Literature

As we approach the coming period of transition, we have got to clear the deck to reveal the truth, expose misconceptions, and lay the ground for conscience clearing, and remedial action, to see that justice is done. In this sense, I herein discuss the issue of Human Rights in Transition. Closely linked to Human Rights, is the notion of Justice when dealing with issues of: identity, religion and politics, sustainable democracy, sustainable economic development, the armed forces, and self-determination.

This section sees the Sudanese second birth in the cradle of human rights, it discusses Human rights, and justice concerning the above mentioned aspects, in the coming period of Transition.

CHAPTER 1

Universal religions and secular ideologies have dealt extensively with the issue of Human Rights. During the first half of the 20^th century, the West has experienced the worst ever violations of Human Rights. Small wonder, therefore, that at the end of the bloodiest experience in the whole of human history, the issue of Human Rights loomed so large and bred the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 10 December 1948. It declared the dignity and equality of human kind, and in 30 articles, spelt out their universal rights.

Then in 1966, the International Community issued the International Agreement on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as detailed in 31 articles. And the International Agreement on Civil and Political Rights, which in 53 articles spelt out the details.

Subsequently, many agreements on specific aspects have been issued, for example, the universal declaration on abolition of discrimination against women in November 1967, and so on. Those documents have since provided the definition of universally recognized Human Rights and the criteria for the civilized behavior of States and societies. Modern states of the UN have extensively signed them, and as extensively violated them.

The Sudan, after independence, signed many of them and lodged reservations[1]. During the nine years of democratic governments, their violation was the exception. During the thirty-two years of despotic governments, their violation was the rule. However, the Sudan suffered a marathon civil war, during which both sides to the conflict violated Human Rights.

An objective survey of Human Rights’ violations in the Sudan would support the following four conclusions:

1. That abuse of Human Rights during the despotic regimes exceeds by far, such violations during democracy.

2. That violations of Human Rights in the three despotic regimes indicate a rising graph: from bad, to worse, to worst.

3. Violations of Human Rights involved all Sudanese citizens, but its incidence on Southern regions and other marginalized regions was worse.

4. The civil war introduced its own dimension of Human Rights violations, in which all parties to the armed conflict were involved.

Following is a list of Human Rights violations in chronological order. It is not an exhaustive list, but includes events which had a durable effect on national memory:

8. The dissolution of the Communist Party and the expulsion of its members of Parliament.

13. The ABA and WADNUBAWI massacres, and the murder of IMAM AL HADI AL MAHDI and his followers in AL KURMUK, 1970.

15. Show trials and tampering with the judiciary, during the second despotism.

16. Betrayal of own constitutional Human Rights provisions, particularly 1972 agreement.

21. Amputations, floggings, in demagogic application of Islamic punishments.

There is a perception, advocated by many, that the story of human rights violations is a one sided track of Northern oppression and Southern victimization. I have already outlined the misdeeds of the different regimes, which governed the Sudan since independence. Northern political forces, which dominated these governments, bear responsibility for them.

However, to put the matter in objective perspective, I offer the following observations: -

FIRST: Much of Northern policies towards the south were negatively influenced by the southern policy initiated by the British colonial administration.

Much Southern perception of the situation sees and condemns the Northern reactions without sufficiently recognizing British culpability.

SECOND: Apart from the issue of Northern bad faith, Southern political ineptness is responsible for failure to represent Southern interests strongly enough especially under democratic conditions. The challenge in Democracy is to be able to organize to serve political ideas and/or interests. Southern society has produced effective military organizations, not so political organizations which are the bread and butter of a democracy. The first Southern party after independence, the Liberal Party was a fragile organization, which had little political clout and allowed its members to be manipulated by other parties. SANU, which had in SAYED WILLIAM DENG an able Statesman, was undermined by the armed military wing, ANYANYA, and after the death of SAYED WILLIAM, no effective leadership or organization succeeded him. The Southern Front, which was composed of a group of competent intellectuals, had not been able to evolve a pattern of leadership and organization. Association with the Nimeiri regime arrested its political evolution. This frustrated and disappointed all those who did political business with it! The numerous parties, which were formed after the 1985 uprising, were locally based quasi-tribal grouping that served as electoral agencies. Even then, they were prone to fragmentation on a personal and tribal basis.

The SPLM/A is an effective organization, but clearly the political identity is absorbed in the military. Its ability to develop a cohesive effective political organization without a military backbone is a future challenge. Unless Southern political opinion forms effective political organization, or joins Northern parties on equitable terms, Southern interests will not be guaranteed under democratic conditions.

THIRD: As a corollary of failure to form effective organizations of political assertion, and more success with military organization, Southern political expression tends to resort hastily to violent means. Violence may be justified in certain circumstances, but to be the norm, it is self-defeating, because it may lead to effective countervailing reaction, and because it becomes a means of settling internal disputes and so fragmentation. The hasty and massive resort to violence in August 1955 did a disservice to Southern interests and stamped South / North relations with a negative character. The same may be said about the shooting down of the two civilian planes immediately after top level negotiations between the Prime Minister of Sudan and the SPLM/A chairman in July 1986. Negotiations, which did not make a breakthrough, but kept the door open for further development of the peace process. The failure to recognize the political and constitutional change, which took place on 6^th April 1985, was a political blunder.

FOURTH: There is a tendency among many Sudanese intellectuals to lump the governments which governed the Sudan together making little distinction between legitimately constituted governments, and the police States created by coups d’etat. Amongst Southern intellectuals and politicians, this failure to distinguish between the two categories of government, portrays the North as one culpable entity united in oppressing the South. No doubt there are common Northern misconceptions about the South, but substantial Southern political opinion branded together two types of Northern dominated governments in an unjustified way. In this context, a well respected Southern intellectual- Politician SAYED ABEL ALIER called his book on the Southern problem “A String of Broken Promises “. The reality is:

· The promise by the political leaders to consider federal status for the South (in 1955) when the country’s constitution is drafted went unfulfilled because the constitution making process was aborted by the 17th November coup d’etat.

· The recommendation of the Twelve- man Committee and the All-party Conference (1967) were rendered fruitless by the 1969 coup d’etat.

In both cases, the Northern party to the agreements and the politicians concerned were immobilized by the new military government. The 1972 peace agreement was reached with Nimeiri. It was essentially reached with an illegally constituted government, and with a “leader" who systemically broke all deals with Northerners and Southerners alike.

n All peace initiatives and tendencies to resolve the civil war by political agreement were associated with democratic governments, namely, the Round Table Conference 1965, the Twelve Man Committee 1966, The All Party Peace Conference 1967, The KOKADAM Declaration 1986, The Sudanese initiative 1988, The Palace Transition Program 1989, and the scheduled constitutional conference for 18 September 1989. Even the June 1995 ASMARA Resolutions were reached between the SPLM/A and the coalition of political forces, which constituted the government in the third democracy.

n All war initiatives were associated with the despotic governments, namely, 1963, 1975, 1983, 1991. The Addis agreement of 1972 was reached during the second despotic regime, however, it was based on the homework of the previous democratic government, and the regime which signed it, proved that it was not consistent with its character by soon breaking it, and preparing the country for a far worse civil war 1983 than the one it ended in 1972.

I call for a policy, which is both effective and legitimate in terms of human rights criteria.

FIRST OF ALL: That policy should aim at exposing the facts so that the truth is established in an officially sanctioned way so that the findings form an authoritative version of events over above partisan considerations.

SECONDLY, That policy must in a viable way represent the will of the people.

THIRDLY, as we shall see, each country will be affected by its own specific conditions which influence how it deals with the issue, particularly between conditions which necessitate measures of clemency, and conditions which demand prosecution and punishment. In the first case, that of clemency, the policy should be consistent with the limits imposed on the State by international law. In the second case, that of prosecution and punishment, international standards related to truth, treatment of offenders, and penalties, international standards should be respected.

Establishing the truth has a therapeutic effect because in the words of Roger Errera, member of the French consiel d’etat “memory is the ultimate form of justice “. It is also a deterrent because “telling the truth about the past undermines the mental foundation of human rights abuses”.

An important aspect of any effective policy is to establish a qualified mechanism, for example, a TRUTH and impeachment commission, which should find the facts and decide upon their impeachability.

Legislation should regulate the composition of the truth and impeachment commission, its terms of reference, the time frame, and its procedures.

Apart from that issue, constitutional and political violations should be dealt with by a special court to try the offenders of the May 1969, and June 1989 Juntas.

The truth about the November 1958 coup d’etat will be uncovered by the truth and impeachment commission, but there should be no prosecution for three reasons: -

FIRSTLY: The November Junta negotiated the terms of democratic transformation with the representatives of the people. Those terms involved amnesty for the coup making.

SECONDLY, the November Junta was the least abusive of human rights among the three Juntas.

THIRDLY, all the November offenders are now dead – accountable to the Ultimate Judge.

The special court to try the May 1969, and June 1989, offenders should be established by law which would empower it to prosecute and punish them.

The May offenders have managed to escape the punishment that they deserve, because they were tried by an ordinary court of law and because the June 1989 coup decided to offer them amnesty.

Our own experience in the Sudan shows that prosecution of coup makers especially for violating the constitution cannot be decided on abstract principles of justice. The balance of power and the mode of transfer of power influence accountability.

General ABBOUD still had official army support when he decided to respond to the call for democracy. When his military commanders offered the representatives of the people to hand over power and allow democratic transformation to take place in exchange for amnesty and temporary nominal power for ABBOUD, the representatives of the people unanimously accepted the deal. Not so with Nimeiri. Responding to the popular uprising of April 1985, and the specific call for the armed forces to support the call for democracy, the whole military establishment decided to expel Nimeiri and terminate his regime without any conditions.

Consequently, the offenders of the May 1969 Junta were put on trial. Whatever plans we may envisage for the June 1989 Junta what actually happens to them cannot be decided before hand on moral and legal grounds only.

S. HUNTINGTON made a study of democratic transformation in scores of countries. Some transformation into genuine democracy developed in terms of the regime’s own decision to democratize. In the case of BRAZIL, for example, the decision to democratize was the regime’s own decision without pressure. In many other cases, democratization is the result of an agreement between the regime and the opposition. In a few cases. Democracy comes as a result of the overthrow of the despotic regime. He offered the following guide lines for the would be democratizes:

If transformation or transplacement occurred: Do not attempt to prosecute authoritarian officials for human rights abuses. The political costs of such an effort will outweigh any moral gains.

If the regime is overthrown: Prosecute the leaders of the authoritarian regime promptly (within a year of your coming to power) while making clear that you will not prosecute middle and lower ranking officials.

Devise a means to achieve full and dispassionate public accounting of how and why the crimes were committed.

Recognize that on this issue, each alternative presents grave problems, and that the least unsatisfactory course may well be: do not prosecute, do not punish, do not forgive, and above all do not forget.[2][1]

However, there can be no specific policy to be decided in anticipation: In Latin America, for example, almost all-democratic transformations, except in Argentine, have been accompanied by a law of amnesty. In Africa provisions for amnesty have also accompanied most of democratic transformations. The two exceptions being Sudan after the overthrow of Nimeiri in 1985, and Ethiopia after the overthrow of Mengistu in 1991.

If the despotic regime is overthrown, there is the widest scope for prosecutions and punishments. No political limits exist to the quest for justice and retribution.

If democratization comes as a result of transplacement, i.e. negotiated agreement, some form of clemency is inevitable. “The issue here is how to settle a past account without upsetting the present transition “. (KADAR ASMAL, Chairman of ANC commission, South Africa).

Whatever the mode of transformation, an authentic version of the TRUTH about the past must be established.

Certain crimes against individuals, and compensation for certain violations should not fall within the terms of amnesty.

However, to day, there is an emerging international aspect to transitional justice.

One hundred and twenty States have voted in July 1998 to set up a permanent International Criminal Court to deal with human rights violations in four categories of abuse, they are: crimes of aggressive war-making, war crimes, crimes against Humanity and crimes against Human Rights.

Such a mechanism, when it materializes will open new horizons and subject human rights offenders to prosecution and punishment whatever the internal arrangements of their position may be! Also, the international human rights constituency has grown enormously with at least 800 internationally active agencies at work. They investigate and publish information about human rights abuses everywhere. Some of them are sure to seek to prosecute offenders if a mechanism is available.

In December 1998, the UMMA Party appointed a committee to study the entire alternative National and International possibilities. Action should begin even before transition arrives.

CHAPTER 2

International charters, and agreements on Human Rights have a very wide range indeed. The NDA’s ASMARA Resolutions of June 1995 have made a decisive contribution to policies and institutions, which should embody a rebirth of the Sudan, and realize the aspiration of all its peoples. Without repeating those resolutions, I shall comment on the most Important aspects of Sudanese renewal, under the following eight headings:

It is a basic conflict over these issues which led to polarization, violence, and violations in human rights. Unless the cause is uprooted, the effect will soon follow.

Therefore an approach to Human Rights in the TRANSITION in Sudan should transcend the static concept of fact-finding, rectification, and redress for the past abuses, and espouse the dynamic concept of sustainable Human Rights.

Modern Sudanese history was dominated by two views relating to the cultural dimensions, namely:

1) That the development of a modern society, modern state, and national unity is only possible at the cost of transcending inherited cultures, i.e., a policy of cultural negation. .

2) That to achieve National unity, and deter alien acculturation, and build our authentic identity, the dominant culture should absorb all other cultural identities i.e., a policy of cultural domination.

Modern history has proven that attempts to uproot inherited cultures are failures, and indeed counter productive, for example, Turkey and ALGERIA. The attempt to impose a dominant culture on other cultures has been resisted, caused polarization, and civil wars.

International consciousness about cultural affairs has by-passed such concepts. The reports of the South Commission1990, mentioned neglect of the cultural aspect as one of the reasons why development plans have failed. The report of the International Commission on Culture and Development 1996, cited the creativity of Human cultural diversity, and advocated Human cultural rights as the latest addition to the Human Rights portfolio.

A Sudanese cultural charter is being worked out to the satisfaction of all Sudan’s cultural communities.

n To recognize Sudan’s cultural and religious pluralism, to establish a cultural map for the Sudan, to guarantee the cultural rights of all the Sudanese communities and to establish mutual recognition and coexistence between the cultural communities.

n Development plans, the media, and educational programs should recognize the cultural diversity of the Sudan, encourage cultural development, and accommodate the different cultures in a balanced way.

n Cultural policy should be decentralized to make room for regional cultural identities without compromising the principle of citizenship as the basis for constitutional rights and duties, and without violating rights and obligations to the center.

n Inherited cultures are not and should not be conceived as static. Recognizing the importance of cultural identity should not mean the rejection of cultural contact and exchange.

n Certain universal principles and values should be assimilated by all cultures, they are, democracy, social justice, the pursuit of knowledge, scientific knowledge, and the values common to civilizations.

n To encourage the enlightened expressions of Islam and Christianity, to avoid all compulsion in religious matters, to encourage dialogue between the faiths, and to make room for African spiritual values which give great concern for relations between MAN and NATURE, between the rational and the instinctive, and between contemporary and past generations. The regulation of friendly contact between the faiths, and proselytization to take place in a climate of tolerance and voluntary choice.

n The recognition of Arabic as the National language and lingua franca. Recognition of regional languages in their respective regions. Recognition of English as the first foreign language to facilitate teaching, training, researches, and contact with the outside world.

n To encourage inter African cultural exchanges, Afro-Arab cultural cooperation, and friendly dialogue between cultures and civilizations to produce a universal cultural charter as a necessary beam in an enlightened world order.

Religion has played a vital role in Sudanese history. The archaeology of the ancient kingdoms of Sudan in MEROE and NABATA shows the sense of their religious zeal.

Then the Christian kingdoms of ALWA, and MACOURA ruled Sudan. Then the Islamic kingdoms of FUR, FUNG, TAGALI, and MUSABBAAT.

One of the main reasons for the NATIONAL Religious revolution in Sudan – The MAHDIA – is the religious violations of the outgoing government – so called TURKYA.

Then in 1898 came the so-called Anglo-Egyptian Conquest of the Sudan. At independence, Sudanese identity reasserted it self in terms of the policies of the political parties.

Religious identity loomed large in the programs of the mass political parties. That religious Islamic association alienated non-Moslems who had their own Christian and African religious beliefs.

Sudanese political opinion began to appreciate the need for an agreement to accommodate religious plurality. Just when a constitutional conference was envisaged in September 1989 to settle the issue among others, the June 1989 coup d’etat put the clock back.

The Sudanese are a deeply religious people, and even when they start with an anti-religious position, they soon move in the opposite direction, for example, the SPLM/A expressed Marxist Leninist tendencies at the beginning. However, at a later date, in 1992, Dr. John Garang took a positive attitude to religion and called the New Sudan Church Council addressing the general assembly of the NSCC: ”The spiritual wing of the movement.”[3][1]

Statements such as the separation of religion from State, and the separation of religion from politics emerged in European history at a time when emergent democratic society faced Church backed obstruction.

As European Statehood matured since the peace of Westphalia in 1648, and since European and American Democracy developed and matured in the 19th century, Western democratic societies found a pragmatic balance between Religion and State, Religion and Politics. Churches and Religious organizations are very powerful in western societies. Almost all-European flags have the Cross in their symbolism.

The House of Lords, which is part of the British legislative and judicial process, has a large number of Church's Lords. Many powerful western political parties include the description “Christian “ in their name.

Even in the most glaringly secular State, the U.S.A, the political clout of religious institutions is considerable. The current domination of the American Houses of Congress by the Republican party owes so much to the powerful support of the Christian fundamentalist groups, pushed into action by the Clinton administration’s too “Liberal “ policies especially on abortion. Disgusted by the fall out from the MONICA GATE, Christian fundamentalist leadership, which has in the first place insisted on impeaching Clinton and expelling him from office, is now moving in the opposite direction. Pat Robertson, the prominent Christian fundamentalist leader has had enough, he declared that America had other priorities than to deal in scandal. His opinion may be an important factor in making the Senate settle for an alternative to a full-blown trial.

Oath taking is required by the constitution for many transactions. President GEORGE WASHINGTON said:” Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice “.[4][1]

The most mundane of U.S. articles, the dollar, bears the inscription:” In God we trust”. How can religion be separated from State?

The State is people, territory, and powers: executive, legislative and judiciary. The State has to recognize the religious beliefs of the people. The State has to legislate to regulate some aspects of a national religious community. The courts have to adjudicate in such matters. Constitutional legal and judiciary procedures involve extensive oaths, which have a religious content, and so on.

Genuine religious beliefs influence the political opinions and principles of citizens. Those who can separate them are those who really have no religious beliefs. It is not a question of separation, but of discarding religious beliefs.

To speak about secularism is also unacceptable, because in essence, secularism is a philosophy which confines meaning in This Time and This Place, i. e, worldly significance. It is a word with very rich connotations, which invite and perpetuate controversy.

What we are really looking for is not a reduction of religion, but an elevation of citizenship identity, and protecting it from the encroachment of any extra-citizenship considerations. We seek to establish:

· No political party, which seeks power to the exclusion of others on religious grounds, should be permitted.

· There shall be no discrimination on grounds of religion, race, gender, or culture.

In Summary: Citizens should be free to pursue their religious beliefs so long as they do so democratically, and seek no political or constitutional advantage for themselves as believers, and recognize the principle that the Nation/State is for all its citizens, without discrimination. What we shall seek to establish and protect, are the rights of believers. However, there are some sections of Sudanese political society, which feel it necessary to devalue the rights of believers. In May 1998, in Pennsylvania University, SAYED STEPHEN WANDU, made the following cute observation: “Some of the Northern elites, which call themselves secularists, seek to enhance their position under the umbrella of identity and cultural pluralism. After they have failed to find a mass base for their ideology, they turned their attention Southwards to look for a cover for their ideology or to persuade Southern elites to accept their ideology to fight for it on their behalf. Those Northern elites always express their ideology in extremist terms. They seek to question and vilify Islamic Arabic civilization, and look for an alternative to it, it is a counter productive stratagem, because it leads to extremism in the opposite direction”.

All attempts to base legitimacy on dictatorship have been inherently unstable, and have had catastrophic results. There is no alternative to democracy as a basis of government in the Sudan.

However, three times democratic government in the Sudan were subverted. Apart from the general reasons which tend to undermine democracy in conditions of under-development, there are eight specific reasons which have to be tackled to make democracy sustainable, they are:

1. The continuous civil- war. Even in conditions of mature democratic systems, several aspects of democracy are suspended during war conditions. The civil war has influenced democratic governments negatively, because, it extended military influence, it absorbed human and material resources diverting them from development and welfare, it increased security risks and required greater vigilance. Civil war conditions, especially when it is an extended affair involving whole regions, tax democratic governments to the utmost limit, and obstruct their functioning.

2. Democracy is not simple vote power, which can decide an issue on the basis of a 51% vote. There are two social forces which the one man one vote majoritarian system fails to accommodate sufficiently, they are:

· Modern social forces which in the underdeveloped stage of the country constitute a minority, feel that the one man one vote system, does not give them a voice commensurate with their real social power. That makes many sections of those modern social forces question the legitimacy of the one man one vote system.

· Cultural minorities which are sufficiently conscious of a separate identity, and which feel that the majoritarian system somehow constrain them.

· Democracy needs to be qualified by certain balancing measures to absorb these frustrations without seriously undermining the one-man one-vote basis of representative democracy.

3. Sudanese mass political parties are influenced by religious and tribal loyalties. However, they are less sectarian than political parties in many Middle Eastern countries, and less tribal than many African parties. A law for political party organization should help make them more national and more democratic. The less national and less democratic they are, the less is the legitimacy of their authority. On the other hand, there are the doctrinaire political parties of ISLAMICIST, Communist, Arabist, and Africanist disposition. They are really committed to totalitarian ideologies, and as such constitute a threat to democracy, because they have used the rights guaranteed in democracy, to undermine it. Party political reform should aim to rectify political parties and make them national and democratic. There will always be differences between political parties because of the differences in their principles and the social interests they represent. Such differences are of the essence of democracy.

4. Trade unions are basic constituents of civil society in a democracy. They have a legitimate function. They have played quasi- political roles in the struggle against foreign domination and dictatorship. That type of national political role is justifiable. Doctrinaire parties and ambitious individuals have attempted to use them politically to effect a civil coup against democratically established governments. This constitutes a threat to democracy and must be politically and legally contained.

5. Freedom of the press is a corner stone of democracy. Under the first and second democracy in the Sudan, the Sudanese press behaved in a responsible way and constituted viable industry and media organs. In the third democracy, the press was most irresponsible and played an important role in undermining democracy. Policy and legislation should firmly seek to establish a healthy free press. Any failure to do so will subvert the democratic system.

6. The Independence of the judiciary is crucial to democracy. The judiciary should mind the functions of the other organs of state without abdicating its legitimate power. Its judges should be politically neutral to avoid making a sham of the independence of the judiciary. A reform of the judiciary in the light of past experience is essential to sustainable democracy.

7. The two most important achievements of modern political development are the peaceful succession of political power, and the subservience of the armed forces to the elected civilian command. The Sudanese armed forces have a tradition of political interventions during which they were instrumental in sacrificing their own discipline and doing a disservice to the country. Democracy can only be sustained when the armed forces are through specific policy measures, and specific legislation, subordinated to the command of the elected government and constrained by appropriate means from any coup making possibility.

8. All the drawbacks here stated have translated in making democratic government (the executive) institutionally weak. There are other reasons in the Sudanese political circumstances, which further weakened government, if that was possible! Throughout the history of democratic government in Sudan, no political party was able to win a majority to enable it to form a government. Parties, therefore, resorted to coalition making. Coalition government is by definition weak. It is weakened further by the fact that the coalition partners in the Sudan share the Cabinet and the Sovereignty or State Council. The Primeministership goes to the larger party, the Presidency of the state council goes to the other party. The parliamentary constitution, which is the basis of the distribution of power between the organs of the state, requires that all executive power be in the hands of the cabinet. The council of state, like the British Queen, reigns but does not govern. This concept is so alien to indigenous culture, that there is no meaningful Arabic translation for it. Even if it was not so alien, however, the smaller party tends to use its position in the Council of State to compensate for its smaller status in the cabinet.

A continuous weakness, nay, crisis accompanied executive power in the Sudanese democratic government. The Sudan, especially under the conditions of decentralization, even federation, requires a strong executive. It was the federal pattern of decentralization, which prompted the Founding Fathers of the American Constitution to seek a strong presidency. Any return to the institutions of democracy, undermine democracy as defined and experienced in the Sudan will simply reproduce the crisis, undermine democracy, and encourage would be coup makers to overthrow it. In the conditions of the Sudan, a strong executive is an imperative for sustainable democracy.

Man does not live by bread alone, but bread is necessary for his survival, without which all the other worthy things come to naught. The challenge of development in the contemporary world is the most serious challenge which states and societies have to face. So far, for many countries, the development challenge has not been faced with the determination and mobilization it requires for lifting itself up from poverty and misery. A dedicated commitment, in contemporary circumstances to development is an imperative for human dignity as well as for patriotism.

Economic development had been measured in terms of growth in income per head. Sustainable economic development should be measured, in addition to growth in income per head of population, in terms of another four criteria, namely:

(A) The impact of the growth in incomes on the growth of social welfare, so that it is reflected in better education, better health, longevity, and all the accepted welfare criteria.

(B) Development could be insensitive to environmental issues, squandering natural resources, and endangering their future. Therefor, development should safeguard the sustainable utilization of natural resources.

(C) Culture, the sum total of values, beliefs, attitudes, customs, and patterns of behavior in a given society is a vital pillar of socio-economic development. Development strategies, which failed to address the cultural dimension, have created a climate of apathy, alienation, and strife. It prepared the ground for reactionary cultural protest.

(D) Failure to espouse a regionally balanced development strategy fueled regional grievances and ultimately caused violent conflict, even civil war. This had an adverse effect upon development.

If and when growth in income per head is accompanied by positive developments in these four aspects, the resultant development is what I describe as sustainable development. Before the onset of the Sudanese totalitarian regimes, the Sudanese economy was viable in that it produced enough to feed its population, to realize a social surplus to finance a moderate degree of development. Production also supplied enough exports to pay for the necessary imports, and even a balance of payments surplus. The Sudanese national currency was $ 3.3 to the pound. The economic policies of the Sudanese democratic regimes were rational and pragmatic. They could be faulted on matters of omission, they failed to restructure the economy and cater for sectional and regional grievances. The economic policies of the Sudanese totalitarian regimes, on the other hand, committed errors of commission; they were trigger-happy seeing an effective military solution to national conflicts. They had to develop enormous security systems to suppress the civilian population- an internal war front. Therefore, they expanded military and security expenditure, to an Nth power to pay for it. That, plus a fall in production levels in the economic performance of both totalitarian regimes, resulted in continuous increasing internal and external financial deficits. They are responsible for the monetary indiscipline, which led to the huge cancerous expansion in government indebtedness, and in the volume of money. The financial and monetary indiscipline reflected itself in the worthlessness of the National currency. The pound became 0.04 of a cent.

The May regime saddled the country with the external debt - a monument to its financial folly and its subservience to foreign manipulation. The two totalitarian systems were responsible for a doctrinaire attitude to the economy, which harmed it in both the leftist and rightist expressions.

For a number of decades, Communism advocated a short cut towards economic development and social justice. That conception influenced economic thought in much of the “third world”. With the collapse of Communism in much of Eastern Europe, the planned economy fell into disrepute. The swing translated itself into a pervasive belief in free market fundamentalism. Development by the state has failed, so the answer is development without the state. However, such a swing back in the opposite direction is unwarranted. Development without the state would also fail. Yes, the state can not fulfill the role of the free market. Nor can the free market replace the state in its role as development promoter. To make the free market possible, and to promote development, the state must secure the following:

· Create and maintain the rule of law to ensure the legal basis of society, protect rights of property, and guard the sanctity of contracts.

· Establish and maintain sound macro-economic policies in the financial, monetary, trade, and investment areas.

· Promote the development of physical infrastructure in transport, communications, and energy.

· Promote the development of social infrastructure in health, education, and social security.

The free market as promoted and complemented by this positive economic role for the state, is the theoretical framework for sustainable development.

(A) A third of the enormous land area of the Sudan is cultivable, it is supplied with water from three sources: rivers, seasonal rains, and ground water.

(B) The country has extensive natural grazing areas and forests. The graze land sustains a huge animal population: camels, cows, sheep, and goats amount to 100 million heads.

(C) Mineral wealth: gold, silver, bauxite, tin, copper, zinc, iron ore, manganese, lead, and others. Plus constructional minerals: granite, marble, gypsum, and others.

(E) The country’s industrial capacity is enormous. Already capital formation in industry is worth more than eight billion dollars. (Current production levels are far below capacity).

(F) The Sudanese expatriate capital is enormous. My estimate is $70 billion.

First: The country’s human resources. The Sudan has a rich endowment of professionals, technicians, artists, teachers and so on. At present, the majority is expatriated. However, in many cases, the expatriation of many of them is a temporary affair. Many of them could be repatriated in appropriate circumstances. The Sudanese traditional sector is another fund of human resources. It could play a decisive role in development. In fact, these two sectors: the expatriate Sudanese, and the traditional sector of the economy, have of late kept the Sudanese economy afloat. Their relative distance from the impact of the central government in Khartoum protected them from its destructive policies.

Second: the enormous regional and international good will for the Sudan, which is of great potential value. During the third democracy, and in spite of cold war conditions, and Sudan’s genuinely non-aliened policy at the time, and the negative attitudes of the leaders of the West towards the third democracy in the Sudan, most of the O.E.C.D states, particularly the Netherlands, Japan, Italy, Germany, Canada, Finland, Britain and others have contributed generously to development aid in the Sudan -the exceptions amongst the developed countries were USA and France.

The contribution of development aid to Sudan by many Gulf states was even more generous. The total amount of development aid was $3.5 billion.

As soon as conditions permit a radical change of economic policy in the Sudan, the following measures have to be effected:

A. The establishment of financial discipline. From the expenditure side: Termination of the excess military and security expenditures necessitated by the totalitarian nature of the regime. The same goes for the elaborate tiers of administration, which have inflated expenditure without any sense. From the revenue side: reform of the taxation system to make its flow consistent with acceptable levels, to enhance its equity, to eliminate double taxation, and to coordinate central and regional taxation.

B. The establishment of monetary discipline. To restore the leadership role of the central Bank, reform the banking system to banish partisan manipulation. To apply measures aimed at siphoning the enormous volume of money, along with other reforms to restore the value of national currency.

C. The rehabilitation of existing, agricultural, industrial, and public utility assets, and the provision of necessary inputs for production.

D. For several objective reasons, we have to appeal for forgiving the external debt.

E. The rehabilitation of war affected areas especially productive capacity, social infrastructure. And the resettlement of the displaced persons.

Some current economic policies have a sound basis and should be continued and reformed. They are:

1. The decontrol of prices and the elimination of subsidies to free the market. The policy was applied without any attempt to mitigate the plight of the most vulnerable social groups. This should be rectified.

2. Privatization is another policy towards a free market economy. However, public economic enterprise, per se, is not uneconomic. Before the catastrophic May regime, the public sector in the Sudanese economy was profitable paying almost 50% of the government budget out of its surpluses. It was the demagogic socialism of the regime, which expanded and deformed the public sector, and plunged it into debt. Some aspects of the economy would continue as public enterprises. However, the bulk of agricultural, industrial, trade, and services activity should be privatized. The privatization carried out by the Act of 1992 is a misnomer. The assets involved were undervalued, and they were sold under the counter without proper marketing measures. The whole program should be reviewed.

n Instability of macro-economic policies, insecurity of property rights, and a flood of arbitrary measures. This undermined confidence in the national economy.

n Almost complete break in the country’s external economic relations. Consequently, the Khartoum Stock Exchange is no more than a shadow stock market.

There is now a fund of rich development experiences, which could be consulted with advantage. They are:

1. Successful agricultural policies which raised the level of agricultural productivity enormously, for example, India and Egypt.

2. Focus on income generating activities in rural areas through development of traditional sector, promotion of cooperatives, and grass roots community projects, for example, India and Bangladesh.

3. Successful industrial policies, which have had a positive impact on industrial production, for example, East Asian countries.

4. The promotion of the export sector of the economy in terms of quality control, marketing, and trade finance, for example, Egypt and Tunis.

It was believed that economic development initially involves sacrifices in terms of social services. Recent experiences, especially in South East Asia, proved otherwise, that investment in social services means investment in human capital and is most rewarding in development.

· Expenditure diverted towards higher education at the cost of general and technical education.

· School curricula reflect the narrow ideological basis of the regime, which would accentuate cultural alienation and conflict.

· The educational policy of the regime is completely insensitive to economic development.

· There are now 30 universities in the Sudan, many of them just labels. Even the older universities have been abused by the so-called “ educational revolution”. The principal of Khartoum university said that its budget before that ” revolution” was worth $12 million, and after it, its worth became $1 million!

The Sudanese Academicians’ Association organized a conference on higher education in Cairo in 1998. There are national conferences on general and technical education scheduled. The analyses and recommendations of these conferences should be put to a commission on education, to review the whole educational plan and curricula, and issue a blue print for educational reform abiding by the following directives:

a- Education is a comprehensive endeavor aiming at: the dissemination of knowledge, of values, and of technology. It should educate people and train them in all walks of life, for the whole duration of life.

e- To decide the optimum mix between government and private responsibility for education, and abide by decentralization.

Health services in Sudan have collapsed. The deterioration in preventive health care is even worse. An updated national comprehensive strategy for primary health care and the provision of health for all (should be taken). It should aim to control and eliminate endemic and epidemic diseases and malnutrition, achieve 100% immunization, reduce infant mortality, and provide specialized medical facilities strategy under the guide lines of the World Health Organization (W.H.O) and the special requirements of the Sudan, for example, the expansion of rural health networks in order to ensure equitable distribution of health resources, and a program to repatriate the considerable health personnel should be covered by the National Health conference.

A National commission on health should be set up to execute the recommendations of the national health conference.

Sudan to day suffers from soil degradation, encroaching desertification. There is no meaningful land use policy and no comprehensive natural resource framework to govern the planning, monitoring, and control the ecosystems. The deterioration in administration and the conditions imposed by the circumstances of the civil war have resulted in almost total neglect of the natural environment. A national environment conference should be held to lay down a national environmental action plan guided by the recommendation of the UN conference on environment and development, agenda 21, 1992, and Sudan’s special environmental problems. A national commission on environment and natural resources should be formed to formulate a blue print for the environment.

The three national commissions, on education, health, and the environment, should be fed by the appropriate national conferences, lay down the respective blue prints, and be established under the country’s top executive.

The reforms here envisaged will get nowhere without radical reform of the Civil Service. The present Khartoum regime has politically manipulated the Civil Service. A radical reform program for the civil service should be initiated, the partisan aspects eliminated, and the implications of the decentralization built into the system.

Labor legislation and trade union organization have been politically tampered with by the Khartoum regime. The most important disservice to the civil service and labor is the effect of inflation on wages and salaries. There is a need for a new wages policy, new labor laws, and a new system for trade union organization. Without such radical measures, it is not possible to realize social peace, and in democratic conditions, the stability required for economic development will be absent!

Closely associated with civil service and labor reform is the issue of corruption. Corruption is the other side of the coin of dictatorship. Dictatorship means power without accountability. “Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”!

Development requires protection from theft, protection from violence, protection from arbitrary measures, and a neutral fair judicial system. There is a positive link between absence of corruption and development. Transparency enhanced International consciousness about this factor. Sudan was relatively corruption-free. That state should be restored.

There are several important infra-structural schemes, roads, especially the Southern and Western highways, dams, especially raising ROSEIRIS, SETIT, and HAMADAB, schemes to increase the discharge of the Nile and so on. A comprehensive plan mapping and deciding the priorities of the infra-structural schemes should be established.

I have outlined a call for sustainable development. The legitimate political authority, which is committed to sustainable development, should phase out its implementation policies in three phases:

Phase one, short run: The first year of that policy would be a year of intensive care and involve life saving measures.

Phase two, medium run: The next three years will concentrate on rehabilitation, resettlement, eliminating the effects of war, dispensing with the relics of the totalitarian regime, and fine tuning the development oriented reforms.

Phase three, long run: The third phase will aim at achieving the goals of sustainable development.

The present economic predicament has put the survival of the Sudanese State at stake. Sustainable economic development is now imperative to save the Sudan from collapse. It is also necessary to guarantee peace and stability in its future.

At present, the country is so impoverished; it will be unable to pull itself from its own bootstraps.

The potential sources of finance for the sustainable development program are:

In 1987, when the effects of war endangered the survival of many Sudanese nationals, I addressed the UNISEF to hold an extra-ordinary conference in Khartoum to convene all the NGO’S concerned, and the UN agencies. The director of the UNISEF responded positively and held a conference in Khartoum. I addressed them with the size of the problem and suggested what we could do in terms of our own contribution, and the facilities we would make. The conference studied the situation and responded very positively.

The recommendations of the conference, which were subsequently accepted by the SPLA without qualification formed the SUDAN LIFELINE.

In 1988, after the extra-ordinary rains and floods devastated the country, my government mobilized its central and regional departments to make a thorough study of the damage in the capital and the rest of the country.

We then addressed the World Bank to help. The World Bank responded positively. Under its auspices we held a conference in Khartoum and presented it with a rehabilitation program.

The conference responded with nearly half a billion dollars fund, 10% of which to be contributed by the government of Sudan.

That is how the Sudan, at the time, turned the devastation to advantage and executed a highly successful rehabilitation program.

The humanitarian war calamity of 1987, and the devastation of 1988 due to natural causes, are small scale compared to the present devastation of the economy of the Sudan.

When the Sudan is liberated from those who caused that devastation, an extraordinary conference under the auspices of the World Bank should be convened to be attended by representatives of all the above listed potential sources of finance to consider our program for sustainable development and ear mark their expected contributions.

In the past, the legitimacy of government was based on dynastic, charismatic, or ideological foundation.

In these circumstances the armed forces were subservient to the legitimate authority. When the said states suffered decline, and the basis of legitimacy was eroded, authority fell into the hands of the military.

It organized the Sudan Defense Force to defend the country. After independence the S.D.F became the armed forces for the independent Sudan.

Several factors have conspired to erode constitutional legitimacy in the newly independent states. This tempted adventurous civilian elements to use the armed forces as a short cut to power, or the armed forces grabed power for themselves. This type of coup making became pervasive in the third world, especially in Latin America where over a thousand coups took place since the second world war. In time, the countries of Latin America realized that military government is harmful because: -

Preoccupation with political matters deprives the military from the needed continuous training and up dating.

Military culture cannot be reconciled with the flexibility required for political and diplomatic culture.

The experience of the military in politics, in the third world ushered into three patterns: -

A political system under some type of continuous military supervision, for example, Turkey.

The subordination of the military to the elected civilian authority (in the pattern of the Western experience) as in VENZUEELA and ARGENTINA.

The British who organized the S.D.F never intended it to be a National organization. The bulk of rank and file of armed forces were drawn from the Western Sudan, especially non-ANSAR tribes.

The officer class was drawn from Northern tribes, especially KHATMYYA tribes. The regional commands were recruited locally reflecting the regional ethnic composition.

Nevertheless, the armed forces of Sudan aspired to be described as a National institution. However, whatever creditability there was in that aspiration, was wiped out by two factors:

FIRST: Its involvement in a long drawn civil war, which polarized Sudanese society and reflected that polarization on the armed forces.

SECOND: The attempts of the May regime to polarize the armed forces in its favor. Then followed the more systematic politicization of the NIF regime.

On the other hand, all the opposing political forces in the Sudan have formed military organizations to stand up to oppression. Therefore, it is fair to say:

Although the majority of officers were not coup minded, the officer class became infested with coup making operations which rendered them vulnerable to political manipulation.

Therefore, the composition of the armed forces could reflect the multi-cultural reality of Sudanese society, or alternatively, become a vehicle of compulsory acculturation. Also it could support the democratic character of government, or alternatively, become the number one threat to it.

The following principles are necessary to ensure a balanced composition of the armed forces of Sudan to ensure balanced cultural relations, and to protect democracy from military predators:

· To establish and maintain highly trained armed forces, under a cohesive and able command, but relying for expansion of its base on the civilian population.

· A compulsory national military service to ensure the availability of a supply of soldiers when necessary for the country’s defense.

· To discipline the armed forces to give allegiance to the democratic system and to take their orders from the elected representatives of the people.

· Total isolation of the armed forces from the process of political competition.

· Maximum economic utilization of armed forces and organization of productive and commercial activities for their benefit.

· Strict regulation of the functions of all the armed forces, especially, the police.

· The realization of cultural balance within the armed forces as a true mirror of the Sudanese society.

· The dedication of the armed forces for the function of defense distant from any policing activities.

· To confine the duties of internal security to the police and public prosecution.

· Internal and external intelligence to be carried out by specialized organizations that gather information without executive powers.

· The establishment of checks and balances to guard against military coups d’etat.

These principles are part and parcel of the package for sustainable human rights.

The huge geographical size of the Sudan and its cultural diversity, make constitutional and administrative decentralization imperative.

The ASMARA resolutions 1995 have established a division of powers between the South and the center. There is a need for a general system of decentralization for the whole country.

However, Sudan’s experience with decentralization whatever the intentions on paper, has been unsuccessful.

The main reason for that is the fact that most revenue through customs goes to the central government. Also, the existing productive capacity is not evenly distributed. Consequently, the regional units have insufficient revenue to finance the administration of their functions. Unless the issue of regional finance, and regional economic activity is resolved, the regional powers whatever they are called, regional, federal; they will be theoretical powers.

The national constitutional conference should decide the final number of regional units, the constitutional name given to describe them, and the means to secure their financial viability.

Sudan since independence joined the UN and its specialized agencies, and several regional groupings.

There should be no problem for Sudan’s national communities in most of that membership, should they decide to continue with unity.

1. The Arab league, and the conference of Islamic states are very loose organizations that accommodate states which are more heterogeneous than the Sudan. The Northern Sudanese mostly take membership in these two organizations for granted. The Southern Sudanese mostly question that membership. Therefore, their consent to continued membership cannot be taken for granted. The question is do both parties make the issue of make or break, or is some form of mutually agreed accommodation possible? This matter should be tackled by the national constitutional conference.

2. Another problem is that of AFRICANITY and NEGRITUDE. In the culture of peace conference on the Sudan in BARCELONA in the mid-Nineties, the following statistics were presented for the Sudan:

Whatever are the accurate figures it is not disputable: That Moslems constitute the majority of the Sudanese, and that Arabic is either the mother tongue or the lingua Franca of the other groups. Whatever the actual position, it is necessary to recognize the fact of plurality, that there will be no compulsory acculturation, and that cultural identity will not give any citizen any constitutional or legal advantage.

3. The Northern Sudanese have developed their African consciousness only lately.

Charged by the energy of the equatorial sun I am baked like a sacrificial offering in the flames of a fire worshipper. I am as black as a bar of ebony.

However, there are two expressions of African consciousness. One is continental and dynamic. Africanity espoused by most African leaders is pan – continental.

However, there is an ethnically defined content for African consciousness: NEGRITUDE.

Which concept prevails in the Sudan and in Africa at large would resonate on the issues of unity or separation, and on the strength or weakness of Afro- Arab relations.

It is not a simple matter because AFRICANISM, ARABISM, ISLAM, CHRISTIANITY, and Western civilization- both Anglophone and FRANCOPHONE are inexorably mixed. They form the “TRIPLE HERITAGE” in the words of professor ALI MAZRUI. The statistical position provides further evidence of the intermix.

The Arabic language is a component of many pan-regional African languages, for example, SWAHILI, HAUSA, SOMALI, and so on. It has kinship relations with AMHARIC and TIGRINIA. The Moslem worldview is closer to the Christian worldview than either to Africa born worldviews.

These facts argue for mutual tolerance and accommodation not for surgical separation. The Sudan could provide the example for that or, alternatively, the rationale for surgical separation.

4. Finally, there are outside influences, which could encourage separation. The Barcelona conference of 1995 contemplated a common Mediterranean future. It included the Northern Sudan and excluded the South from its vision. President Muiseveni in his 1998 address to NLM Conference presented a vision of a BANTUNILOTIC identity, which extended from the Southern Sudan to South Africa. These visions could be encouraged by clash of civilization concepts and, in turn, encourage separatist tendencies in the Sudan.

Sudan, in case of a successful new attempt at unity could be the link, which should form a nexus between the Mediterranean common future and the sub-Saharan entity. The opposite is also true. There is much more at stake in developments in Sudan than what concerns it alone.

Self-determination is an integral part of universal Human rights. To uphold international stability, entitlement to it had to be limited to nations or viable cultural entities, which may form viable political entities.

For a long time after the second world war, national borders have frozen according to the arrangements, which were made after the war. The cold war ensured the continuation of those arrangements in most parts of the world.

The right of self-determination justified the struggle of the African peoples to gain independent statehood. The O. A. U. charter 1963 explicitly legitimized the borders of the African successor states as handed down from colonial times.

Although some movements resented this, the doctrine of the Sovereignty of the Nation-State sanctified the status quo. Those who didn’t comply took up arms and resisted.

Developments after the end of the cold war 1991 opened the road to reconsideration. Czechoslovakia, and Ethiopia, broke into two successor states through a process of self-determination. Quebec exercised self-determination, and decided to remain part of Canada.

At the independence of Sudan 1956, and after, the majority of Southern opinion favored Federation.

Far from any such development, the 1958 coup d’etat deprived the peoples of the Sudan, including the Southerners, of the civil and political rights which the democratic constitution guaranteed, the civil war started in 1963 and continued for a decade, and in 1972 the South settled for regional self-government. The May regime of NIMEIRI did not entertain a genuine devolution of power. Resistance to it was started by ANYANYA-II, which aimed at separation, and later the resistance stage was dominated by the SPLM/A. It crushed the ANYANYA-II and substituted its national liberation aims.

Before 1989, there was no mention of self-determination. The SPLM/A had agreed with the democratic government on a peace process culminating in a National Constitutional Conference, to be held on 18^th September 1989.

The NIF regime in Khartoum espoused a very narrow ideological program. By 1993, all Southern Sudanese opinion called for self-determination. Inside the Sudan, the Union of Sudanese African Parties (USAP) made that clear to us: their UMMA allies. Then the Washington Declaration lined SPLM/A, its breakaway parties, USAP in exile, and several Southern-leading personalities, behind a call for self-determination for the South- November 1993.

Towards the end of 1993, the UMMA PARTY publicly endorsed self-determination for the South. The repulsive policies of the NIF Regime made the call for self-determination an inevitable response. In June 1995, all the NDA member organizations endorsed self-determination. In 1996, the NIF regime accepted it as part of its terms for peace. So, apparently all Sudanese political forces have endorsed self-determination.

1. Sudan is home to much cultural plurality. However, the North/South cultural divide is especially deep, multi-faceted and conspicuous.

2. The JUBA conference of 1947 could be faulted on many aspects. It resolved that the South as well as the North should develop as an integral united political entity. Southern political opinion in the conference was unprepared and underrepresented. As Southern political opinion developed much later, it may reasonably dispute the authenticity of the resolutions of the 1947 JUBA conference.

3. The terms which Southern political opinion exacted for their status in a united Sudan after independence, i. e, federation, were left in suspense due to the abortion of the constitution making process by the 1958 coup d’etat.

4. The long drawn civil war, the sacrifices, the bloodshed, and the calamitous wounds of war have created bitterness and polarization. Above all, some parts of the Sudan, particularly in the South are de facto separated from the central authority in Khartoum. In many ways, separation has already taken place. The real issue in Sudan to day is whether to legalize it or to seek to undo it through the process of self-determination?

One: Self-determination under the policies and practices of the present regime, i. e, a Sudan governed by a quasi- theocratic constitution, administered by a partisan ISLAMICIST party which has monopolized control of the civil and armed forces, control of the economy, and which is in axis relations with the ISLAMICIST international net-work, would inevitably confirm separation.

The relationship of the Southern independent state with the Sudanese NIF dominated state will not be better than the present relations between the NIF dominated Sudan and its neighbors. It will be far worse. The NIF dominated Khartoum regime has already encouraged personal, tribal, ethnic, and religious differences within the South to a great extent. Therefore, self-determination now is a recipe for disaster. It will lead to consolidation of separation, hostility, and continuation of war or wars by other labels. Some short sighted Northerners, even cherish this prospect as directing Southern hostility against each other and away from the North!

Two: Self-determination under the terms envisaged by the NDA ASMARA resolutions 1995. This requires the formation of transition national government in which all the NDA parties including the SPLM/A will be represented. The transition government will carry out a radical reform program, which addresses, and hopefully resolves, all the past grievances in a systematic way.

This scenario will give vote for unity its best chances, and if the vote goes for separation, then it gives good neighborly relations between the two successor states the best opportunity.

The constitutional conference envisaged by the ASMARA SCENARIO will consider and resolve the specific choices to be offered in the self-determination referendum. It will specify the mechanism to ensure that that the referendum is free and fair. It will also specify the basic elements of the democratic citizen rights basis on which the future constitution will be based.

Although certain aspects of the future constitution must be resolved and agreed before the referendum because they influence the choices to be made by the voters, the final constitution can only be drafted after the referendum results are known.

So far, self -determination is discussed in terms of the Southern Sudan as defined by colonial boundaries 1956. There are some territories, which fall North of the North/South boundary, and sections of their population have joined the SPLM/A and identified with its aims. These territories are the Nuba Mountains in Southern KORDUFAN, the ABYEI area in South Western KORDUFAN, and INGASANA hills in Southern Blue Nile. The sections of the population in these areas, which joined the SPLM/A, expect to be entitled to self-determination. This expectation should be considered in the light of the following facts:

A- The territories concerned: the Nuba Mountains, the INGASANA mountains, and ABYEI are not viable for statehood. Therefore, self-determination for them can only mean joining with the North or the South, or deciding upon the degree of decentralization they prefer.

B- In the Nuba Mountains, the ethnic Nuba is not the majority. The Arab tribes, and the Arabicized tribes, who cohabit with them the Nuba Mountains, constitute the majority. So unless an ethnic cleansing policy drives the Arabs and the Arabicized tribes (BARNU, BARGU, FALATA, SLIHAB, and DAGU) even if all the ethnic NUBA vote for joining the South, the resulting situation will be a Northern ISLAND syndrome. The ethnics NUBA themselves are divided about were to identify.

C- The INGASANA are clearly a minority in Southern Blue Nile, being outnumbered by the FUNG and the BARNþU and the FALATA. The total number of the ethnic INGASANA is somewhere between 100,000 to 120,000.

D- The ABYEI enclave is inhabited, predominantly, by ethnic DINKA, but the enclave itself as a territory is claimed by the MISERIA cow owning Arab tribe. The claims and counter claims can not be settled by any objective criteria acceptable to both sides, they cannot be settled by force. The only viable position is to negotiate a settlement.

E- There are Arab tribe settlements and seasonal interests South of boundary. They may claim the right to self- determination to decide where to join? The Arab settlements and interests have been recognized by all administrations, and there are traditionally recognized tribal boundaries, which differ from the administrative boundaries.

F- The ASMARA resolutions –which I participated in and endorsed- have addressed some of these problems in a general way. A specific comprehensive policy should be considered and agreed in the National Constitutional Conference.

However, the following principles from a Human Rights perspective, must be respected:

1- The voice of the inhabitants of these territories North and South of the North/ South boundary has got to be democratically heard.

2- There is no question of ethnic cleansing, the demographic situation in the country has got to be accepted as it is. Even the resettlement of the displaced people has got to be voluntary.

3- Whatever happens to the North / South relationship, the previously closed districts, and the marginalized areas warrant special treatment to achieve stability in terms of sustainable Human Rights.

4- The political forces entitled to sit in the Constitutional Conference, are those forces which have been elected to the 1986 Constituent Assembly, plus those political forces thrown up by military resistance.

5- IGAD States, Egypt, Sudan’s other neighbors, plus the IGAD partners, should have observer status to the conference.

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[1] In a paper to a conference organized by the UN Commission on Human Rights held in Geneva, November 1998, I have argued for the basic complementarity of Human Rights from an Islamic perspective and Universal Human Rights’ charters.

[2] Editor Neil J. Kritze, transitional Justice, P.81.

[3] The civil roles of the churches in the Southern Sudan. Discussion paper No.6 African rights April 1995 P. 29

[4] G. Washington’s fare well address