25^th October 2001

Sudan’s Peace and Democratization Process

Umma Proposals

 for the International Community

There are some good reasons why, this time round, the Sudanese Peace and Democratization Process is more promising.

                   1.                        The Peoples of Sudan in both the South, and the North have shown a marked war fatigue, and dictatorship fatigue. Suffering and war damage is pervasive in the whole country, especially in the war theatre in the South and the Nuba Mountains.

                   2.                        The two processes of peace making and Democratization have gone quite well in the whole African Continent so that most of the notorious African wars have now been eliminated by effective Peace Agreements, and Dictatorial Regimes have become a minority in a Continent in which they have previously prevailed.

                   3.                        In the Sudan, the principles necessary for a just peace Agreement, and a Democratization program have, in theory, gained universal acceptance among the conflicting parties in the Sudan, those principles are detailed in the attached document entitled: Principles for a Comprehensive Political Agreement.

However, there are two reasons why the Sudanese conflicting Parties, despite the theoretical potential for Agreement between them, require outside mediation.

They are:

                    · The need to bridge an unfortunate confidence gap between them.

                    · The need to establish a mechanism, which would ensure the implementation of what, has been agreed.

The IGAD Mediation

The IGAD initiative began in 1994 and since then kept a Peace Process going for almost a decade. Its achievements are:

(A)  It pinned down the two main Sudanese Parties to armed conflict, namely, the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the SPLM/A to a specific six points Declaration of Principles(DOP)

(B.)      It engaged Sudan’s Horn of Africa neighbors in the pursuit of Peace in the Sudan.

(C.)       It involved an International constituency, namely, the IGAD Partners’ Forum (IPF) in the Sudanese Peace Process.

However, the IGAD initiative has failed to cover much ground, and suffered from certain drawbacks:

a)      It confined its activity to only two parties to the conflict considering them representative of the North and the South. This assumption is unrealistic.

b)      It concentrates on the important task of the search for peace, but does not give sufficient attention to the need for Democratization. Democratization is the main guarantee for the sustainability of the Peace agreement.

c)      It bases itself on the simplistic notion of either the two parties agree upon the conditions for a united Sudan, or, if any of the two parties fails to accept them, the South will be given the right of self- determination. In such circumstances self- determination would inevitably lead to separation into two hostile successor States. There is a different approach to self- determination coming at the end of a Period of Transition, which is governed by a National Government, which would address National grievances and implement a radical reform program. Such a scenario would enhance the chances of a decision for unity in the referendum.

d)      The IGAD initiative, as it stands now, does not involve Sudan’s North Africa neighbors.

e)      Since 1998, the IGAD States have entered into hostilities between themselves and so failed to behave, as a team.

Because of these drawbacks, we have, since 1998, called for a review to enlarge the IGAD initiative. That did not materialize paving the way for an alternative Regional initiative, the Joint Egyptian Libyan initiative, which presented itself in 1999.

The Joint Egyptian Libyan Initiative

The Joint Initiative made some progress:

A)    It engaged all the parties to the conflict.

B)     It widened the Agenda to include all the points of conflict, particularly, the search for Peace, and Democratization.

C)    It encouraged mutual recognition among the parties to the conflict.

D)    In June 2001, it presented the GOS, the National Democratic Alliance and the Umma Party with a nine-point memorandum, which goes a long way in providing the conflicting parties with an Agenda to be discussed in a Round Table Conference to resolve the points of conflict.

However, the Joint Initiative has three drawbacks. They are:

·        It takes the unity of Sudan for granted. It is necessary to qualify the hoped for unity by the term voluntary unity, which would indicate the free consent of the Southern population through a referendum.

·        It is necessary to involve Sudan’s Horn of Africa neighbors in the process.

·        It is necessary to involve Sudan’s friends in the International Community, namely, the IPF States in a supportive role.

The Nigerian Input

Historically, Nigeria has had much to do with the search for peace in the Sudan. President Obasanjo is familiar with almost all Sudan’s political leaders. His stature, Nigeria’s place in Africa, and the striking analogies between the peoples of Sudan and Nigeria, call for a Nigerian role in the search for peace and stability in the Sudan. He is hosting an all Southern Sudanese Party meeting in Abuja on 12^th November this year. This meeting could help them reach consensus upon the acceptable terms for peace and stability in the Sudan. This could have multiple blessings for the Sudan:

·        It would pin down all Southern parties to a specific peace program.

·        It would terminate upmanship among Southern groups.

·        It would simplify the process of negotiating with the North, particularly, because it is not conceived as a step towards greater polarization between North and South, but conceived in the context of facilitating a North/ South accord.

Thus, the Nigerian input could act as an African lever to help the negotiations for a Comprehensive Political Agreement in the Sudan.

What can the International Community do to help the search for Peace and Democratization in the Sudan?

1.      No doubt the International community helped the Peoples of Sudan in two ways:

-         It stood up for Human Rights and all the Sudanese Regime’s obnoxious policies.

-         It generously provided Humanitarian relief aid.

However, for various reasons, since 1997, the Sudanese Regime eschewed its initial ideological agenda and internally, regionally, and internationally, espoused a corrective line of policy. Remarkable figures in the International Community detected the change and took flexible steps towards the new situation, however, American policy, during the administration of President Clinton acquired a highly rigid approach. The States, which have qualified as outlaws have been painted in a corner, and nothing they could do would change that judgment. Therefore, whatever new look the Sudanese Regime adopted, US policy preserved in a policy of destabilization and support for the Sudanese party of armed resistance. American policy towards the Sudan continued to be one of isolation, containment and support for dissident armed resistance. The new US approach, which accompanied the Bush administration, is a welcome adjustment to new realities in the Sudan.

2.      The International Community’s approach to Peace needs to abide by four main guiding principles:

·        To address all the parties to the conflict in Sudan, and to cultivate their confidence by being convincingly even handed.

·        To make a just end to the civil war a priority.

·        To realize the importance of Democratization as a desirable aim in itself, and as the most effective means to protect the Peace agreement.

However, it should be made clear that what the International Community is about to do is help the Sudanese help themselves. That the involvement of outsiders is to help achieve the aims, which have been nationally decided: Peace and Democratization.

3.      It is necessary to keep an open mind towards the current mediation efforts. Three ideas associated with the IGAD initiative are relevant to any process of political Agreement in the Sudan. They are:

-         The adoption of a declaration of principles to pin the conflicting parties down to specific principles.

-         The involvement of Sudan’s Horn of Africa neighbors in the Sudanese Peace and Stability Process.

-         The involvement of the International community in that process as represented by the IPF.

Four ideas associated with the Joint Initiative are necessary to the process of political agreement in the Sudan. They are:

·        The involvement of all the Sudanese parties to the conflict.

·        Widening the agenda of discussion to include both the Peace Process and the Democratization Process.

·        The idea of an All Party Round Table Conference as a forum for negotiating a Sudanese Comprehensive political agreement.

·        The involvement of Sudan’s North Africa neighbors in the Peace and Democratization Process.

The Nigerian input would benefit the search for Peace and Democratization in the Sudan.

A flexible International approach to the situation could lead to a coordinated mechanism, which would use the good ideas in all the current initiatives and be blessed by a pervasive National and Regional support.

4.      Apart from the intervention of Providence, Religion is a very important factor in politics and International Relations. It can have a most important role to play in social peace within societies, and International peace between societies. Politics and International Relations are that much impoverished if and when they marginalize the spiritual and moral aspects of Human Affairs. Religion can thus play a considerable role in Sudan’s Peace Process.

5.      At the National level, the approach to peace needs to be comprehensive in terms of consulting the political parties, some important civil organizations and some outstanding personalities. Religious organizations both Moslem and Christian should be involved to allow them to express their views and to recruit their considerable clout to the process of political accord in the country. These organizations must have credible credentials.

6.      At the regional level, it is necessary to involve Sudan’s Horn of Africa and North Africa neighbors to solicit their support for the process of Comprehensive Political Agreement in the Sudan, and so help remove any obstacles to it.

7.      At the International level, the good will and cooperation of the States of the IPF should be solicited and established. A UN supportive role, especially the Secretary General would further enhance the International role.

8.      It is very important to seek to establish a follow-up mechanism, which would assure skeptical parties that what was reached would be effectively implemented.

9.      All this could lead to a broad informal National, Regional, and International coalition to help achieve a National Agenda, which the Sudanese parties to the conflict, have all, theoretically, approved. Secondly: This coalition would put its weight behind the comprehensive political accord in the Sudan and isolate any group, which seems to be creating obstacles or to lack seriousness in abiding by what it had already agreed to. Thirdly: this coalition would, in due time, organize a Conference under World Bank auspices to help the Sudan in the coming Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Development program.

This is a challenging scenario. However, it is commensurate with the responsibilities of the International Community in a World seeking for Peace, Democracy, cultural and religious tolerance and respect for Human Rights.

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