TO UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

 

Literature 

 

24th March 1999

H. E. the U.N High Commissioner for Human Rights

Geneva,

Switzerland

SUBJ: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SUDAN (1997-99)

                 The peoples of Sudan appreciate the great effort your commission makes to monitor the observation of Human Rights in the U. N. member countries. We specially appreciate the serious effort to focus on Human Rights in the Sudan and the appointment of a Special Rapporteur to make an annual Report on the subject since 1992. The abuse of Human Rights in Sudan, which has been continuously exposed since then and the continuous condemnations, were well earned.

            In the last two years (1997-1999) the Khartoum Regime has undergone a face lift which some mistook for genuine change. The Khartoum Regime may rightly claim now that its abuse of Human Rights is less crude than it was five years ago. It can rightly claim that its abuse of Human Rights is not different from some of Sudan’s neighbors. However, if the current abuse of Human Rights in the Sudan is measured in terms of universally approved Human Rights charters, its showing is dismal. If it is measured against the Human Rights situation in Sudan before the June 30th Coup d’etat, the comparison will show how long are the strides which the Sudan has taken backwards!

 In fact the International Community has treated the Khartoum Regime very mildly. It was a coup against a properly elected Democratic Government, and should have been denied recognition in the first place, as the Haiti coup of 1996, and the Sierra Leone coup of 1998.

Abuse of Human Rights in the Sudan is still alive and kicking. The main difference to day is that the regime is more conscious of the weight of International opinion and the need to placate it.

As your commission reviews the situation, I am sure the Special Rapporteur will offer enough objective information and analysis. However, as the elected Prime Minister of the Sudan (1986), I feel obliged to present my witness of the Human Rights scene in the Sudan over the past two years. I shall present my witness in seven sections and give examples of the Human Rights abuse in the Sudan (1997- 1999)

 SECTION ONE

NEGATION OF THE OTHER

In the 20th century, both Communism and Fascism have developed ideologies and institutions to monopolize power and establish institutions to exclude other opinion. The present Regime in Khartoum believes in an anachronistic ideology, but it has borrowed heavily from the means and methods of modern TOTALITARIANISM.

The regime is exclusivist and self-righteous because it claims to speak on behalf of God. This theocratic claim is totally alien to ISLAM which is a lay religion and in which the state is a civil institution.

(A)                  The Sudanese Armed Forces were regarded as a National Institution. They have been put under the control of a minority party, the Islamic National Front NIF. Several partisan para-military organizations have been formed to further complete the partisanization of military power and the exclusion of others.

(B)                   The Sudanese Police Force, which was also regarded as a National Institution, was similarly manipulated.

(C)                   The Sudan civil service was subjected to a broad witch-hunt to eliminate opposing political elements, and to put leading posts in the hands of the ruling party.

(D)                  The judiciary was independent. The regime completed its control of the judiciary by the appointment, last year, of the chief justice, Hafiz AL Sheikh AL Zaki, who is an NIF cadre, without credible experience as a judge. Previously, the chief justice was either promoted as the most senior judge, or elected by the senior judges.

(E)                    All elected Trade Unions have been banned by the June Coup. Instead, new Trade Unions have been set up. During the last two years, elections have been conducted for the Bar Association, for the Labor Union, for the Gezira Farmers’ Union, and for a number of Students’ Unions. These elections have been accompanied by Police intimidation. Elements opposing the regime have been harassed, interrogated, arrested and tortured. The elections themselves were systematically rigged. The Sudanese experience in this respect is typical of the totalitarian pattern of Government: The manipulation of the institutions of the modern state, and the institutions of civil society for the Partisan purposes of the regime. Those who reject such manipulation and/or resist it are simply crushed with all brutality.

 

 

 

 

SECTION TWO

ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS

 

During the last two years, the Khartoum Regime conducted a Public Relations Campaign to give the impression that its abuse of Human Rights has ended. The following are examples of the continued abuse of Human Rights during the period in question.

1.                 On the 30th of June 1998, the regime discovered bombs planted in nine spots in the Capital. They made broad accusations across the board. They arrested scores of people and threatened to give them exemplary punishment. They put the accused on public show, they tortured them. Two of the accused had actually died during detention.

2.                 Two leading persons of the Umma Party and Ansar Group, namely, Abdal Rahman Nugdalla, and Abdal Mahmoud Abbu, have been arrested in connection with the bombs. They have been kept in isolation for three months and have been condemned by official statements. After mental and physical torture they were released without any interrogation or trial.

3.                 The Ansar leader of Friday prayers Adam Ahmad Yousuf condemned the baseless arrests, accused the Government of using the incident to get rid of its political opponents, and demanded their release. He, and three others who represent the committee responsible for composing the Friday sermon were arrested and put on trial. The court acquitted them. However, Security immediately re-arrested them!!.

4.                 The Regime boasts that it does not hold political prisoners any more. This is untrue. There are scores of political prisoners held in ways to hide their existence. It is true that the periods of detention are shorter but not less severe, for example, in July 1998, the entire executive Committee of the elected (and banned) Federation of Labor Unions was arrested and shortly afterwards released. The Regime now practices part-time detention. The victims are ordered to report to State Security every day in the morning. They are then kept waiting until the evening and released to return in the next morning. This harassment could go on for weeks and months!!.

5.                 People’s privacy is systematically invaded. Correspondence is opened and read. Telephones are tapped. All the NIF formations are recruited to spy on their neighbors, civil servants on their colleagues, and so on. In the whole cross section of society NIF formations spy against their respective social or official counterparts.

6.                 The information gathered about others, which indicates their doubts about the NIF Regime, is used against them. Thousands of Civil Service and Armed Forces personnel have been summarily dismissed without any process of law. This practice continued throughout the last two years.

7.                 The right of assembly is systematically denied. On the 26th of January, the Umma Party and Ansar Group have organized a National celebration of the liberation of Khartoum. The assembly was banned, and the city where they were going to be held was occupied with police Forces and militias.

8.                  After the tragic events in Western Darfur Region, a number of citizens from the three regions of Darfur representing members of the 1986 elected Parliament, professionals, traders, students, and religious and tribal leaders have written a memorandum analyzing the violent events in the regions, apportioning responsibility for them, and suggesting measures to deal with them. They planned to assemble and present the memorandum. Their assembly was banned by force.

 

 

 

SECTION THREE

WAR CRIMES

 

1.                 The traditional concept of JIHAD as evolved by past theologians is embedded in its historical circumstances. It is based upon a division of the world into two zones: one the zone of Peace, the other the zone of War. It requires initiating hostilities for religious purposes. It requires the enslavement of prisoners of war, and so on. I have shown elsewhere in my book on the Social Teachings of Islam, that JIHAD is a comprehensive commitment to the cause of righteousness. That it involves all aspects of service to the cause of righteousness starting with self- purification. JIHAD requires armed conflict in self-defense and in the defense of religious freedom. However, the NIF regime declared JIHAD on its opponents without engaging in the tolerant elucidation of the concept of JIHAD. Therefore many of the regime’s supporters considered themselves engaged in JIHAD as understood by many old days theologians. It is true that the regime has not enacted a law to realize slavery in Sudan. But the traditional concept of JIHAD does allow slavery as a by-product. Also, the regime has encouraged intertribal armed conflicts. Tribal traditions, especially in the borderline areas, do involve mutual enslavement as a consequence of victory in battle.

2.                 The armed forces of the NIF Regime do not abide by the rules and regulations of modern warfare. Consequently, they have engaged in the following practices:

A-                           They rarely take prisoners of war. Captives are systematically executed.

B-                            In the rare cases when they take prisoners of war they torture them to the limit. In the 14th of Nov. 1997, five prisoners of war belonging to the Umma Liberation Army, namely: Abd Al Hadi Ahmad Al Khidir, Omar Ali Mohammad, Abbas Mustafa, Al Kheir Al Sadig and Hassan Musa, have been tortured to near death, and have been humiliated by being paraded as traitors and foreign agents. The Umma party reported the case to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and requested its interference for the release of the POW.

3.                 In the Southern war zones, and the Nuba Mountains, civilians living in the garrison towns have been suspected of fifth column activities and simply taken away to be secretly executed. Such practices became massive in 1998 following Commander Karbinu’s attempt to take the town of Wau.

4.                 In the Nuba Mountains, and in the South, the Regime has conducted a scorched earth military policy resulting in the destruction of villages, in the displacement of thousands of citizens.

5.                 The Regime has systematically used food as a military instrument. In the crucial months of February and March 1998, the regime denied the Humanitarian Relief Organizations right of access to Bahr Al Ghzal thereby contributing to the famine which disseminated that region.

 

 

 

 

SECTION FOUR

YOUTH AND STUDENT PERSECUTION

 

There is a complex relationship between the Khartoum Regime and the students. The movement, which fathered the regime, the NIF, was founded amongst students. It is a type of Sudanese TALIBAN. It irrationally engaged in the establishment of Universities without the necessary means, because it sought to extend its constituency. However, the regime failed to take into consideration that its students’ support is based on the idealistic promise, which the movement offered. As a government, all hopes were dashed and the Regime is widely considered among Sudanese youth as a coercive kleptocratic group of opportunists. Therefore, support for it among Sudanese youth, particularly students has collapsed.

The regime found itself short of soldiers to fight its various JIHADs. The regular Armed Forces are based on voluntary recruits. Those who presented themselves for recruitment were overwhelmingly from ethnic groups which the regime considered suspect. The Popular Defense Forces, which were numerically large, would not present themselves for combat. Therefore the regime sought to activate the law of compulsory National Service and twist it to mean compulsory military service available for instant combat. The whole exercise became one of compulsory instant combat. Sudanese youth, particularly students, resisted this holocaust. The regime reacted by linking the right of education with this holocaust. The relevant educational stages were put under military control.

School leaving qualification, and access to higher education has become contingent upon doing the compulsory instant combat. The first victim of this policy is the right of education, the second is academic freedom. Sudanese male students have fled to the Four Corners of the Earth. For the first time in history, Sudanese school certificate results for 1999 have shown 70% female students. The males have escaped registering for the school certificate to avoid the inevitable link with compulsory instant combat.

The following events are examples of the raging battle between the regime and the Students of the Sudan:

1.                    In the camps designed for speedy training and instant delivery to combat zones, insubordination and open revolt became endemic. The most notorious is that which took place in Al Ailafun Camp. There the students and other youth revolted and fled for safety. They attempted to escape by crossing the river. A number of them, 169, were killed, some by being shot from the back, and a minority by drowning. The event took place on the 2nd of April 1998. The regime broadcasted lies about the event and refused a chorus of demands for proper investigation.

2.                 In Cairo, in Damascus, and all the cities, which allow freer access to Sudanese students, it is possible today to interview hundreds of Sudanese Students who tell a story of cat and mouse chase between the Khartoum Regime and the Students.

3.                 In fact, there is currently a raging battle between the regime and the registered students:

A-                           To buy security for itself, the regime had summarily closed the institutions of higher education for almost a year: October 1997 to September 1998. Again they were closed for a month during 1998. They were closed for security reasons.

B-                            In August 1998, the regime decided to raise residence fees by 80% in Khartoum University. The students demonstrated in protest. They were violently repressed. A score were arrested, tortured, and one of them: Mohammad Abdul Salam Babiker was tortured to death.

C-                          Elections were held for the Students Union in Omdurman Islamic University in March 1999. The election clearly indicated a land slide victory for the students opposing the regime. The government side attempted to rig the elections, the opposition students resisted these attempts. NIF student supporters aided by security forces engaged opposition students in open battle. Some opposition students were arrested, and tortured. In fact two students belonging to the Ansar organization, namely, Adam Isa Mohammad, and Al Wasila Ahmed Izzadin, have been kidnapped by security personnel and tortured by pulling out their nails, flogged, and sprayed with a chemical, which was then set on fire. Those horrors took place in March 1999. The two students are now with their families and may be interviewed. Attached are photographs showing what happened.

D-                          Following is a description of up-to-date events in Gezira University last week. The authorities ordered students to keep out of the Campus after 6p.m. The students opposed the instructions and staged a sit-in. They were dispersed by force and security forces aided by NIF students beat the opposition students.

E-                            A similar incident took place in East Nile University.

F-                            A number of Students from the KORAN University have been subjected to terrible torture: pulling of nails, burning of skin, electric shocks and so on. Attached is videotape taken on the 20th of March 1999, showing five students victims of torture, and smuggled out of the country.

This scene is wide spread. Two non governmental universities which demonstrate the success of Sudanese private enterprise in the field of Higher education, namely, Ahfad University, and Ahlia University, have received a great deal of negative attention by the NIF regime.

 

 

SECTION FIVE

RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION

 

1.                                         The regime does not tolerate real religious freedom. The regime may be able to claim that it has become more religiously tolerant, that it has allowed more churches to be built, and so on. However, even to-day, the issue of religious persecution could be demonstrated by two aspects:

ASPECT ONE: The recently enacted constitution of January 1999 puts a non Moslem citizen at a disadvantage, because it imposes Islamic duties on all citizens in terms of the following articles of the Constitution: 6,7,9,15,17 and 19.

ASPECT TWO: The regime’s official ideology which emanates from all its media institutions and public utterances describe the Sudan as an Islamic State in terms of the ISALMICIST Agenda. Consequently, even if the Government itself refrains from extremist Islamicist postures, fanatical groups take the law into their own hands, and take action against the “enemies of God”. This led to a mushroom growth of autonomous fanatical initiatives, born in Sudan, and/or allied with like-minded external fanatical groups. Such groups have been responsible for several bloody events during the last decade. The latest event in this bloody chain took place last February 1999, when a Christian Student group in the University of Khartoum held their annual book show for the Bible. A group of Islamicist Sudanese zealots and some of their non- Sudanese Islamicist allies attacked the whole exhibition. They destroyed it, and violent conflict between the organizers of the exhibition and the attackers ensued. The conflict has caused widespread instability in the University of Khartoum. It is still raging. The Khartoum regime has not directly participated in the event. However, it created the intellectual and emotional environment for it.

2.                                         Two Catholic Priests: Rev. Lino Sebit, and Rev. HILARY BOMA have been arrested in July 1998 and charged with responsibility for the June 30th 1998 bombings and held in unknown locations. The charges are completely baseless and nothing but religious prejudice lies behind them.

3.                                         Religious persecution in the Sudan today is also directed against Moslems who do not share the Regime’s Islamicist ideology. The Ansar religious organization had had the lion’s share of oppression. Their main mosque in Omdurman and headquarters were occupied in 1994 and used for Government purposes. In 1998, and in compliance with the new tactic, the place was evacuated by Government officials and handed over to a handful of senile Ansar individuals who are manipulated by State Security. So in 1998, the place was not handed back to the organization from which it was usurped, but, to a group, which appears as different from the Government but is in fact Government-manipulated. During 1998, they tried to do the same for the second main mosque, but failed. ANSAR delegates to the different parts of the Sudan are systemically harassed. The same applies to all religious organizations, which refuse to support the ISLAMICIST agenda of the Regime. They are intimidated, their leaders of Friday prayers are harassed, and their interests are systematically used to pressure them to comply with the Regime’s program. There is a continuous tug of war between the Regime and the Islamic religious community in the Sudan.

 

 

 

SECTION SIX

FEMALE PERSECUTION

 

In the face of it the NIF’s ideology is gender conscious. The NIF leadership has grasped the political importance of women and has taken steps to accommodate them. However, it is clear that women are treated as poor relations and not as recognized in their own right. The traditional attitude to women has not been eliminated, and many officials still think that their official ISLAMICIST ideology requires women to be third class citizens. Many policies treated women as minors who cannot be trusted to behave without guardians.

1.                 During 1998, a busload of Ahfad female students was directed by a group of security officers to a branch office in Omdurman. There they were subjected to humiliating treatment and after being examined one by one, a number of young ladies were flogged for not being modestly dressed in the eyes of the security officials!!

2.                 During 1998, the authorities of Khartoum State issued what they called Public Order Regulations. The gist of the regulations is that women cannot be trusted to behave as responsible human beings, and must therefore be put under continuous security. Their sole role in life seems to be temptation, and the “honorable” male members of society should be protected from their evil designs. The regulations take the whole issue of morality and good behavior out of context and treat it in isolation as a proof of the Regime’s Islamicist credentials. This program of gender oppression is unislamic. Islam honored womankind. Today in the era of Universal Human Rights, Islam will not be found wanting.

 SECTION SEVEN

ECONOMIC PERSECUTION

 The Sudanese economy suffered from an arbitrary ISLAMICIST economic program, coupled with an unimaginative compliance with IMF recipe, and a break in Sudan’s external economic relations.

1.                 The so-called Islamic Banking system, especially in terms of the instruments of MURABAHA and SALAM, is a regressive Banking system, which imposes interest of 48% under the guise of MURABAHA. The real rate of interest under the guise of SALAM is even higher. The rate of interest in Sudan’s traditional Banking system never exceeded 16%.

2.                 The imposition of ZAKAT has slight relation to the real Islamic ZAKAT. As presently applied in Sudan it is no more than a system of double taxation for Moslems.

3.                 Taxation itself as an instrument of public finance has been violated. As applied in Sudan, it is a measure of rewarding supporters and punishing opponents.

4.                 Privatization, which is an important item towards the market economy, has been undertaken in the Sudan as a means of turning the National Economic assets to the governing party and its cronies. It is a classic case of piracy not privatization.

5.                 The massive dismissal of Civil Service and Armed Forces personnel only added to the partisanization of the instruments of State in the Sudan.

 

CONCLUSION

1.                 It is wrong to regard the Khartoum Regime in terms of Democratic deprivation alone. The picture presented by the seven sections of abuse and discrimination describes a state of war between the ruling Junta and all sections of Sudanese society. The whole spectrum of Sudanese society has suffered terrible abuse and discrimination at the hands of this regime. The exodus from the Sudan is a direct consequence of that abuse and discrimination. It is an international duty to help the citizens of the Sudan in their present predicament.

2.                 No doubt there is currently a degree of press freedom in Sudan, also there is more freedom of movement in terms of travel restrictions. There are also some attempts to accommodate religious and cultural plurality. Some sections of the Regime talk in more tolerant terms. The regime is serving out sedatives, if you like. However, the real disease of an oppressive ideology and a Police State to empower a minority party and to disenfranchise the majority of the people of the Sudan and to intimidate them is very much in business.

3.                 We, the Peoples of the Sudan appeal to the U. N. Commission on Human Rights to resolve the following:

(A)                              To condemn the Khartoum Regime for its record of Human Rights abuse, and to instruct the Khartoum Regime to “cease-fire” in its war of aggression against the Peoples of the Sudan particularly the civilian population.

(B)                               The office of Special Rapporteur to be mandated to continue with its valuable work. The office should be strengthened and enabled to have a permanent office in Sudan to keep its hand on the Human Rights pulse in the country.

(C)                              The only guarantee for Human Rights observance on a sustainable basis is complete transparency as made possible by Democratic Government.

 

 Therefore the Human Rights Commission should recommend to the U. N. General Assembly that the U. N. should pass two new resolutions, namely:

One: No coup d’etat against an elected Government will be given International recognition.

Two: Regimes which have been established as a result of coup d’etat against a bona fide Democratic Government and have achieved de facto recognition by the International Community should be required to effect democratic transformation in genuine terms, spelt out by the International Community, and based upon articles of the Universal Charters of Human Rights.

 The representatives of the Peoples of the Sudan as represented by the parties of the National Democratic Alliance and others, have presented the Khartoum Regime with a Memorandum on the 29th of December 1998, which charted a safe road to peace and democratic transformation in the Sudan. We hope that the International Community will appreciate and support the legitimate aspirations of the Peoples of the Sudan.

 I am yours faithfully

 Al Sadig Al Mahdi

Last Freely Elected Prime Minister

 of Sudan –1986 

 

 

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