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INTRODUCTION SECTION I SECTION II SECTION III SUMMARY SECTION-I LESSONS OF MODERN DEVELOPMENT Chapter One: The British Legacy Chapter Two: The Legacy of Democratic Governments Chapter Three: The Legacy of Autocratic Governments This section replies to the question: how did this happen? Covering: The British legacy, the legacy of democratic regimes, and the legacy of autocratic regimes:
THE BRITISH LEGACYThe British have conquered the Sudan in 1898, in the name of the Khedive of Egypt. They established a regime, which was theoretically a condominium, but in reality, a British dependency. They created the modern Sudan. They endowed it with a modern legal system, a modern economy, modern system of education and modern civil, military and police services. The Political service, which was responsible for these achievements, was a small-dedicated group of high caliber. Finally, when national and international circumstances made it inevitable, they effected an orderly democratic transition to an elected Sudanese Authority. In the debit side, the British Development policy had a very narrow base. They neglected many parts of the country not directly involved in the production, irrigation and transport of cotton, especially the Southern part of the Sudan, where in many cases; their policy had a negative racist content[1]. British southern Sudanese policy must be deemed the worst black spot in British Imperial History. Some Southern intellectuals maintain, in the words of Dr. Francis Deng: “The gravest mistake of the British is that when they withdrew from the Sudan, they did not erect a constitutional barrier to separate North and South Sudan from each other”[2]. POLICY TOWARDS THE SOUTH The real failure of the British Imperial policy towards the Southern Sudan, is that they embarked upon two diametrically contradictory policies: · The First was the so called Southern policy (1920), which explained that the policy of the Sudan Government was to keep out “Mohamedan” influence from the Southern Sudan, and suggested that “the possibility of the Southern (Black) portion of the Sudan, being eventually cut off from the Northern (Arab) area, and linked up with some central African system, be borne in mind”[3]. In pursuit of that tendency, in 1921, the Governors of the three Southern provinces were no longer required to attend all the meetings of Governors held annually in Khartoum. Instead, they were to have their own meetings in the South, and keep in touch with their opposite numbers in Kenya and Uganda. In 1922, the Passports and Permits ordinance was promulgated. The ordinance empowered the Governor General to declare any part of the Sudan a “Closed District”[4]. “Southern Policy” aimed at prohibiting the use of the Arabic language in the South, prohibiting Islamic and encouraging Christian proselysation, and setting a “bamboo” curtain between North and South. · The Second diametrically opposite Southern policy: In 1946, the administration embarked upon a policy as follows: “The policy of the Government of Sudan regarding the Southern Sudan, is to act upon the fact that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine to render them inextricably bound for future development to the Middle Eastern and Arabicized Northern Sudan; and therefore, to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future, as socially and economically, the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future”[5]. This policy later informed the Juba conference of June 1947. The conference was attended by Sudan Government British officials, Northern and Southern Sudanese government officials, a score of Southern Sudanese tribal chiefs and one Northern Sudanese tribal Chief. The conference resolved upon two matters, namely, that the North and South constitute one state, and that the planned Legislative Assembly should represent the whole Sudan. It is clear from the minutes of the conference, that the Southern representatives had several reservations about the resolutions, first, that the South could not yet decide upon the question of a united State, and second, that the South has not been prepared for a legislative assembly, as has been the case in the North”[6]. Southern reservations were not really accommodated. SAYED MOHAMMAD SALIH AL SHINGITTI[7], the most Senior Northerner attending, offered many explanations and assurances. However, his good will assurances cannot be considered representative of the North, nor binding on it. The British officials in the conference were simply advocating an already decided policy. They had no room for reservations. HANDLING THE ROLE OF THE EGYPTIAN PARTNER Lord Cromer had said: “We run the Sudan largely by bluff”[8]. They have bluffed Egypt out of its partnership role in the administration of the Sudan. Egypt’s position in the Sudan has grown out of MOHAMMAD ALI’s vague imperialist notions to become along with British withdrawal from Egypt, a corner stone of modern Egyptian Nationalism. Therefore, the way the British Government treated Egyptian claims and interests in the Sudan stamped Egyptian policies towards the Sudan with doubt, bitterness and anxiety. Those two aspects of the British legacy in the Sudan, namely, the “Southern Policy”, and the handling of the role of Egypt in the Sudan, have bequeathed the successor State in the Sudan, two time bombs, which threatened it’s stability. The fist time bomb exploded into a marathon civil- war. The second, haunted Sudanese Egyptian relations, and stamped them with a high doze of mutual suspicion and anxiety.
THE LEGACY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS
This year -1999, the modern Sudanese State established in 1956 has grown 43 years old. Two years have been years of transition government. The rest, 41 years, are divided between six systems of government. Three Parliamentary democracies spanning nine years. Three autocracies sharing 31 years. In his erudite article on the African State as a political refugee, Professor Ali Mazuri studied the crisis, which bedeviled the African states since their independence. He stated that a state has six functions, sovereignty over the national territory, command over national resources, collection of revenue, the construction of the national infrastructure, the provision of social services, and the maintenance of law and order. Any state, which fails in these duties, is in trouble. The weakness of the institutions of modern Statecraft, and the lack of National cohesion due to the ethnicity factor caused the crisis of the African State in post-colonial Africa. Those factors make democracy unworkable because under democratic conditions there is too little government leading to chaos. The alternative authoritarian regimes relapse into too much government and so tyranny. Both conditions, namely chaos and tyranny constitute failed States. Democracy is a highly advanced system of modern government. In the west, where it developed, it was preceded by the Nation- State as recognized by the Peace of Westphalia 1648, the Nineteenth century Industrial Revolution, and a high degree of literacy and education. Such preconditions have not taken place in the numerous African States, which acquired their Independence by a democratic process. Problems associated with weak institutions of state, incomplete nationhood, undeveloped economy and religious and ethnic conflicts, weakened the successor democracies, and made them an easy prey for military coups d’etat. The authoritarian regimes which ensued invariably tried squandered national resources on extra military expenditures, extra security expenditures, abused human rights, put an end to basic freedoms, gave free reign to corruption and attempted to resolve National problems by high command. Needless to say, the whole exercise boiled down to a story of failure. Democracy in Sudan performed relatively better than elsewhere in Africa, and better than the Sudanese despotic regimes. CREDITSThe three democratic regimes of the independent Sudan: 1956-58, 1965-69, 1986-89 may be credited with: 1. The smooth administration of the transition of power into independent Statehood. 2. The maintenance of a modern welfare state which abided by free and fair elections, independent judiciary, a neutral civil service, National armed forces and Police and a free press. 3. They ran a rationally administered National economy. 4. They maintained a non-aligned foreign policy in terms of the Cold War, and a balanced regional policy in terms of Sudan’s Arab and African commitments. 5. They maintained a level of respect for Human Rights, and basic freedoms, and tolerance of religious and political plurality, which was rare in “Third World” conditions. Therefore, ideological organizations of a Communist, and Islamicist orientation, which were promptly suppressed in many Asian, African and Latin American countries, were highly tolerated. Regional lobby organizations were accepted and in many cases accommodated. 6. The political and cultural nature of the South/North civil war was recognized, and consequently, all the attempts at a peaceful resolution of the conflict took place during the Democratic period, namely: n The Round- Table Conference, 1965. n The Twelve- Man Committee, 1966-67. n The All-Sudanese Party Peace Conference, 1967. n The KOKADAM Declaration, 1986. n The Forum for National Accord, 1987. n The Sudanese Peace Initiative, 1988. n The Sudanese Transitional Program, 1989. n The Sudanese Peace Process, which culminated in agreement to hold a National Constitutional Conference in 1989.
DRAWBACKSHowever, the modern Sudanese political system, had a major Achilles heel: CULTURAL PLURALITY It failed to recognize and sufficiently accommodate cultural plurality. When modern National Consciousness developed in the first half of the 20th century in the North, it developed upon an Islamic Arabic identity, in close association with the Middle East and North Africa, especially Egypt, as the major cultural power center of the region. It was assumed that all other Sudanese cultural identities will inevitably be assimilated. It is true that in the cultural field, many Northern Sudanese writers, poets and artists began from the sixties onwards to recognize the special cultural status in the Sudan, and hence the emergence of what Ahmad Al-Tayeb Zein Al- Abdin called “SUDANITY”, a concept defined by writers and poets in ethnicity conscious terms, which leaned heavily on Sudan’s Africanity, namely, the poets: MOHAMMAD AL MEKKI IBRAHIM, AL NOUR OTHMAN ABBAKAR, MOHAMMAD ABD AL-HAY, SALAH AHMED IBRAHIM, and so on. For example: A portrait of our nation: Seven doves, a wave of turbans, a host of palm trees, and a mass of potentialities. I see in view: An idol, a drum, a Koran”. Mohammad Al Makki Ibrahim: I shall come back to you Oh Sennar, You bright black thread Spread between the mountain top and its side, Between the Desert and the Forest. Mohammad ABD Al- Hay However, it must be stated categorically, that the Sudanese political system had a blind spot in terms of recognizing and accommodating Sudan’s cultural diversity. Only as an aftermath of violent civil conflict, did that realization and accommodation emerge. That blind spot aggravated another blind spot in the modern history of the Sudan concerning the issue of slavery. Contrary to what is expected, the British administration in the Sudan implemented a policy, which almost tolerated slavery. The high points of expression of modern Northern Sudanese political consciousness, namely, the 1924 revolt, and the Graduates Congress movement, were silent on the issue of slavery. The institution of slavery died a quiet death in the Sudan. However, it left a mass of psychological and social scars which unless they are properly treated, they will continue to fuel negative feelings and attitudes. The subject is pregnant with myth and discrimination, and needs to be handled objectively. However, no clarifications and explanations will dispense with the need for the progeny of the slavers to disown and repent and for the progeny of the victims to forgive and forget, and for both groups to recognize the essential brotherhood of Man which links them. UNBALANCED DEVELOPMENT STRUCTURE The second disastrous failure of the modern Sudanese Democratic political system is the fact that it didn’t effect a structural reform of the National economy to broaden the base of development, and tackle the deprivation of substantial regions of the country and sections of the community. The unbalanced nature of the development of the modern Sudanese economy, led to the development of the modern sector of the economy, at the cost of the traditional sector, and the enrichment of the urban centers at the cost of the rural areas. This subsidized the high and middle classes in the urban areas, and impoverished the rest of the country. Consequently, an unjust distribution of economic resources between regions and social groups prevailed. An exodus from the regions into urban areas occurred, expressions of grievances multiplied, and social peace subsided. UNREALISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS DEMOCRACY The third major failure of the democratic systems of government in Sudan is the unrealistic un-original attitude to the democratic system itself. It was generally assumed that the political parties, the judiciary, the press, the trade unions, the armed forces and all the institutions of Democracy in the modern Sudanese State, will automatically develop into their expected roles of a normative Democratic system. To begin with, the educated classes in many “Third World” countries gave democracy a very low ranking in their priorities. Their real priorities were economic development, modernization, national unity and so on[9]. Several elitists drew extensively from classical thinkers, like J. J. Rousseau, who argued that human dignity, and freedom, could only be achieved through equality. This requires a revolution at once, political and moral, an assertion of the will of an undifferentiated people as the only legitimate source of power[10]. This led to resort to a Rousseau -type concept to argue for the single party dictatorship, as representative of an undifferentiated people. The party is seen as representing the general will. Marx derided the Democratic bourgeois state. However, Marx’s ideas about the instrument of political change, the party, and the seat of political power, the state, were very vague. It was left to Lenin to build the Socialist Party and State. Lenin stood Marxism upside down, because he relegated to politics -the Party and the State- the key role which in Marxism was the role of the economy. The Leninist Party as taken to its logical conclusion by Stalin, became the most effective modern organization for political mobilization. The Leninist State as perfected by Stalin became the ultimate political powerhouse in the 20th century. Both Mussolini and Hitler, simply borrowed the Stalinist political system and state craft to serve fascist ideas. Revolutionaries of Left and Right, who drew large sections of the intelligensia in the third world in the Third World into their support, deprived third World Democracy from the enthusiasm and support of many of the best brains. Problem number one, which required some novel devices, is how to give the democratic system legitimacy in the eyes of this section of the intelligensia? An Arab writer, George Tarabishi, has recently published a book “On the culture of Democracy “. He said “we belong to a generation, which was deceived about Democracy. Revolutionary movements and despotic regimes have persuaded themselves and deceived us into believing that Democracy is a fake system, which should be radically reformed. After we witnessed the bloody performance of the Radical regimes which oppressed the people and achieved nothing, and after we witnessed the collapse of the Communist’s experiments, it dawned upon us the reality about Democracy as the best system devised by human endeavor. Our discovery of the reality and worthiness of Democracy is the best thing that happened to our generation towards the end of the 20th century. It has become the alternative to all the failed ideologies in the region”[11]. The second problem is that of inability to see that there are certain problems which cannot be resolved by majority votes. Differences in religion, language, ethnicity form cleavage societies because in them people do not differ on the basis of ideology like Liberalism, or Socialism, nor do their differences boil down to differences in interests like social classes. Arthur Lewis maintained that “ African governments will achieve greater legitimacy if Parliamentary elections, the appointment of public officials, and the distribution of public funds among the subcultures is guided by the principle of proportionality”[12]. This concept was termed by social scientists LIPHART and LEHAMBRUCH: CONSOCIETAL decision making democracy. They argued that culturally fragmented countries could hope to attain democratic stability if they utilized consociational, rather than competitive (winner -take- all) majoritarian decision making”[13]. In societies where such ascriptive groupings (based on heritage), democracy needs to cultivate concepts and institutions of balance.
RELATIONS WITH THE ARMED FORCES: The fourth major failure of the Democratic political system is concerning the relations with the armed forces. To take the armed forces for granted, and expect them to keep to their legal function, and behave themselves in the troubled conditions of Third World states, is to court trouble, as we have harshly discovered in the Sudan. At the dawn of independence, the political system needed to consider the role of the armed forces, and make basic decisions about it. There are three possible alternative policies towards the armed forces, which a modern state, which is not actually run by them could adopt: The first, and most desirable is to require them by constitution and law, to be confined to their professional duty as the defense arm of executive elected power, as is the case in the Western democracies. However, this is a highly advanced state of affairs, which had taken the West centuries to achieve. The second is the extreme measure adopted by Costa Richa in Latin America, the abolition of the armed forces as an unwanted menace to the political system. The third is to involve the armed forces in the political process in what Azikwe, the first president of Nigeria, called diarchy. It is suggested that the systems of government in both Turkey and Egypt integrate the armed forces in collaboration with the civilian democratic process to form a diarchy. Failure to attend to, and resolve the role of the military in a well thought out policy, cost the Sudan very dearly, indeed. How dearly? We shall see! Apart from coup making, the fact that the armed forces exercised a high degree of autonomy from executive civil authority permitted the armed forces to run the civil war in a way, which involved many political blunders, which the democratically elected civilian governments had to accept. I name three major incidents. They are: · The military command in the South became so frustrated by the political activities of the Southern intelligensia during the second democratic reign in Sudan (1965-69). They generally regarded them as a fifth column for the ANYANYA armed movement. Therefore, in 1965, scores of Southern itelligensia were rounded up, and “liquidated” in JUBA and WAW. PRIME MINISTER MOHAMMAD AHMED MAHGOUB headed the then civilian government. At that time, I was the elected leader of the Umma Party, which SAYED MAHGOUB represented, in the governing coalition. My first clash with the Prime Minister, which, among other factors, led to the schism in the Umma party in 1966, was linked to my demand that the government should bring the military authorities involved to book. · The second incident was again during a second reign of SAYED MAHGOUB as Prime Minister, in 1968. Another over zealous military authority saw SAYED WILLIAM DENG, the president of SANU as a security risk. SAYED WILLIAM DENG was the most farsighted Southern statesman, who contributed so heavily to the peace process in the Sudan. He courageously returned to the Sudan as soon as the military regime of (1958-64) collapsed. He established an well-organized and well-run political party, SANU, inside the Sudan. He engaged in the fruitful discussions, which through the Round Table conference, the Twelve Man Committee, the All Sudanese Party Conference and the Constitutional Commission, produced the most viable draft for a just resolution of the civil- war. Some military authorities in the South, saw him in a different light, and regarded him as a collaborator with the ANYANYA armed movement. They ambushed him and killed him while electioneering during the 1968 general elections. They deprived the Sudan of a pillar for peace, and an honorable statesman to build peace and mutual understanding in the Sudan. · The third incident happened in February 1989. As Prime Minister, military operations military intelligence, briefed me about the developments of the civil war, particularly, about the army’evacuation of LIRIA, a post near JUBA. In the presence of all the high command and the core commanders, I rejected the briefing and challenged the meeting to answer to six main criticisms about the administration of the war. They accepted the truth of the criticism, and so I asked them to put their act together, and recommend the policies necessary to effect the necessary reforms. Instead, and in defense of their autonomy, they politicized the issue, avoided the military accountability and came up with the Memorandum of February 1989. INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY Another problem concerned the independence of the Judiciary. Again, according to Democratic principles, the Independence of the judiciary is a basic Democratic principle. However, after the October uprising of 1964, an active politician, SAYED BABAIKIR AWADALLAH, became chief justice. He didn’t respect the sanctity of his post, and continued his active radical politics. Without the neutrality of the judges, the independence of the judiciary becomes a mockery of justice and politics. One of the unfortunate moments of Democratic government in Sudan took place in 1965, during the first reign of SAYED MAHGOUB as Prime Minister. During a discussion circle in the faculty of education, Khartoum University, a leftist student was accused of insulting SAYEDA AISHA, the wife of Prophet Mohammad. The incident led to demonstrations organized by the ISLAMIC CHARTER FRONT, the forerunner of the NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT NIF. The demonstrations went to the then president of the Sovereignty Council of Sudan, SAYED ISMAEL AL AZHARI, who declared his support for what the demonstrators demanded: the banning of the Communist Party of Sudan, and the expulsion of its 12 members of Parliament. Some UMMA Party leaders supported the demands. Both the Prime Minister SAYED MAHGOUB and myself had reservations about the demands, but the necessary resolutions received massive parliamentary support. The measures themselves were a high handed way of using majoritarian decision-making. They were one of two incidents where parliamentary majorities behaved in an unbalanced high handed way; the other was when a majority of parliamentarians resolved to force dissolution of Parliament in 1968, by resigning from the constituent assembly. In both cases, it is formal Parliamentary majorities betraying the spirit of democracy. The dissolution of the Communist Party had serious consequences in that the Party appealed to the judiciary against the Parliamentary resolutions. The judge concerned, who was himself a communist sympathizer, declared the resolutions unconstitutional. The chief justice was a communist collaborator. The result was a serious weakening of the system of democratic government, because of a major contradiction between two institutions of state: The legislative, and the Judiciary powers. The high handed dissolution of the constituent assembly drove the aggrieved party into radical opposition and extra parliamentary tactics. Both measures thus eroded some of the legitimacy of the democratic system of government, playing into the hands of the coup makers of MAY 1969.
THE LEGACY OF AUTOCRATIC GOVERNMENTSThe Modern Sudan was plagued with three autocratic regimes established by three military coups d’etat, 1958-1964, 1969- 1985, 1989-… THE FIRST AUTOCRACY The first autocratic regime (1958-64) was established by a General’s coup. It had no specific political ideology. It formed a simple military autocracy but it formed neither a command party nor a police state. The coup took place in collaboration with the then Prime Minister, SAYED ABDALLAH KHALIL, who was the Secretary General of the UMMA PARTY, which was in coalition with the PEOPLES’ DEMOCRATIC PARTY. In 1958, the Umma Party was worried about political instability in the Sudan. There were difficulties between the coalition partners about drafting the country’s constitution. Within the ranks of the UMMA PARTY, there were two alternative policies: One led by the President of the Party, SAYED AL SIDDIG AL MAHDI, which pointed out that stability in Sudan is better served by an UMMA coalition with the NATIONAL UNIONIST PARTY headed by SAYED ISMAEL AL AZHARI. The then Prime Minister, and Secretary General of the UMMA Party thought otherwise and recommended strengthening the ongoing coalition with the P.D.P. Umma Party members of Parliament already began collecting signatures in support of a change in coalition partners. The Prime Minister, who was himself an ex-army officer, had earlier discussed in the Umma high councils, the possibility of a hand over of power to the army, to help prevent the expected instability, and to help draft the constitution in an atmosphere free from political party maneuvering. The Umma party leadership discussed the option, and dismissed it. As differences within the UMMA party about whom to form coalition with, developed into two competing lobbies, the Prime Minister, in the absence of the President of the Party abroad, clinched a deal with the armed forces’ High Command, to take over power, suspend the constitution, effect certain reforms, and administer the country on a temporary basis. However, the army high command had ideas of their own. If they were to assume power, they will assume it for themselves and not to execute anybody else’s agenda. The commanders of the Northern and Eastern army commands staged a mini-coup, which was resolved by reaching a compromise with the army’s High command. One result of that compromise was to dissociate the military take over completely from the outgoing Prime Minister, and to rule the country in their own rights, as a “Revolution”. The November Regime, so described because the coup took place on 17th NOVEMBER 1958, had no political program, besides administering the country and keeping law and order. However, to do so they suspended all basic freedoms, and denied all the internationally recognized Human Rights. They put the country’s regions under the command of the regional military commanders. They allowed some devolution of local and regional power in terms of local government councils, and provincial councils. Otherwise, and particularly in the administration of the technical ministries: Agriculture, Finance, Industry, Education, Health and so on, they appointed technocrats, and allowed business to proceed as usual. They also espoused a balanced but Western leaning foreign policy. Without making any structural reforms, their administration of the economy was rational and benefited from Western and Eastern sources. In addition to the suspension of basic freedoms and denial of Human Rights, the NOVEMBER regime’s major blunder was it’s Southern policy. When the Sudanese political parties discussed the possibility of declaring the independence of the Sudan by Parliamentary decree, rather than through a plebiscite as formally stated by the ANGLO-EGYPTIAN Agreement of 1954, the representatives of the Liberal Party (The Party of the South) supported the motion, on condition that the South will be given federal status in the Sudanese Constitution. The UMMA Party and others promised them that the issue would be taken up when the Constitution is drafted. The coup of November 1958 put an end to the process of constitution making, and so to that promise. That was not the only Southern deprivation. The coup dissolved parliament, dismissed the elected government, and disbanded the political parties. In all of these institutions, the South, along with other regions, was represented. After the coup, all these voices were silenced. The formation of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (the governing body) was totally ethnicity-blind. The only Southern representation was a single cabinet seat (cabinets in military regimes are lightweight bodies which take and not issue orders). A veteran Southern politician SAYED SANTINO DENG held the seat. Many of the disbanded Southern politicians fled into exile after the coup, and formed with others (THE SUDAN AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION- SANU), and its military wing (THE ANYANYA). The only previous violent incident involving NORTH/SOUTH antagonism was the revolt of August 1955. Before self-government in Sudan (1954), there was much talk in the councils of the Sudan government about the need for special measures to protect Southern interests during the coming self-government. Nothing specific was decided. Then came the process of SUDANIZATION and British withdrawal. Sudanization became a process of replacing the British with Northern Sudanese personnel. The new administrators fraternized with Northern traders, who dominated trade activity in the South- THE JELLABA. At that time, the Southern Command of the Army of Sudan, was composed of local recruits. The officers were overwhelmingly from the North. On the 18th August 1955, some Southern troops in TORIT refused to obey some military administrative orders and revolted. They killed, en masse, their Northern officers, many Northern administrators, and many of the traders and their families. The revolt spread to other towns and posts. Subsequently, the mutiny was crushed, and the many Southern troops involved were captured, prosecuted, and punished. On March 1963, General ABBOUD, the head of the military junta, was scheduled to attend the inauguration of the O.A.U. at ADDIS ABEBA. As a measure of good- will, he pardoned the Southern troops, who were imprisoned after the August 1955 mutiny. That pardon was not part of a wider policy, but an isolated event. In other respects, the junta’s Southern policy was repressive. It disenfranchised Southern political representation. It espoused a policy of highhanded acculturation. Small wonders, therefore, that the released ex-troops joined the ANYANYA, and the military resistance intensified. Ever since colonial times, the South was venu to an extensive presence of Church missionary activity. European religious personnel manned the Missionary establishments. The junta accused them of aiding and abetting the armed resistance led by ANYANYA. The junta decided to expel them, en masse, in March 1964. As the situation deteriorated further, the junta decided upon the only option it was trained to take: military action. In April 1964, I published a pamphlet “The Southern Problem”. I argued: “The problem is a political, economic, and cultural problem that can not be resolved by military means. It should be widely and freely discussed, to find the appropriate solution”. The junta did see the need for a wide discussion of the problem; they appointed a National commission to do so. They even allowed some measure of free discussion of the Southern problem as a national issue. However, as usual in such circumstances, the discussions went out of hand. Discussion groups and rallies were organized in the University of Khartoum. The conclusions reached in general confirmed the view that military means can not solve the problem, and that in the absence of basic freedoms, there cannot be any meaningful discussion, and so resolution of the problem. The Southern problem led to the National problem of democracy. At that point, the junta moved to suppress political activity in the University of Khartoum. The violent suppression of the rally to discuss the problem on 21st October 1964 led to the immediate death of AHMAD AL QURSHI TAHA, whose death became the rallying point for the uprising, which ultimately toppled the NOVEMBER junta. THE SECOND AUTOCRCY The second autocratic regime, which is also the first totalitarian regime (1969-85) in Sudan was a Colonel’s coup supported by two ideological associations, communists, and Nasserites. Nasserite elements have a very limited presence in the Sudanese political society. They never exceeded a handful of intellectuals and army officers, closely linked with Nasserite intelligence institutions. But the communist party in Sudan was a strong organization, well established among the modern sections of Sudanese society, and within trade unions and farmers unions. The party even had a mass base, which in 1968 enabled the General Secretary of the Party SAYED ABDAL KHALIG MAHJOUB to win a central parliamentary seat in OMDURMAN. It is fair to say that the communists and their leftist fellow travelers provided the political support for the new regime. The communist party of Sudan has since offered ambivalent attitudes to the coup. However, actions are more decisive than words. Their participation may be represented by the following facts: · The military cadre of the party was involved in the coup and their leaders became members in the Revolutionary Command Council. · On the eve of 25th May 1969, the central committee of the party decided to accept participation in the coup government, so their participation was the official party policy. · The front organizations of the communist party, namely, the Sudanese Women’s Union, the Sudanese Youth Union, and so on, have become the new regime’s supporting civilian organizations. · The policies of the new regime, domestic and foreign, were copies of communist party programs. · The know- how employed to establish a totalitarian state, was drawn from Eastern European Communist and Nasserite sources. · The Soviet mentor of Sudanese Communism became the Godfather of the new regime. It is true to say that there was a basic contradiction between the communists and their other allies in the 25th of May regime. NIMERI with encouragement from Nasserist and other leftist elements saw himself as a Sudanese Nasser, in whom the buck of Sudanese politics has stopped. The communist party, on the other hand, was adamant about its political autonomy, which it expected to prevail. In this sense, its participation in the regime was only a phase in its political evolution. They thought that the buck of Sudanese politics stopped with them. The two positions were ultimately irreconcilable. They fell apart, and in July 1971, after a communist party associated coup failed, NIMERI butchered the leadership of the communist party of Sudan, employing against it all the brutality which was earlier applied to those who opposed the regime, measures which at that time, communist spokesmen called “revolutionary violence”. The legacy of the second autocracy in Sudan consists of five aspects: FIRST: It opened the chapter of bloody history in the modern Sudan. The ruthless suppression of opposition in ABA Island, and NORTHERN OMDURMAN (WADNUBAWI). Then came the ruthless suppression of the communist party. SECOND: It established the first totalitarian state in Sudan, and laid down its instruments, namely: n An official ideology which is exclusive and tolerates no competition. n A command party, which suppresses all dissent. n A police state enforced by a huge security mechanism accountable to no law or moral value so long as it destroys the enemies of the regime. n Politicization of the civil and armed institutions of the State in favor of the partisan policy of the regime and its single party.
THIRD: The demagogic manipulation of the economy, and a number of economic legacies: · Before the 1969 coup, the Sudan had a mixed economy with a very viable public and private sectors. The public sector surpluses provided on the average more than 40% of the government revenue. The private sector provided more than 60% of the country's exports. The new regime put the public sector under the administration of political (leftist) cronies, and enlarged it through measures of nationalization and confiscation. The personnel who were appointed to administer this huge economic empire were partisan political appointees who destroyed the viability of the economy. That phase of the administration of the economy continued for two years (1969 - 1971). · The second phase lasted ten years (1972 - 1982). This phase was blessed by the prevalence of the Peace agreement of 1972. During this phase the regime embarked upon a policy of economic liberalization. The regime enjoyed a favorable treatment by the West, and by the Arab Gulf States, resulting in a huge 8 billion-dollar volume of foreign development aid. At this phase, the regime’s economic administration became more pragmatic, and several development schemes, and infra structure constructions were built. During this phase also, oil was struck in the Sudan in 1980. · Third Phase (1982-85): the regime again reverted to doctrinaire manipulation of the economy. However, this time the policy plunged into the opposite ideological direction. ISLAMICIST economic polices. By 1982, the regime’s economic policies and all the foreign economic aid failed to achieve a sustainable development. Far from it, the value of Sudanese exports towards the end of the life of the regime fell to about $ 300 Million; half what it was in the Sixties. The internal and external financial balances, which had been in surplus before the coup, fell into continuous annual deficits between 40% and 45%. In 1983 the government changed the Banking act to allow it to escape monetary discipline and resort to unlimited loans from the banking system and printing currency. Consequently, the value of the national currency began its free fall. The Sudanese pound was equal to 330 Cents in 1969. It became 14 Cents in 1985. Sudanese Development, which was before the coup dependent on the surplus of the National Budget, which fell into continuous deficits, became completely dependent upon foreign aid. Before the coup, Sudan had no external debt. A sad legacy of the May regime is the external debt, originally, 8 billion dollars but because of compound interest it has grown at an average annual one billion dollars so that to-day (January 1999) it is 20 billion dollars!! Lack of accountability, and the high handed measures which dictatorship allowed the regime to take opened an entirely new chapter in corruption in the Sudan. Hitherto, corruption in Sudanese public affairs was the exception. During the second autocracy it became the rule. FOURTH LEGACY: The manipulation of Islam and Islamic legislation as a means of legitimizing the regime and intimidating its enemies. The first shameless pioneer in this respect was the PAKISTANI General DIA AL HAG, but NIMEIRI, who saw the basis of his legitimacy eroded resorted to it as the first to - do so in the modern history of Sudan. The regime originally drew some legitimacy from manipulating socialism. Then it shifted its position, and relied upon National unity as created by the 1972 Agreement. Between 1972 and 1982, NIMEIRI squandered that achievement and needed another source. He observed the internal and external signs of Islamic awakening, and decided to manipulate Islam for the purpose of stabilizing the regime. He bequeathed the Sudan a sorry legacy of ISLAMICIST opportunism. FIFTH AND LAST But not least legacy: The civil - war. It is ironic that two things: the economic performance, and the Peace Agreement, which were publicized as the MAY regime’s monumental acheivements, should be negated to leave a most negative economic legacy, and a catastrophic civil war. At its inception, the MAY Regime was ethnicity blind. The entire membership of the Revolutionary command council was from the NORTH. The regime, on communist initiative, appointed SAYED JOSEPH GARANG, a leading communist to take charge of Southern affairs. He issued a politically conscious nine point Southern policy. Soon after the issue was put in a back seat until the power struggle between NIMEIRI and the communist party of Sudan was settled. After the bloody events of July 1971 several factors helped create conditions for a peace oriented Southern policy. NIMEIRI needed a substitute power base. Western powers and their regional allies were eager to reward NIMEIRI, for his break with communism. The peace negotiations which took place in ADDIS ABEBA with effective mediation by Emperor HAILASELASE and the African Council of Churches, made headway and a peace agreement was signed in 1972. The peace Agreement put an end to the civil war on the basis of regional self - government for the South. “After all, the final agreement (1972) when closely examined is based on the discussions, findings of the legally constituted regimes before 1969. The resolutions of the Round Table Conference, the recommendations of the Twelve-Man Committee, and the findings of the All-Political Parties' Conference, were the basis of the agreement. “[14] Between 1980 and 1983, several factors drove NIMEIRI to betray his peace Agreement and launch the Sudan into a civil war which was much more dangerous than the civil war which ended in 1972. They are: - (A) DICTATORSHIP does not really accept devolution of power. In it, “Power inevitably flows upwards as water inevitably flows downwards”! NIMEIRI continuously interfered with the powers of the Southern Executive Council. He influenced the election of its president. When the council opposed his decision to build the oil Refinery in Kosti town rather than in Bentu town, he decided that the council grew too big for its boots. He listened to an interested Southern party, General JOSEPH LAGU and contravened the agreement by a high handed decree to divide the South into three regions. (B) NIMEIRI`S Western orientation after 1971 helped reach the agreement of 1972. However, his Western alignment went further to involvement with Western strategies in North Africa and the Red Sea. In 1982, an anti- Western, pro- Eastern alliance was singed in ADEN, bringing together LIBYA, ETHIOPIA and SOUTHERN YEMEN. This alliance provided a regional and international patron for resistance to the MAY regime. (C) NIMEIRI’s great disservice to the modern Sudan is the ideo- cultural coup, which he staged in September 1983. Although that ideo- cultural coup actually came after the SPLM/A led civil war, it provided the SPLM/A with added justification for resuming the war. The gulf between the ANYANYA war, which was terminated by the 1972 Agreement, and the SPLM/A war which was a direct product of the catastrophic policies of the first totalitarianism in The Sudan is huge: n In the ANYANYA war, the numbers of troops never exceeded 3000. They never captured a command post or town. They didn’t disrupt rail, road, and river transport. As Prime Minister, I toured the whole South in 1966 using rail, road, boat and aircraft without any hindrance. They had no open regional, nor international support. They had no more than light arms. n The SPLA war amassed troops in tens of thousands. Their training and equipment is sophisticated. From the very beginning, it captured posts and towns, put an end to the development schemes, and disrupted road, river, rail and air transport. Nimeiri’s ill-advised flirtations with cold- war alliances provided it with invaluable regional and international allies. Nimeiri’s regime capitalized on the homework of the second democratic reign in Sudan, and on the windfall of his devastation of the communists of Sudan, to end a limited insurrection in 1972. His despotic regime betrayed the country, squandered the peace opportunity, and bequeathed the Sudan a civil war which put its survival as a state at stake!. The decline and fall of the MAY regime in April 1985 came about as follows: a. The bloody persecution of the ANSAR after the massacre at ABA ISLAND and WADNUBAWI in March 1970 motivated thousands of ANSAR to immigrate to Ethiopia along the route taken by the IMAM AL HADI in MARCH 1970. Several political leaders have fled the country and formed an opposition NATIONAL FRONT in exile, for example, SHARIF HUSSEIN AL HINDI (the man who after death of SAYED ISMAEL AL AZHARI in 1969, became the de facto leader of the D.U.P), Dr. OMAR NUR AL DAYEM, who was by that time, the second man in the UMMA party leadership, and SAYED OSMAN KHALID, the external representative of the ISLAMIC CHARTER FRONT. In 1972, I was still in detention. From there I sent a message to Dr. OMAR to explore the possibilities of LIBYAN cooperation with us. That contact succeeded, and Libya agreed to support the National Front, and provided it with finance, arms and training. I was released from detention in May 1973 as a direct result of the adoption of a new CONSTITUTION, to constitutionalize the ADDIS ABEBA agreement of the 1972. Between my release in May 1973, and September 1973, I had, along with others, organized the SEPTEMBER (SHABAN) uprising. The May regime suppressed it in a very cruel way, and shut down all the relative freedoms it tolerated after its enactment of the NEW CONSTITUTION. To narrow the basis of the uprising, the regime blamed it on the ISLAMIC CHARTER FRONT. However, later in the year, in December 1973, I was arrested again. I was released on April 1974 and was allowed to leave the country ostensibly for medical reasons. In exile we reorganized the NATIONAL FRONT, organized our supporters into an efficient fighting force, mainly ANSAR freedom fighters, with some Islamic Charter Front's freedom fighters. In July 1976, we staged an armed uprising, which nearly toppled the regime. NIMEIRI responded with a policy of brutal suppression. When the dust settled, he realized that the opposition had teeth and political abilities. He offered National Reconciliation through a third party. Initially, the NATIONAL FRONT unanimously accepted national reconciliation. In July 1977, we agreed on terms of National Reconciliation. Just as in the case of the ADDIS ABEBA agreement of 1972, NIMEIRI had no real intention of devolving power. He wanted NATIONAL RECONCILIATION to enhance the legitimacy of his government. After about a year, we discovered that to our dismay. However, two aspects of the National Reconciliation process remained, namely, the safe return to Sudan of a great number of opposition leaders from exile. Secondly, the provision of a greater margin of political freedom which resulted in holding relatively free trade unionist elections, especially among the professionals (teachers, doctors, engineers, clerks, bankers and so on), and among the students of higher education. b. The failure of the economic policies of the regime resulted in a terrible rise in inflation. On the average, prices rose 1000% between 1970 and 1980. Inevitably, this drove the newly constituted professional trade unions into enhanced trade unionist activity. However, the first significant clash between the regime and a professional body, was with the judiciary. NIMEIRI’s so called “legislative revolution” of September 1983, started as a means of putting the judiciary in the defensive. c. The newly constituted students’ unions, especially that of OMDURMAN ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, after a period of mobilization, took to the street. They heralded the April 1985 uprising. The professional Trade unions, particularly the University teachers, the medical doctors, the engineers, the lawyers, the cashiers, began demonstrating against the regime. The political parties, particularly the UMMA, orchestrated the whole activity, joined with the demonstrations, openly called for the downfall of the regime, provided the movement with the text of the NATIONAL LIBERATION CHARTER, and openly appealed to the armed forces to support the popular demands, topple the May regime, and pave the way for democracy in Sudan. On the 6th April 1985, the Armed Forces of the Sudan as a whole staged a coup and opened the way for the third Democracy after a year’s transition period. THE LEGACY OF THE SECOND TOTALITARIAN (THIRD AUTOCRACY) ISLAMICIST PROGRAM The most important doorstep to the legacy of the “SALVATION” regime, established by the 30th June 1989 coup d’etat, is its ISLAMICIST program. Moslems consider Islam as the Third and last revelation in the trail of IBRAHIM. The Quran recognized other religions in the ABRAHAMIC tradition as peoples of scriptures. The Quran recognized Human worth as such. Recognition of Human worth as such, and religious plurality, established the basic tolerance of ISLAM, revelation and reason complement each other. That argued for a theo- rationalism, or theo-humanism. Consequently, it was possible for Moslem thinkers and sages, without any ecclesiastical authority, to develop various Moslem schools of thought through KALAM (Theosophy). Moslem philosophers developed the schools of Greek philosophy, and elaborated idea- systems to reconcile the Truths of Revelation and Reason. Moslem mystics (SUFIS) acquainted themselves of the Pantheistic concepts of Eastern -particularly Indian- religious insights, and injected them into the ISLAMIC worldview. At another level, Moslem theologians, applied the injunctions of the holy texts to social reality, and elaborated numerous schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Islamic civilization opened two- way traffic influencing other world civilizations, and being influenced by them. However, in three aspects: the system of government, the economy, and foreign relations, Islamic practice adapted, to a large extent, the systems elaborated by other civilizations. The most prevalent system of government after a short initial period, became a system of Imperial Royalty. The economic system became one of feudo- capitalism. Foreign relations were cold war relations with contemporary Empires. Before this pragmatism prevailed, there were many idealist voices, which protested against it. ABU ZAR ALGEFARI, was alarmed at the emergence of feudo- capitalism, and loudly protested. AL KHAWARIJ (the rebels) were alarmed that politics were getting out of divine control. Their view of Islam was theocratic. There is no particular system of government, nor system of economy in ISLAM. There are certain ISLAMIC political principles - for example, participation (SHURA), justice and so on- and Islamic economic principles – for example, the duty of developing production and fair distribution- to guide the system which Islamic society adopts. Neglect of this guidance fueled the continuous protests of reformers and revolutionaries. | |||
