INTRODUCTION            SECTION I              SECTION II          SECTION III     SUMMARY  

SECTION-II

THE SUDAN TODAY

  This section surveys: The NDA’ s view on the Sudan’s present predicament (the ASMARA resolutions), and the regime’s reacting policies (the peace agreement from within and the new constitution).

 It also describes the scenarios to overthrow the “SALVATION” regime, and the possibilities of political transformation.

Chapter1: The NDA Views

Chapter 2: The Regime's Resolutions

Cahpter 3: Senarios to Overthrow the "Salvation" Regime

           

CHAPTER 1

THE NDA’S VIEW

  Meanwhile, The NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE, the umbrella organization of the Sudanese Opposition, which united all the Sudanese political forces including the SPLM/A, held a series of successful conferences in NAIROBI, April 1993, in CHUKDOM, in December 1994, and finally in ASMARA in June 1995.

 

THE ASMARA RESOLUTIONS

The Asmara conference took a number of historic resolutions, published on 23/6/1995. The main resolutions may be summed up in three categories:

FIRST CATEGORY: self-determination is a natural and democratic right for peoples. It should be exercised in a climate of legitimacy and democracy, and under regional and international supervision. The citizens of Southern Sudan are entitled to self-determination before the end of the transition period. The South is defined by its boundaries as in 1^st January 1956. The NUBA Mountains and ABYEY region will have rights contingent upon specified investigations. The choice in self -determination shall be between unity (Federal or Conferral) and independence.

            Self-determination shall come after the period of transition, during which, the NDA authority will work to regain mutual trust, and restructure the Sudanese State to make unity the more attractive choice.

 

SECOND CATERGORY:

Religion and State in Sudan will be governed by the following principles: Human rights as defined in regional and international charters will be integral parts of the Sudan constitution. Legal rights and duties shall be based on citizenship and there will be no discrimination between citizens on the basis of religion, race, gender, or culture. The state respects Peoples’ religious beliefs, which should live in mutual tolerance and co-existence.

            No political party should be organized on a religious basis.

THIRD CATEGORY:

The mobilization of effort, including military action, to overthrow the Khartoum regime.

 Other resolutions dealt with the shape of government during the period of transition, decentralization, humanitarian issues, the structure of the NDA, and the constituents of future Sudan.

However, the NDA resolutions allowed for the possibility of a negotiated transformation through the IGAD process.

 

CHAPTER 2

THE REGIME’S RESOLUTIONS:

PEACE FROM WITHIN & NEW CONSTITUTION

 The Khartoum regime, which previously rejected the D.O.P of IGAD in 1994, denounced the ASMARA resolutions of June 1995 as a betrayal of Islam and the Sudan.

            Between 1991 and 1994, the Khartoum regime had hoped to take advantage of the fall of the Mengistu Regime (1991), and bring about a military resolution of the civil war.

 The following developments indicate the total failure of the regime’s policies:

A. The Asmara resolutions linked together all Sudanese opposition forces in a specific political and action program. The regime’s negative attitude to the IGAD initiative, as represented by the D.O.P, drew the NDA and the IGAD states closer together. The military activity against the regime increased, and two more war fronts were established, namely, in the North East, and the Southeast.

B. There were several opposition activities inside the Sudan. However, only in April 1996, have the different political forces presented the regime with a joint memorandum, in which they declared the complete failure of the regime’s policies, demanded the dissolution of its power, and supported the non-military aspects of the Asmara resolutions.

C. The restlessness of the political situation in the Sudan, culminated in Student Opposition Demonstrations, in Khartoum in September 1996. To counter its hopeless isolation, and negative position on peace and political development, the regime embarked upon a new tactic. The new tactic had two prongs: One, to review its position on the D.O.P, declaring support for it, and simultaneously to initiate a process of peace from within, in which it accepted some of the ASMARA principles, which it had earlier denounced. The other, to address the issue of political development, in terms of a new constitution.

 Consequently, the regime singed a Peace agreement from within, with seven splinter parties in April 1997. It published a New constitution (NC) to be effective in January 1999. Both were denounced and rejected by the Sudanese Opposition. Why?

 

PEACE AGREEMENT FROM WITHIN

 

            No doubt, the agreement of Peace from within has some positive elements, which it copied directly from the ASMARA resolutions. Namely:

1.  Chapter 3.2.1: “The basis of rights and duties in the Sudan shall be citizenship, and all Sudanese shall equally share in all aspects of life and political responsibilities on the basis of citizenship”.

2.  Chapter 7.10.1 to 8: Stipulates holding a free and fair referendum, conducted by a special referendum commission, and observed by O.A.U, Arab league, UN, religious bodies, IGAD, national and international NGO’s and any other countries, to choose between unity and secession.

 

However, the positive elements are completely wasted, nay, rendered extremely counter productive by the following facts:

A- The agreement is signed with breakaway factions from the two main organizations: Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), and Union of Sudanese African Parties (USAP), i. e, minority factions. The agreement gives them certain political, constitutional, and administrative rights, and gives them veto power over all subsequent peace matters. This means, any talks with the majority organizations will be subject to that veto power, i. e, fruitless. I quote, chapter 5.1.a to d, describe the formation of a coordinating council for the Southern States to be composed of the parties signatory to the agreement. The functions of that council: “General supervision of the implementation of the agreement as well as all peace matters”. Chapter 8.2.a: “No amendment bill on this agreement shall be presented to the National Assembly without consulting the coordinating council”.  This means, there is no room for agreement with the SPLM/A, and USAP, main stream, which does not endorse the special rights and interests of the breakaway factions.

B- Self -determination in the context of the ASMARA resolutions, envisages an interim period in which past grievances are addressed, and certain specific structural reforms- not mere participation in established institutions- are implemented. All this should give the vote for unity a reasonable chance. However, referendum under NIF dominated conditions, with its narrow partisan ideo-cultural identity, will inevitably ensure a vote for secession, and two hostile successor states!

C- The agreement is embodied in an undemocratic constitution subject to arbitrary changes like Nimeiri’s treatment of his constitution and of the 1972 agreements. Another analogy with the Nimeiri precedent, is the inherent vulnerability of an agreement signed with an illegitimate minority regime in the absence of the representatives of the majority of the people of Sudan.

 

CONCLUSION: The Peace Agreement from within is no peace agreement at all. It will lead to separation and continuous inter- tribal wars within the South and border wars between the successor states. There is no alternative to a comprehensive peace agreement, endorsed by the political forces, which represent the whole of the Sudan, and guaranteed, by a legitimate constitution of the country.

 

THE NEW CONSTITUTION

 

The New Constitution NC of January 1999, does not answer to such a description, for the following reasons:

1- The NC has an illegitimate pedigree. The government appointed a so-called National Constitutional Commission. The main political forces boycotted it, but they could see that its chairman and many of its members were not rubber stamp NIF members. The same description applies to the technical constitutional committee. The government out of recognition changed the draft constitution, which they finally submitted. An alternative draft constitution was substituted, rushed through the rubber stamp National Assembly, and passed through a cosmetic referendum.

2- The draft constitution of the so-called National Constitutional Commission, which is far better than the substitute draft, is nevertheless faulted on:

            ·   Article 6, which employs the MAWDUDI concept of Sovereignty to God. This concept is a conduit to theocracy, because, it allows humans to speak on behalf of God, and exercise that sovereignty. No believer would challenge a statement about the cosmological fact of God’s Omnipotence. However, Sovereignty is a political concept, which should be vested in the people. Interestingly, the great historian AL TABARI, narrates an incident in which the First Moslem King: MUAWYA, was challenged by a famous companion of the prophet MOMAMMAD (S.A.A.W.S) not to describe public finances as God’s, but as the peoples’.

            ·   Article 84 specifies SHARIA, and custom as the sources of legislation. This should be made comprehensive by broadening the sources to include all revealed TRUTH, appropriate human developed jurisprudence, and custom, as sources of legislation. Such a broad view of the sources is acceptable in terms of Islamic Principles, as well as Reason.

            ·   The draft makes no room for accountability for past misdeeds. In fact, articles 203, 204, 205 and 206 endorsed all that preceded and legalized it.

3- The new constitution reproduced these faults, and went further, eliminating all the liberal aspects of the draft submitted by the “National Commission”. Specifically:

a. Article 33 of the Draft Constitution (DC) prohibits subjection of a person to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.

b. Article 35 of DC prohibits arbitrary arrests.

c. Article 28 of DC provides for the right of trial before normal courts of law for civilians and not special courts.

d. Article 30 of DC empowers citizens to seek justice from administrative abuse.

e. Article 24 of DC guarantees the right of movement.

f. Article 45 of DC prohibits discrimination on the basis of political loyalty. All these articles have been eliminated in the new constitution.

  MOST IMPORTANT:

g. Article 41 (1) of DC states: “Citizens have the right to organize for political, cultural, Trade Unionist and scientific purposes. The state should guarantee these rights. They should be exercised through appropriate legal regulations”. The NC changed this clear expression as follows:

                     n  Article 27 (1) of the NC states: Citizens have the right to TAWALI (an Arabic word, which has many connotations, but may be translated: succession), and organization for cultural, economic, and professional purposes, according to the law.

                       n  Article 27 (2) of the NC states: The right of citizens to organize political succession (TAWALI) on condition:

A.  The organization is based on SHURA, and democracy, in the choice of leadership.

B.  It employs persuasion, and not financial power, in its competition with others.

C.  It abides by the inviolable principles of the constitution as regulated by law.

4- Articles 6,7,9,15,17&19 of the NC enforce Islamic duties on all citizens.

 

Therefore, the majority of the people of the Sudan have rejected the new constitution.

 CHAPTER 3

SCENARIOS TO OVERTHROW THE “SALVATION” REGIME, AND POSSIBILITIES OF POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

 Consequently, the situation in the Sudan to-day is one of complete polarization between: The Regime and its 1997 Peace Agreement, and its January 1999 constitution; and The NDA along with other opposition forces which is mobilizing to overthrow the regime by:

 

SCENARIOS TO OVERTHROW THE REGIME

   n  Increased military pressure in the four fronts, and more which could make the regime collapse in the pattern of MENGESTU’s Ethiopia, or MOBOTO’s Zaire, or a similar pattern.

 n Increased political pressure towards a popular uprising in the pattern of ABBOUD’s or NIMEIR’s Sudan in 1964 and 1985 respectively.

             In both Scenarios, the aim is to overthrow the regime: A Replacement Strategy.

 POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

 In the past decade plus, scores of countries have experienced political transformation, for example, Czechoslovakia and Poland in Eastern Europe, Uruguay and Argentina in Latin America. Benin, Niger and Togo in Africa, and so on. Is there any possibility of that taking place in the Sudan?

 

The IGAD Initiative, IGAD partners’ Forum, and the

NDA- inside Memorandum

 

a- The IGAD initiative:

 The IGAD initiative as represented by the D.O.P is the most serious and sustained mediation effort between the Khartoum Regime and the SPLM/A main stream. The talks, which covered seven rounds, got nowhere, even after the Khartoum Regime declared its acceptance of the D.O.P. There are still scheduled talks between the two parties under IGAD initiative. However, certain developments have occurred, and unless accommodated, they make the IGAD frame out of date. They are:

            ·   As a result of the ASMARA resolutions of June 1995, and the peace agreement from within of April 1997, there are now, in addition to the North/South conflict, a South/South and a North/North military conflicts.

        ·  The IGAD states’ ability to function as a team has been impaired by the two regional wars: in the Horn of Africa, and in the Great Lakes District. Teamwork has become impossible, and the violent conflicts encouraged the emergence of new alliances, and enabled interested parties to fish in troubled waters.

        ·  Some of Sudan’s geographic and/or cultural neighbors, who are highly concerned with its security and stability, and who are not involved with the IGAD peace process, aspire to be so involved.

            ·   The IGAD process, even if it could be resumed within its old terms, is designed to make peace between only two of the conflicting parties. However, its most important drawback, is that it gives the NIF a veto on the future of the Sudan. Since the NIF is committed to a narrow partisan ideological basis for a united Sudan, it leaves only one alternative for those who see the Sudan in pluralist citizen based identity- that is: separation. The prospect of separation, if that is the democratic wish of the citizens concerned, is now commonly accepted by all the major political forces in the country. However, if it takes place under NIF conditions, it will not lead to peace. Far from it, it will lead to continuous intertribal and border wars. Relations between an expansionist. NIF regime freed from its Achilles heel, and the successor Southern State will not be better, but far worse than the current relations between an NIF led Sudan, and its present neighbors.

So as presently constituted, the IGAD framework is no road to peace and stability in the Sudan.

 

b-  The IGAD Partner’s Forum :

The IGAD partner’s forum, which is a gathering of the members of the International Community (mostly G7 Scandinavian countries, plus Egypt) meeting in Rome on July 1998 is, through its ministerial committee, moving to make up for the problems tethering the IGAD states. Although they move under the IGAD umbrella, their activity will, inevitably, give an international color to the regional initiative. In the same vein, four internationally renowned Humanitarian NGO’s -namely: OXFAM, Medicens SANS Frontiers, CARE, and Save the Children’s Fund- have expressed their frustration at the growing humanitarian tragedy in the Sudan, and the stalling peace process, indicating that peace is the key to the resolution of that tragedy. They have appealed to UN Secretary General in a December 1998 letter, saying: " the more proactive political role, which would require inter alia a full time Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN, and international pressure should seek to reinforce and complement the IGAD process".

It is only to be expected that when the conflicting parties fail to make progress, and when the regional mediators are disabled, the ever-escalating humanitarian tragedy will lead to the internationalization of the Sudanese tragedy.

Unless it assumes a very high profile, internationalization will not cut much ground.

 

C- The Memorandum of NDA- Inside the Sudan:

            On the 29^th December 1998, the NDA inside the Sudan, along with other opposition parties, trade unions, and prominent personalities, presented the Khartoum Regime with a historic Memorandum.

 The memorandum constitutes Sudanese terms for peace and democratic transformation.

 The memorandum presented the Government with the following specific demands:

 “The aim is to Salvage the country from its political, economic, social, and security crises, the rejection of political violence, the creation of a conducive climate, towards true national unity, that will prevent foreign intervention into the internal affairs of our country. All such patriotic aims, can only be achieved by setting up a strong transitional national unity government, acceptable to the people of Sudan, to fulfill the following agenda:

I-   Dismantle the current one-party state, and set up instead a democratic Sudanese State, which accommodates all shades of opinion in the country.

II-  To convene an all inclusive constitutional conference, whose function shall be:

1.  To work out a comprehensive, just and permanent peace agreement, to put an end to the war, and to conduct self-determination for the South, in a democratic climate.

2.  To establish a strong democratic foundation for the administration of the country.

3.  To establish a comprehensive and effective mechanism of accountability, to redress all violations and malpractices, committed since independence.

4.  To establish a sound basis for a balanced foreign policy geared to serve the country’s interests.

5.  To enact the rules and regulations for a free and fair general elections.

III- To conduct general elections under regional and international supervision.

D- To hand power over to the elected government.”

 

            Legitimacy of government in the Sudan can neither be based upon dynastic credentials, nor on the credentials of a Revolution which had, through its accomplishments, achieved national recognition. The only feasible basis for legitimacy in the Sudan, is democratic legitimacy.

            The temperament of Sudanese individuals and society is wedded to the values of tolerance and moderation, which are consistent with a democratic system of government. It looks as if the destiny of Sudanese society has an appointment with democracy. In spite of the short periods of democracy in the Sudan, and the long periods of dictatorship, democracy seems the norm and dictatorship the exception!

            Dictatorial regimes in the Sudan, including the current one, manifest the distinct discomfort of sitting at the point of a spear. They are almost surprised by their survival.

The world is, for quite some time, witnessing a democratic wave. Despotic regimes are falling like autumn leaves. Both national and international considerations indicate that one way or the other, the Sudanese Junta has come to the end of its tether. Whether through overthrow, transplacement. Democratic transformation is in the horizon. It will have to be accomplished through a period of transition.

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