IGAD Peace Process, 1999

Literature 

 May 1999

The IGAD Peace Process after the sixth round of talks

Between government of Sudan and SPLM/A

1. The D.O.P. of 1994 presupposes the assistance of two parties to the conflict in Sudan: The G.O.S. and the SPLM/A.

he two parties were required to declare their support for the six-principle (D.O.P.) as the basis for peace negotiations.

2. The D.O.P.  Offers two specific alternatives:

(A)                    A united country which is secular, democratic, and recognizes religious cultural and ethnic plurality.

(B)                    Failing that, The peoples of the South should exercise self-determination.

3. The N.I.F Regime in Khartoum is not any other national authority. It is a doctrine regime with a partisan Islamisist ideology which it has imposed on the majority of the Muslims of the Sudan, imposed on the Christian and other non-Muslim citizens of Sudan, changed the nature of the civil war into Jihad, espoused on expansionist Islamisist program towards Sudan’s regional neighbors and indeed, beyond them into the international scene.

Therefore, the N.I.F regime could not except the D.O.P. its declared policy was to recast the Sudan in terms of its partisan ideology, and to coordinate with the forces of radical Islamisism to create an Islamisist international. The D.O.P.  Contradicted that self- image of NIF. It was summarily rejected. That was in 1994.

4.  Between 1994 – 1997, the regime faced a determined united opposition. It was besieged by internal, regional, and international factors so that its opposition became untenable. It decided to change tactics and declared its support for the D.O.P. in 1997.  The regime knows very well that it can  not  fulfill  the  conditions  required by  the  D.O.P. for  a united  Sudan .  The  consequent self – determination  and  separation , it  calculated  will relive  its  hopeless military situation , allow  it  consolidate   its  hold on the  northern Sudan and  enable  it  to  the tribal differences  within  the  southern  Sudan for a future day of reckorting .

5.  However , the  parties to the IGAD declaration not  represent the  majority of  the  peoples  of  the  Sudan ,  the  SPLM/A is party to an agreement with  Sudan’s  political forces  apart  from  the  NIF . The  National  Democratic Alliance  has  an agreement  in  place  which  fulfills   the  conditions for  a united and  just  Sudan .  The  parties  in  the  NDA  have  agreed  to  establish  a transition  national government for a four years period .  During  that  period  ,  a national  program  which  will seek  to  redress  all  the  grievances  of  the  of  the  merginalized  peoples  of the  Sudan .  Only  after  this  exercise  will  the  aggrieved  peoples  of  the  Sudan be  required  to  exercise  the  right of  self – determination . In  such  circumstances  ,  it is  expected that  the majority will  confirm  their  preference  for the  unity of the Sudan .

A vote  for separation  will water into friendly successor  states in  the  Czechoslovak  pattern .

6.  The  IGAD  initiative   has  been  the  most serious  and  sustained  effort to  resolve  the  Sudanese  conflict  peacefully  .  The  position  of  the  IGAD  states  as  mediators  resets  on  solid  grounds : -

( A ) They  have  been commissioned  by  the  O.A.U.

( B )  Their  security is  adversely  affected  by  instability  in  the  Sudan .

( C ) Currently  , they  are  bearing  the  burnt  of  instability  in  the  Sudan .

8.  However ,  the  IGAD  initiative  as  it  stands  at  present  would  lead to unacceptable  results : -

( A )  It  recognizes  only  two  out  of  the  numerous  parties  to  the  conflict . there  would  be  comprehensive  settlement  at  the  end  of  the  deliberations  .

( B ) The  current  mediations  excludes  some  of  Sudan’s  geographical and  cultural  neighbors  whose  interest  in  Sudan’s  stability  is  imperative .

( C ) Given the  theocratic  character  of the  present  regime  iin  Khartoum it  makes  the  division  of the  Sudan  into  at  least  two  hostile states  inevitable  .

9.                  Sudan  now  faces  a multiple  conflict , a collapsed  economy , a widespread famine , and regional  and  international  isolation .  The  Khartoum  regime  can  neither accept  the  conditions  necessary  for  a united  Sudan ,  nor  be  able  to  sustain the  war .  in  the  circumstances, the expected  August  round  of  meeting  between  the  GOS  and  the  SPLM/A  will  confirm  the  inability  of  the  two  sides  to  agree  upon  the  necessary  conditions  for  a united  Sudan  ,  and  so  resort to  self – determination  ushering  into  the  division  of  Sudan  into  at  least  two  hostile  states  led  by  two  bitter  enemies  who  will  resume  hostilities  simply  changing  the  legal  character  of  the  war ! .

10.              The  alternative  to  that nightmare scenario  is  to  convene  a national  constitutional conference  which  comprehensively  represents  the  peoples  of  the  Sudan  as  represented  by  the  political  forces  whose  credentials   were  established  by  ballots  in  the  last  free  general  elections  of  1986 ,  and  by  the  bullet  in  the  long  lasting  civil  war .

That  conference  should  seek  to  reach  :  -

( A )   A comprehensive  peace  agreement .

( B )  A constitution  for  the  Sudan  acceptable  to  its  peoples .

11.  The  IGAD  states  should  build  upon  their  well  appreciated  efforts  and  carry  on  the  preparations  for  the  conference  drawing  upon  the  resources  and  good  will  of  other  states  among  Sudan’s  geographical  and  cultural  neighbors  ,  and  upon  the  clout  of  the  IGAD  partners  .  If  and  when  the  national  constitutional  conference  is  held  ,  the  IGAD  rainbow  , viz. , the  IGAD  states  ,  the  IIGAD  plus  , and  the  IGAD  partners  ,  could  have  an  observer  status  and  establish  two  mechanisms  :  one  for  mediation  , and  another  for  follow – up  purposes  to  ensure  the  proper  implementation  of  the  resolutions  of  the  national  constitutional  conference .

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