28.7.2002

A strategic Paper on Just Peace in the Framework of

Comprehensive Political Settlement in Sudan

The Eight factors that paved the way for peace:

1- Rejection of War: As a result of the total devastation that it brought to both the South and the North, the peoples of the Sudan have unanimously come to reject the war. The youth in the North have boycotted the call for war, and in the South a group of eminent Priests called for its immediate stoppage. On the other hand, it became evident that neither party (the Government and the SPLM/SPLA) can win the war militarily. And although the Southern resistance has won a lot of support both regionally and internationally, it was not foreseeable that the Southern armed resistance would defeat the Sudanese State, which in turn, has managed to mobilize allies and regional and international support too. As such, the war became simply a guerilla war draining the financial and human resources of the country.

2- Development of Issues of Common Interest: Despite the toll in human lives, and the huge damage to economic, social and political infrastructure, the war has however brought to the forefront some key issues believed to contribute positively to the future of the Sudan. These were issues, which previously divided the Sudanese but may well now lead to their unification. These developments may be summarized as follows:

- Religious belief and cultural identity are natural aspirations at the individual and group level, but cannot be imposed on others by any single Party.

- Islam satisfies the aspirations of Muslims in Sudan, but at the same time cannot be imposed on other Muslims by the political agenda of a given group, nor can it be imposed on non-Muslims.

- Citizenship, and not religious affiliation, should be the basis of Constitutional Rights and Obligations.

- It is not possible to govern Sudan by one single Party, while denying all the others their natural and Constitutional Right. The current governing Party was subjected to a number of divisions testifying to this observation. Political, religious, and cultural plurality are the very characteristic of Sudan itself.

- Unity of Sudan is a genuine desire of all-Sudanese, however, in the light of the experience of the war, it should be brought about voluntarily and be confirmed through a free and just referendum.

The above factors have produced a good stock of Peace culture, and laid foundation for peaceful settlement and National reconciliation. And despite the fact that the current government in Khartoum accepted most of them, a psychological barrier between the two parties at war, prevented the conclusion of such settlement.

3- The Role of the Umma Party: The Umma Party broke this psychological barrier by adopting a negotiated comprehensive political settlement. Accordingly, it initiated an unprecedented serious dialogue with the government to attain peace without having to participate in the government. This gave the Umma Party the credibility that it is the national interest rather than the partisan interest, which is of the essence to it. This, further on, gave the party the flexibility and the acceptability to talk to various local, regional and international parties on the issue of peace and political stability in Sudan.

The Umma party was thus able to underline the following three important issues:

a- Present the relationship between Religion and state in a moderate context (that Islamic Enlightenment), unlike that of the Fundamentalist Right and the Fundamentalist Left.

b- To ascertain the right of self-determination with priority to unity, at a time when that right started to lose support by many in the North.

c- Distinguish between needed beneficial international intervention in the problem of Sudan, and unwarranted interference. The Umma Party argued that “Internationalization” of the Sudan Problem might not be all-evil.

4- The Role of the Government: It must be admitted that the government contributed to the above positive climate through the following steps:

First, by drastically changing its previous ideological agenda denying others any right whatsoever. Second, it survived American pressure forcing the USA to look for alternative solutions. Third, in the aftermath of the 11^th September 2001 incident, the government showed a lot of flexibility and cooperation with the American administration, thus winning some sympathy. Fourth, having developed Sudanese oil, the government became more ready for a peaceful settlement, if not for anything but to guarantee the smooth flow of oil. In a number of ways, the development of oil has contributed positively to the peace process in Sudan.

5- The Regional Role: It is to be observed that Africa, South of the Sahara, has strongly supported the Southern Sudan Cause during the current regime, mainly due to the regime’s attempts to institute and impose a Sudanese identity based on it’s own political agenda. However, Africa discovered that there are many voices in the North, which, unlike the regime, accepts the rights of the Southerners and, which calls for peace. These voices were aided by the balanced position of Nigerian President , Obasanjo, who came to power in May 2001.

6- The European Position: The European stand was very much against the regime until very recently, when the regime adopted its extremist ideologies and policies. However, the European position was modified after it entered into beneficial dialogue with the regime in the context of the political change. A Landmark in this regard is the Cotonu Agreement in which the normalization of political relations with the regime was tied to progress towards political dialogue in the country. Moreover, it was made a condition to involve the European Union, the regime and the civil society organizations in any agreement concerning developmental aid to Sudan.

7- The American Position: The following factors have contributed to changing the American position towards the regime in Sudan from one of isolation, containment and active support to its opposition, to one of earnest support to the peace process in Sudan:

(a) It became clear towards the end of the Clinton era that the policy of isolation and containment of the regime had actually failed.

(b) The extremist policies of the regime towards war in the South and towards its Northern opponents, produced many lobbies inside America against the regime. Discussion arose between the policy of isolating the regime, which was not effective and a more proactive policy, which would protect the victims of the war and of the regime.

(c) After the 11^th September 2001 incident, the regime started to distance itself from extremist organizations and showed a lot of flexibility in its dealings with the USA. Given this fact, and the fact that the SPLM/SPLA has a good relationship with it, the USA saw an opportunity in playing a role in ending the Sudanese problem.

(d) The regime was able to develop the already discovered oil fields utilizing the services of oil companies competitive to the USA, like China. This created concern among the American oil companies and consequently in the corridors of the American administration. Both parties wanted to correct this imbalance.

8- Peace Forums: Last but not least, are the many forums and study groups organized by eminent Sudanese thinkers and experts and supported by the international community, which helped in creating an established peace culture and national agenda for the prospective Sudan. These forums include,

A) The program of building peace in the Sudan, a series of conferences organized by the African Renaissance Institute (ARI) in collaboration with the Foreign Relations’ Institute (FRI), the last one of which was the third consultative forum organized in the U.K. during 28-1-2002 to 1-2-2002.

B) The forum supported by the European Union under the banner of: “The European Initiative for democracy and Human Rights: A proposal for Peace in Sudan”. This forum held two meetings, one in Khartoum and the other in Nairobi and will hold a major meeting in August 2002 in Heidelberg in Germany.

C) The comprehensive report issued by the International Crisis Group (ICG), which contained detailed information and strong arguments that the chances for peace in Sudan have improved.

D) The UN has adopted a proactive and positive approach towards peace in Sudan through its Secretary general and some of its specialized organizations.

The above eight factors have combined to create a unique climate in favor of the peace process in Sudan. The interplay among domestic, regional and International factors was thus the deciding factor.

MEDIATION EFFORTS

The third Democratic Regime and the SPLM/A were about to hold the awaited National Constitutional Conference on 18-9-1989 to discuss and hopefully resolve all pending issues. The military coup- de’ tat of June, 30 1989 prevented this possibility. The regime that followed adopted slogans, which further worsened the situation, and the religious factor was made to come fully to play for the first time. As such, the early efforts of mediation by ex-President Jimmy Carter and ex-President Ibrahim Babangeda resulted in dialogues of the deaf and had no avail.

On the other hand, and since 1994, the IGAD Initiative introduced two important elements. These are:

- The announcement of six guiding principles (Declaration of Principles DOP) that call for a democratic secular Sudan, or else, self- determination for the South.

- Involvement of the International community as observers to the peace process under the name of the friends of IGAD.

The government of Sudan only accepted to sign the six principles in 1997. But the DOP. itself suffered from a number of weaknesses:

i- Simplifying the choice between a united democratic secular or self- determination could easily mean separation.

ii- Negotiation was limited to the government and the SPLM/A.

iii- Sudan neighbors in North Africa were not involved.

iv- The IGAD group of countries were divided among themselves and could not have real influence on the two parties.

The Umma Party has repeatedly pointed out those weaknesses and called for the revision of the principles and the negotiation mechanism. And in parallel to this, the party contacted Sudan North African neighbors and requested them to show more and closer interest in the Sudanese affair. As a result of these efforts, in August 1999, Libya proposed an initiative, which later was supported by Egypt to become the “Joint Initiative”. Despite its many positive aspects, the joint Initiative also suffered from the following drawbacks:

a) It ignored the right of self-determination.

b) It did not involve Sudan’s Horn of Africa neighbors.

c) It did not have a practical mechanism for its implementation, nor had it the needed financial back up.

But it must be said that despite its shortcomings, the joint Initiative helped to revive the IGAD Initiative. In this regard, the United Sates role under the Bush administration was re-activated through the appointment of Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy to Sudan in November 2001. The American intervention was successful in introducing the following new concepts:

- That the mediator is able to propose solutions and convince the parties to the conflict to accept them.

- That those suggested proposals have a mechanism of supervision and follow-up.

- That arbitration may be resorted to in the case of difference.

The four agreements reached between the two parties under American sponsorship allowed for a more influential role in Mashakos talks in June 2002. And it must be said that the true value of the Mashakos Accord is not in its literal statements, many of which are liable to differences of opinion, but rather to the following reasons:

- It resembled a tool for crossing from animosity to talking.

- It created an opportunity to voice reconciliatory ideas.

- It formed a symbol for peace.

The accord managed to strike agreement on three vital problems:

1) Governed the relationship between Religion and State in a way that balances between national unity and religious freedom.

2) Confirmation of the right of self- determination in a way that gives priority to national unity, by agreeing to just transitional arrangements that are capable of positively influencing the result of the referendum in the direction of national unity.

3) Agreeing on the length of the transitional period and on some of the reforms needed during it.

We in the Umma Party, welcomed all what has been reached in the Mashakos Accord. We believe that it tackled some fundamental issues that thus far have been points of difference of opinion. However, we also believe that there are other equally important matters that need to be added to complement the Accord and clear some of the ambiguities. We therefore propose the following:

A- Agreement on a central national constitution that overrides all other laws and regulations. Whatever diversity of laws that is necessitated, it must accommodate both national unity and religious freedom. To avoid any conflict between such laws and the constitution, these must be catered for in the constitution itself. General laws must have a general source and general acceptability. Specific Laws relevant to specific groups can have the source unique to those groups.

B- Decentralization of the State is an agreed upon objective, but it is very important to agree to the division of roles between center and regions during the transitional period and be included in the Constitution. Examples of Central authorities would be: Sovereignty, the Flag, the currency, the national armed forces, national planning and the constitutional judicial review. All others will remain decentralized.

C- The mechanism for ratifying the Constitution has to be national because the constitution itself is a national affair. In addition, the constitution has to incorporate the following:

- The peace agreement.

- All human rights and general freedoms as incorporated in International human rights agreements and covenants.

- Specifications of the three Constitutional Powers, their democratic formation and separation of their powers.

All these fundamentals have been agreed upon by all political parties of the Sudan when they accepted the memorandum of the Joint Initiative and its nine points. Therefore we urge that they be incorporated in the current agreement.

D- The idea of establishing another house besides parliament is a good one provided that all states are represented equally, and that certain qualifications are observed that will help serve the objectives of the House.

E- To avoid any future controversy, the issue of the transitional government must be clarified and specified in detail in the agreement. The phrase which was included in the memorandum of the Joint Initiative seem to serve the purpose, which reads, “to form a transitional government in which all political forces shall be represented”.

F- As to, what is the definition of “political forces’, this was agreed upon previously by all parties to mean: the regime, the National Democratic Alliance NDA and the Umma Party. Yet, the definition, which would better incorporate today’s political scene would have to include: the National Congress and its allies, the SPLM and its allies, the political forces which emerged as a result of 1986 general elections, and the political forces which gained prominence due to its role in national struggle since then.

POINTS FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS

There are a number of points that require to be discussed during the next round of talks to augment the peace agreement. The most important of these are the following five issues:

1) Distribution of Wealth: It has to be accepted that there are depressed and marginalized areas in Sudan in as far as development and services are concerned. The overall development program of the country must be revised in a way that brings justice to those regions and attain balanced development. And to avoid controversy over the distribution of oil revenue, we propose that those revenues be distributed among three uses:

- One third for development in the region, where oil is discovered.

- One third for a National Regional Balance Fund.

- One third for the central budget.

2) The Cultural issue: we have to accept that the phenomenon of cultural arrogance is fairly prevalent in our society, and apology about its negative ramifications is well due. All parties should commit themselves to an understanding, which accepts cultural diversity and religious multiplicity and organize co-existence accordingly. Representation in the current government institutions does not take into consideration such diversity. Accordingly, total revision should be undertaken with this objective in mind. On our part, we propose the 10- points in the Annex to this paper as a base for the cultural Charter.

3) The armed forces: It has to be agreed that the country must have unified national armed forces, which is truly national in its composition and of the highest efficiency. In the interim period until the question of voluntary unity is agreed upon, we propose the following arrangements:

(i) A preliminary period to coincide with cease fire with arrangements similar to the ones adopted for the Nuba Mountains Agreement.

(ii) A second period to be tied to the transitional period in which the armies will be allies under unified leadership but distinctive units, similar to the arrangements of Nato.

(iii) A third period, which would reflect the outcome of the referendum: should unity be the choice, the two armies will be merged and unified according to a detailed technical program that is prepared during the transitional period to avoid past mistakes. All other para-military organizations should be dissolved and their arms collected, and their personnel be helped to remerge in civil society and be able to lead a decent life.

4) Cease-Fire: An armistice may be agreed upon as a sign of good will during the talks, and as soon as agreement on all the points mentioned here is reached, a total and comprehensive cease-fire agreement may be signed.

5) Lifting of the State of Emergency: As soon as the total cease- fire agreement is signed, the state of emergency should promptly be lifted.

PROGRAM OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

The Transitional Period is concerned mainly with the following:

1- Incorporating the peace agreement in the national constitution.

2- Implementation of the peace agreement.

3- Agreement about the new constitution and its implementation such that reform of the government system and democratization can be achieved.

4- Implementation of a comprehensive post-war program in order to:

- Efficiently and equitably resettle the immigrants and the displaced.

- Comprehensively rehabilitate investment projects and economic and social infrastructure in the war zone.

- Consider such rehabilitation as part of a larger “Marshall” program to rehabilitate the South and all zones, which were affected by the war.

5- Design and implement a special developmental program for the areas along the North/ South boarders of separation of the war zone in order to contain all negative effects of the war and help establish permanent co-existence. Indeed a special chapter in the peace agreement needs to be devoted to those areas due to their sensitivity and due to the vital role they play in sustaining lasting peace. Public National participation in such program is an important success factor.

6- At the National level, there is need for an urgent salvation and reform program to address the ills that have bedeviled the Sudanese economy over the past few years. In order for such reforms to bear fruits and enable the economy to attract domestic and international foreign investment, the reforms must be guided by the following principles:

- Establishment of the state of law in which individual ownership and contracts are fully respected and protected.

- Adopting macro-economic and investment policies that reward investment and production, and organize the fiscal and financial systems in a way that serves the above objectives.

- Rehabilitation and development of economic and social infrastructure, particularly in water, electricity, roads and communication.

- Correcting regional imbalance in development projects and services.

- Adopting the policy of the market economy with necessary precautions against the negative impact of globalization and the WTO with a view of protecting the poorer sections of the community.

- Preservation of the environment.

- Creation of the appropriate mix between development and culture.

7- The current Federal Government System is a failure for three reasons: The states are fully under the control of the central government, they are not financially viable, and they are extremely costly to run. The required decentralized system should cure these three ills and enable the governments of the states to be self-reliant both administratively and financially. In this regards, the number of the states may not be more than 9 whose leadership and legislative bodies are freely elected.

8- Agree on a foreign policy that fits the new era of national reconciliation. The attached annex spells out the outline of our view in this regard.

9- Formation of a National Investigation Committee to look into all the injustices to which people were subjected, and have those injustices corrected is imperative.

THE NATIONAL NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT

The two parties of the talks have to realize that, it doesn’t matter what weight they currently carry, they do not represent all the Sudanese people. There is a bigger percentage of the Sudanese they should endeavor to have represented in the talks so that we do not repeat the experience of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. Therefore, what is required is avoidance of a bi-lateral agreement, but rather endeavor to make it national, and whatever is done be done with full transparency. In this connection, if the intention is to reach a national agreement, there is no objection that the talks may continue to be between the two parties. However for this to happen, the agreement will have to be endorsed by a national forum before it is finally signed. Such forum may represent all the active forces, which emerged as a result of the 1986 national elections, the government and its allies, the SPLM and its allies, representation of the Trade Union Movement, the Press and the National Personalities who were involved in one way or another with the peace initiatives. This so-called Sudanese National council, may be governed by the following guidelines:

(i) Whatever is reached between the two parties will be tabled to a meeting of the council, if the council agrees to it, it will be adopted, if amendments were proposed by the council and accepted by the two parties they will also be incorporated in the agreement.

(ii) If all members of the National Council unanimously agree on an issue, but not the two parties, the latter abide by the former’s decision.

(iii) If some of the members of the council made a proposal that is accepted by the two parties, that proposal may be added to the agreement.

(iv) All members of the council shall sign the agreement after endorsing it and shall pledge to support it and defend it.

THE REGIONAL ASPECT OF THE AGREEMENT

The agreement, if concluded, will mark an important step in regional cooperation since it is being sponsored by IGAD under the leadership of Kenyan President Arob Moi. IGAD’s efforts should be complemented by the efforts of the sponsors of the Joint Initiative- Egypt and Libya- in future talks. Both Nigeria and South Africa have had their share in supporting efforts towards peace in Sudan. They also should be included in the talks. Such inclusion should cover supervision and participation in the various committees that are responsible for follow-up and proper implementation.

THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF THE AGREEMENT

Any attempt from the international community to impose a view or a solution on the Sudanese people would represent an unwelcome internationalization of their problem. But all efforts to help them reach a settlement along the principles which they themselves accepted would be a valuable and welcome development. This is particularly so under the conditions of lack of trust and psychological barrier created by long years of war. With this understanding we welcome the efforts of the United States of America, Britain, Italy and Norway. To these countries, the list of those countries, which have special international weight like Russia and China, and those countries, which have special relations with Sudan like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait must be added.

If all goes well, we propose that the UN crowns its success by endorsing the agreement, and that the World Bank sponsors the efforts to rebuild the Sudan and implement the comprehensive rehabilitation and development program.

Guarantees of Implementation

During the period of confrontation, both the Government and the SPLM adopted fundamentals that were necessitated by that period. Those partisan fundamentals may now be replaced by national fundamentals about which everybody agrees. As for the Muslims, they shall agree on those fundamentals in the religion that shall become obligatory to them.

In order to avoid any regress in the peace process as a result of suspension and lack of trust between the two parties, it is required from all Sudanese partners of peace to start a full-fledge offensive to create the necessary atmosphere for peace, and to try to leave behind the language of yesterday and adopt the language and programs of tomorrow. This should by definition mean denouncing violence, terrorism and injustice.

The government in particular will have to prove its credibility through adopting practical measures that shows its unweaving commitment. There were a number of incidents in the past in which the government did not quite honor its word:

- In April 1997, the government signed an agreement with Dr. Reyak Mashar, and only one month later it issued the constitutional decree no. 14, which practically replaced and negated the agreement. This was the testimony of Dr. Reyak Mashar himself.

- In a similar situation, Dr. Lam Akol, who was one of the signatories to the Khartoum- Fashouda peace agreement later on informed that it was the security and military arrangements adopted by the government that led to the failure of the agreement.

- We, in the Umma Party, delegated a team to conduct negotiations with the government. The party did not endorse the outcome of the negotiations in two famous decisions on 18-2-2001 and 8-4-2002. This was a normal democratic practice. However, despite this, and despite the fact that the government was fully informed of the two decisions and of the fact that the negotiating team was not authorized to reach a binding decision, the government went ahead and signed an agreement with the negotiating team on behalf of the Party.

All the above practices put the government credibility very much in question, which, at the same time, justifies many doubts on its sincerity.

- The success of the Nuba Mountains agreement may be ascribable to international supervision and international arbitration.

- The Mashakos Accord has also introduced a mechanism of supervision for the implementation of the cease fire and of the agreement. This is a welcome development, despite all sensitivities, and a necessary tool to bridge the gap of years of mistrust. To augment and strengthen the role of the supervision and follow-up body, we propose that the National Forum be represented in it and be allowed to play a role in supervision, implementation and follow-up.

PORMISING SUDAN

Sudan is known to be an extremely rich country in both human and natural resources. Many of the those resources have been squandered by the civil war and by continued rule of dictatorial regimes. We have in our hands a historic golden opportunity for the Sudanese people, supported by the good will of the international community to say farewell to the gloomy past and make a fresh and new start to build the Sudan of tomorrow. Level headedness, forgiveness, freedom, religious, political and cultural diversity are the pre-requisites of a better future. If only the government would make the right and give the right signals regarding just peace and democracy, this historic moment could well be turned into a dream come true. It is up to the government to ride with the peace tide and achieve the national objectives, or be imprisoned in its own partisan slogans and lead the country to more fractionism. The opposition, on the other hand, is called upon to stop confrontation language and extend its hands for better cooperation to serve the future of the Sudan. This is a historic opportunity, so let us not waste, and be reminded of the Hadith of Prophet Mohamed (P. U. H) who said: “In the unfolding of Time, there are moments of Grace, EXPOSE yourself to them”. Put in a secular context in the words of Shakespeare: “There is a tide in the affairs of men, which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune. Omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in shallows and in miseries. On such a full sea are we now afloat”.

THE LEADING SUDAN

If Sudan were to achieve just peace and peaceful move to democracy, this would have far- reaching positive effects in the following fields:

(i) Many countries in the situation of Sudan have war or conflict arresting their progress. If Sudan had to strike a solution, this would be example to be followed by those countries.

(ii) Sudan resembles Africa in miniature. If peace and stability is attained in Sudan, this will have a big positive effect on the relationship between the Arab World and Africa, on the future of the African Union, and on the NEPAD initiative.

(iii) Peace and Stability in Sudan will have a positive impact on all its neighbors, particularly those of the Nile Basin, and will thus positively influence the future of the Nile Basin Initiative.

(iv) By reaching a comprehensive peace agreement, Sudan would give an example for transition from a state of war to a state of just peace.

(v) And likewise of transition to democracy. Moreover, the Sudan experience would give vivid evidence to the benefits to be derived from national, regional and international alliances in the era of globalization.

Annexes:

1- The Cultural Charter.

2- Evaluation of the Experience of the Federal Government.

3- Foreign Policy in Sudan.