and past generations. The regulation of friendly contact between the
faiths, and proselytization to take place in a climate of tolerance
and voluntary choice.
n
The
recognition of Arabic as the National language and lingua franca.
Recognition of regional languages in their respective regions.
Recognition of English as the first foreign language to facilitate
teaching, training, researches, and contact with the outside world.
n
To encourage inter
African cultural exchanges, Afro-Arab cultural cooperation, and
friendly dialogue between cultures and civilizations to produce a
universal cultural charter as a necessary beam in an enlightened
world order.
Religion has played a vital role in
Sudanese history. The archaeology of the ancient kingdoms of Sudan
in MEROE and NABATA shows the sense of their religious zeal.
Then the Christian kingdoms of
ALWA, and MACOURA ruled Sudan. Then the Islamic kingdoms of FUR,
FUNG, TAGALI, and MUSABBAAT.
Then comes MOHAMAD ALI’S conquest
of the Sudan in 1821.
One of the main reasons for the
NATIONAL Religious revolution in Sudan – The MAHDIA – is the
religious violations of the outgoing government – so called TURKYA.
Then in 1898 came the so-called
Anglo-Egyptian Conquest of the Sudan. At independence, Sudanese
identity reasserted it self in terms of the policies of the
political parties.
Religious identity loomed large in
the programs of the mass political parties. That religious Islamic
association alienated non-Moslems who had their own Christian and
African religious beliefs.
Sudanese political opinion began to
appreciate the need for an agreement to accommodate religious
plurality. Just when a constitutional conference was envisaged in
September 1989 to settle the issue among others, the June 1989 coup
d’etat put the clock back.
The Sudanese are a deeply religious
people, and even when they start with an anti-religious position,
they soon move in the opposite direction, for example, the SPLM/A
expressed Marxist Leninist tendencies at the beginning. However, at
a later date, in 1992, Dr. John Garang took a positive attitude to
religion and called the New Sudan Church Council addressing the
general assembly of the NSCC: ”The spiritual wing of the movement.”[1]
Statements such as the separation
of religion from State, and the separation of religion from politics
emerged in European history at a time when emergent democratic
society faced Church backed obstruction.
As European Statehood matured since
the peace of Westphalia in 1648, and since European and American
Democracy developed and matured in the 19th century, Western
democratic societies found a pragmatic balance between Religion and
State, Religion and Politics. Churches and Religious organizations
are very powerful in western societies. Almost all-European flags
have the Cross in their symbolism.
In Britain, the Queen is both head
of State and Church.
The House of Lords, which is part
of the British legislative and judicial process, has a large number
of Church's Lords. Many powerful western political parties include
the description “Christian “ in their name.
Even in the most glaringly secular
State, the U.S.A, the political clout of religious institutions is
considerable. The current domination of the American Houses of
Congress by the Republican party owes so much to the powerful
support of the Christian fundamentalist groups, pushed into action
by the Clinton administration’s too “Liberal “ policies especially
on abortion. Disgusted by the fall out from the MONICA GATE,
Christian fundamentalist leadership, which has in the first place
insisted on impeaching Clinton and expelling him from office, is now
moving in the opposite direction. Pat Robertson, the prominent
Christian fundamentalist leader has had enough, he declared that
America had other priorities than to deal in scandal. His opinion
may be an important factor in making the Senate settle for an
alternative to a full-blown trial.
The American President is required
to take an oath upon taking office.
Oath taking is required by the
constitution for many transactions. President GEORGE WASHINGTON
said:” Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life,
if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are the
instruments of investigation in courts of justice “.[1]
The most mundane of U.S. articles,
the dollar, bears the inscription:” In God we trust”. How can
religion be separated from State?
The State is people, territory, and
powers: executive, legislative and judiciary. The State has to
recognize the religious beliefs of the people. The State has to
legislate to regulate some aspects of a national religious
community. The courts have to adjudicate in such matters.
Constitutional legal and judiciary procedures involve extensive
oaths, which have a religious content, and so on.
How can politics be
separated from religion?
Genuine religious beliefs influence
the political opinions and principles of citizens. Those who can
separate them are those who really have no religious beliefs. It is
not a question of separation, but of discarding religious beliefs.
To speak about
secularism is also unacceptable, because in essence, secularism is a
philosophy which confines meaning in This Time and This Place, i. e,
worldly significance. It is a word with very rich connotations,
which invite and perpetuate controversy.
What we are really
looking for is not a reduction of religion, but an elevation of
citizenship identity, and protecting it from the encroachment of any
extra-citizenship considerations. We seek to establish:
·
Citizenship as the
basis of constitutional rights and duties.
·
No political
party, which seeks power to the exclusion of others on religious
grounds, should be permitted.
·
There shall be no
discrimination on grounds of religion, race, gender, or culture.
In Summary:
Citizens should be free to pursue
their religious beliefs so long as they do so democratically, and
seek no political or constitutional advantage for themselves as
believers, and recognize the principle that the Nation/State is for
all its citizens, without discrimination. What we shall seek to
establish and protect, are the rights of believers. However, there
are some sections of Sudanese political society, which feel it
necessary to devalue the rights of believers. In May 1998, in
Pennsylvania University, SAYED STEPHEN WANDU, made the following
cute observation:
“Some of the Northern
elites, which call themselves secularists, seek to enhance their
position under the umbrella of identity and cultural pluralism.
After they have failed to find a mass base for their ideology, they
turned their attention Southwards to look for a cover for their
ideology or to persuade Southern elites to accept their ideology to
fight for it on their behalf. Those Northern elites always express
their ideology in extremist terms. They seek to question and vilify
Islamic Arabic civilization, and look for an alternative to it, it
is a counter productive stratagem, because it leads to extremism in
the opposite direction”.
There is no basis in Sudan for
government to be based on dynastic authority.
All attempts to base legitimacy on
dictatorship have been inherently unstable, and have had
catastrophic results. There is no alternative to democracy as a
basis of government in the Sudan.
However, three times democratic
government in the Sudan were subverted. Apart from the general
reasons which tend to undermine democracy in conditions of
under-development, there are eight specific reasons which have to be
tackled to make democracy sustainable, they are:
1. The
continuous civil- war. Even in conditions of mature democratic
systems, several aspects of democracy are suspended during war
conditions. The civil war has influenced democratic governments
negatively, because, it extended military influence, it absorbed
human and material resources diverting them from development and
welfare, it increased security risks and required greater vigilance.
Civil war conditions, especially when it is an extended affair
involving whole regions, tax democratic governments to the utmost
limit, and obstruct their functioning.
2. Democracy
is not simple vote power, which can decide an issue on the basis of
a 51% vote. There are two social forces which the one man one vote
majoritarian system fails to accommodate sufficiently, they are:
·
Modern
social forces which in the underdeveloped stage of the country
constitute a minority, feel that the one man one vote system, does
not give them a voice commensurate with their real social power.
That makes many sections of those modern social forces question the
legitimacy of the one man one vote system.
·
Cultural
minorities which are sufficiently conscious of a separate identity,
and which feel that the majoritarian system somehow constrain them.
·
Democracy
needs to be qualified by certain balancing measures to absorb these
frustrations without seriously undermining the one-man one-vote
basis of representative democracy.
3. Sudanese
mass political parties are influenced by religious and tribal
loyalties. However, they are less sectarian than political parties
in many Middle Eastern countries, and less tribal than many African
parties. A law for political party organization should help make
them more national and more democratic. The less national and less
democratic they are, the less is the legitimacy of their authority.
On the other hand, there are the doctrinaire political parties of
ISLAMICIST, Communist, Arabist, and Africanist disposition. They are
really committed to totalitarian ideologies, and as such constitute
a threat to democracy, because they have used the rights guaranteed
in democracy, to undermine it. Party political reform should aim to
rectify political parties and make them national and democratic.
There will always be differences between political parties because
of the differences in their principles and the social interests they
represent. Such differences are of the essence of democracy.
4. Trade
unions are basic constituents of civil society in a democracy. They
have a legitimate function. They have played quasi- political roles
in the struggle against foreign domination and dictatorship. That
type of national political role is justifiable. Doctrinaire parties
and ambitious individuals have attempted to use them politically to
effect a civil coup against democratically established governments.
This constitutes a threat to democracy and must be politically and
legally contained.
5. Freedom
of the press is a corner stone of democracy. Under the first and
second democracy in the Sudan, the Sudanese press behaved in a
responsible way and constituted viable industry and media organs. In
the third democracy, the press was most irresponsible and played an
important role in undermining democracy. Policy and legislation
should firmly seek to establish a healthy free press. Any failure to
do so will subvert the democratic system.
6. The
Independence of the judiciary is crucial to democracy. The judiciary
should mind the functions of the other organs of state without
abdicating its legitimate power. Its judges should be politically
neutral to avoid making a sham of the independence of the judiciary.
A reform of the judiciary in the light of past experience is
essential to sustainable democracy.
7. The
two most important achievements of modern political development are
the peaceful succession of political power, and the subservience of
the armed forces to the elected civilian command. The Sudanese armed
forces have a tradition of political interventions during which they
were instrumental in sacrificing their own discipline and doing a
disservice to the country. Democracy can only be sustained when the
armed forces are through specific policy measures, and specific
legislation, subordinated to the command of the elected government
and constrained by appropriate means from any coup making
possibility.
8. All
the drawbacks here stated have translated in making democratic
government (the executive) institutionally weak. There are other
reasons in the Sudanese political circumstances, which further
weakened government, if that was possible! Throughout the history of
democratic government in Sudan, no political party was able to win a
majority to enable it to form a government. Parties, therefore,
resorted to coalition making. Coalition government is by definition
weak. It is weakened further by the fact that the coalition partners
in the Sudan share the Cabinet and the Sovereignty or State Council.
The Primeministership goes to the larger party, the Presidency of
the state council goes to the other party. The parliamentary
constitution, which is the basis of the distribution of power
between the organs of the state, requires that all executive power
be in the hands of the cabinet. The council of state, like the
British Queen, reigns but does not govern. This concept is so alien
to indigenous culture, that there is no meaningful Arabic
translation for it. Even if it was not so alien, however, the
smaller party tends to use its position in the Council of State to
compensate for its smaller status in the cabinet.
A continuous weakness, nay, crisis
accompanied executive power in the Sudanese democratic government.
The Sudan, especially under the conditions of decentralization, even
federation, requires a strong executive. It was the federal pattern
of decentralization, which prompted the Founding Fathers of the
American Constitution to seek a strong presidency. Any return to the
institutions of democracy, undermine democracy as defined and
experienced in the Sudan will simply reproduce the crisis, undermine
democracy, and encourage would be coup makers to overthrow it. In
the conditions of the Sudan, a strong executive is an imperative for
sustainable democracy.
SUSTAINABLE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Man does not live by
bread alone, but bread is necessary for his survival, without which
all the other worthy things come to naught. The challenge of
development in the contemporary world is the most serious challenge
which states and societies have to face. So far, for many countries,
the development challenge has not been faced with the determination
and mobilization it requires for lifting itself up from poverty and
misery. A dedicated commitment, in contemporary circumstances to
development is an imperative for human dignity as well as for
patriotism.
Economic development had been
measured in terms of growth in income per head. Sustainable
economic development should be measured, in addition to growth in
income per head of population, in terms of another four criteria,
namely:
(A) The impact of
the growth in incomes on the growth of social welfare, so that it is
reflected in better education, better health, longevity, and all the
accepted welfare criteria.
(B) Development
could be insensitive to environmental issues, squandering natural
resources, and endangering their future. Therefor, development
should safeguard the sustainable utilization of natural resources.
(C) Culture, the
sum total of values, beliefs, attitudes, customs, and patterns of
behavior in a given society is a vital pillar of socio-economic
development. Development strategies, which failed to address the
cultural dimension, have created a climate of apathy, alienation,
and strife. It prepared the ground for reactionary cultural protest.
(D) Failure to
espouse a regionally balanced development strategy fueled regional
grievances and ultimately caused violent conflict, even civil war.
This had an adverse effect upon development.
If and when growth in income per
head is accompanied by positive developments in these four aspects,
the resultant development is what I describe as sustainable
development. Before the onset of the Sudanese totalitarian regimes,
the Sudanese economy was viable in that it produced enough to feed
its population, to realize a social surplus to finance a moderate
degree of development. Production also supplied enough exports to
pay for the necessary imports, and even a balance of payments
surplus. The Sudanese national currency was $ 3.3 to the pound. The
economic policies of the Sudanese democratic regimes were rational
and pragmatic. They could be faulted on matters of omission, they
failed to restructure the economy and cater for sectional and
regional grievances. The economic policies of the Sudanese
totalitarian regimes, on the other hand, committed errors of
commission; they were trigger-happy seeing an effective military
solution to national conflicts. They had to develop enormous
security systems to suppress the civilian population- an internal
war front. Therefore, they expanded military and security
expenditure, to an Nth power to pay for it. That, plus a fall in
production levels in the economic performance of both totalitarian
regimes, resulted in continuous increasing internal and external
financial deficits. They are responsible for the monetary
indiscipline, which led to the huge cancerous expansion in
government indebtedness, and in the volume of money. The financial
and monetary indiscipline reflected itself in the worthlessness of
the National currency. The pound became 0.04 of a cent.
The May regime saddled the country
with the external debt - a monument to its financial folly and its
subservience to foreign manipulation. The two totalitarian systems
were responsible for a doctrinaire attitude to the economy, which
harmed it in both the leftist and rightist expressions.
For a number of decades, Communism
advocated a short cut towards economic development and social
justice. That conception influenced economic thought in much of the
“third world”.
With the collapse of Communism in much of Eastern Europe, the
planned economy fell into disrepute. The swing translated itself
into a pervasive belief in free market fundamentalism. Development
by the state has failed, so the answer is development without the
state. However, such a swing back in the opposite direction is
unwarranted. Development without the state would also fail. Yes, the
state can not fulfill the role of the free market. Nor can the free
market replace the state in its role as development promoter. To
make the free market possible, and to promote development, the state
must secure the following:
·
Create and
maintain the rule of law to ensure the legal basis of society,
protect rights of property, and guard the sanctity of contracts.
·
Establish and
maintain sound macro-economic policies in the financial, monetary,
trade, and investment areas.
·
Promote
micro-economic policies conducive to economic activity.
·
Promote the
development of physical infrastructure in transport, communications,
and energy.
·
Promote the
development of social infrastructure in health, education, and
social security.
·
Seek to redress
regional imbalances.
·
Protect the
vulnerable sections of society.
·
Protect the
environment.
·
Be mindful of
positive association of development with culture.
The free market as promoted and
complemented by this positive economic role for the state, is the
theoretical framework for sustainable development.
THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE
SUDAN
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