Road Map For Peace and Stability in Sudan

  

Literature 

 

 

14 August 1999

 There are various historical, cultural, political and economic causes for the long lasting armed conflict in the Sudan.

The Sudan became independent 43 years ago. For 75% of that period, it fell prey to military dictatorship. The three short periods of Democratic Government were each succeeded by a longer lasting dictatorial Government. The civil war almost spanned the duration of all the three dictatorial Governments and the three democratic Governments. During the three periods of Democratic Government, there were serious atempts to find a compromise resolution to the armed conflict:

·         During the first Democratic period (1954-58), the basis of proposed compromise was to adopt a Federal Constitution for the Sudan.

·         During the second Democratic period (1964-69), the proposed compromise was a constitution  with strong devolution of powers to the regions in the form of a system of Regional Self-Government.

·         During the third Democratic period (1985-89), the basis of compromise was suspention of all controversial legislation, the convening of a National Constitutional Conference to decide upon the issues of: Religion and State, National Identity, Just distribution of Wealth and Social Services and balanced political participation.

The three dictatorial periods of Government have consistently opted for military solutions to the armed conflict. However, the second dictatorial Regime (1969-85) utilized the negotiated preparations of the previous Democratic Period (1964-69) as worked out by a series of talks (The Round Table Conference 1965, the Twelve Man Committee 1966 and the All Sudanese Party Conference 1967), utilized the Regional and Western International sympathy it received because of its clampdown upon the Communist Party of Sudan (1971), and reached an agreement with the armed resistance as represented by ANYANYA-I in 1972, which stopped the civil war for a decade. Two weaknesses led to the demise of that agreement:

-          It attempted to resolve an important National issue in the absence of National representation.

-          It involved a devolution of power in a totalitarian system to which the devolution of power is unthinkable.

Consequently, the Regime abrogated the 1972 agreement and landed the country with a more serious civil war  in 1982 than the one it ternminated in 1972.

The contribution of the three coups d’etat in Sudan to the escalation of the civil war was immense. The first coup (1958) trampled on the Federal Constitution compromise, the second coup trampled on the Regional self- government system as incorporated in the draft constitution, then it adopted it and finally it abrogated it. In the third Democratic period (1985-89), there was a promising Peace Process based on the KOKADAM Declaration (March 1986), the Sudanese Peace initiative (November 1988), and the Transitional Palace Program (February 1989). Consequently, by June 1989, there was an agreement by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A on the operation of Lfie Line Sudan. There was an on going cease- fire. There was agreement to hold a National Constitutional Conference on 18th September 1989. The Sudanese political forces were all poised to strike a historic compromise on all the issues, which caused the civil- war. Just then, the National Islamic Front staged a coup d’etat with a diametrically opposite agenda. Far from allowing any room for compromise, the new Regime adopted a program of ideological and cultural hegemony. The SPLM/A became the target of JIHAD. All other political forces had to submit or face rigorous oppression.  They organized political opposition to the Regime.  Eventually they took up arms to resist the Regime’s Islamicist terror.  The civil war became deeper because of  The religious dimension, and more extensive.

            Nevertheless, the Regime, while engaging full swing in its JIHAD agenda, encouraged mediators to explore the possibilities of Peace Negotiations.  Thus started the ten year fruitless Peace negotiations between NIF Regime and the SPLAM/A.  That process covered three phases:

Phase One: Negotiations between the two parties in Addis Ababa and Nirobi brokered by ex-president Carter of U.S.A. (1989 - 1991).

Phase Two: A series of talks held in Abuja through Nigerian Government mediation (1991 - 1993).

Phase Three: A series of meetings held in Nairobi, Kampala, and Addis Ababa, mediated by the IGAD States. (1993 - 1999).

The talks between the two parties before the IGAD iniative were dialogues of the deaf because the SPLM/A was seeking accomodation for radical change, whereas the NIF Regime was seeking acceptance for its Southern Policy, namely, to uphopld its Islamicist program for the Nation, to establish Federation for the country, and to permit the States to exempt themselves from Islamic legislation, if they so wished.

            The IGAD States put an end to that dialogue of the deaf by proposing a Declaration of Priniciples to guide the talks. (1994).  This step froward was frustrated by the Regime’s rejection of the D.O.P for three years.  It finally accepted the D.O.P in 1997.  The IGAD initiave and its D.O.P became the most promising mediation effort to end the civil war in Sudan because:

·                     It involved some of Sudan’s most important geopolitical neighbors who influence political events in Sudan and are influenced by them.

·                     The D.O.P boxed the two Parties into negotiating terms for a united Sudan acceptable to all its citizens, or allow self - determination for the agrieved region.

·                     It channeled International interest in Sudan’s Peace Process through the IGAD Partners’ Forum.

            Inspite of this positive input, the Sudan Peace Process stalled.  Meanwhile, the Sudanese political, economic, and humanitarian predicament witnessed a noose dive into misery.

(A) Political debate has given way to bullet exchanges, so that the politically active Sudanese are poised to kill or be killed.

(B) The war fronts have expanded to six.  The conflint itself has acquired a hideous cultural and religious dimension.  It multiplied into numerous facets: North/South,North/North, and South/South, conflicts.

(C) Most of Sudan’s borders became high tension security risk areas.

(D) The NIF Regime imposed an oppressive Police State upon the population.

(E) The Sudanese territories controlled by SPLM/A and NDA, suffer a destabilized economy, deficient social services, and continous areal bombing threats.

            The scars of war, the culture of violence, the mismanagement of the economy, corruption, and internal and extermal adventurism have disrupted peoples’ security and livelihood.  They fled en masse into internal and external emmigration.  Estimates of the death toll, the displaced, the refugees, those at risk, and those in grave health and famine risk run into millions.  The international media have characterized Sudan as a model for disaster.  Calls for international intervension to end the human tragedy in Sudan became pervasive, for example, in November 1998 four international aid agencies (N.G.O’s) have addressed a letter to the U.N. Secretary General to report the futility of the humanitarian relief effort if a political resolution of the armed conflict does not materialize (OXFAM, M.S.F, CARE, and S.C.F.).  The Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop Hume addressed the British Foreign Secretary in the same vien.  On 15th June 1999, the U.S House of Representatiives passed a concurrent Resolution (i.e. supported by U.S. Senate) which condemned the Sudan Regime for numerous atrocities, and effectively called for political intervension by the U.S.  President, and the U.N Security Council to resolve the conflicts in Sudan.  The President of U.S. is expected to report to the House in 90 days about what was done to resolve the situation in Sudan.  A U.S. special envoy was appointed to report on the situation.  Meanwhile, some aid officers who visited SPLA controlled territories, in Lanya an KAYA last July reported symptoms of exposure to chemical wespons.  This will be investigated and if confirmed, it will fuel calls for international intervension in Sudan.

            The tragic humanitarian sitnation in Sudan has encouraged two types of urgent response:

·         Calls for bilateral arrangements which would divide up the country between the de facto powers without any need for a comprehensive agreement, or a democratic process.  To stop the carnage at any cost even if the arrangement will not be suslainable.

·         Calls for international intervension without any reference to any Sudanese authorization.

            Although such tendencies may be explained in terms of the urges and pressures created by the Sudanese tragedy, they may make the tragic situstaion chaotic.

            The urgency of the Sudanese predicament further exposes the inadequacy of the latest round of IGAD talks in Nairobi between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A (19-23 July 1999). The establishment of a Secretariat, the appointment of a special envoy, and the formation of technical committees, are necessary follow-up mechanisms. In the absence of a political break-through, they will not cover much ground.

After six years, and numerous rounds of talks, it is high time to take stock of the IGAD initiative. Since 1994, several negative developments impaired the IGAD teamwork. Otherwise, some important developments materialized without being incorporated into the IGAD framework, namely:

A)                The SPLM/A is now firmly allied to other Sudanese Parties and political groups within the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The NDA has unanimously supported the D. O. P and through its ASMARA Conference Resolutions of June 1995, developed them into a fully-fledged basis for a Peace agreement and for Democratic Government. The ASMARA Resolutions tackled the issue of self-determination as a basis for voluntary unity in a way, which should offer the unity verdict a better opportunity through a period of transition during which all the grievances, which prompted the call for self- determination, should be systematically eliminated. During the last two years, the Khartoum Regime signed “Internal Peace Agreements” with some break away factions of the SPLM/A which grouped themselves into political parties (April 1997), the Regime enacted a constitution (June 1998), which represents the views of the Regime about the country’s political future more explicitly than any previous document. Inside the Sudan, the NDA presented the Regime with a Memorandum in 1996 and a second Memorandum in 1998. The second Memorandum, particularly, spelt out the terms for a comprehensive political settlement in the Sudan. In the light of these developments the D.O.P. of 1994 needs to be updated to cater for the requirements of a comprehensive political agreement. A Declaration of Principles, which incorporates the relevant aspects of the D. O. P and includes the relevant new developments, is now imperative: A Declaration of Principles for a Comprehensive Political Agreement.

B)                 The DOP was between two parties to the conflict in Sudan. The conflict is now multi-faceted, and the Declaration of Principles for a Comprehensive Political Resolution should involve the participation of all the parties to the present conflict.

C)                 Egypt is an important neighbor of Sudan. It aspires to enter into regional formations which must involve Nile- basin States, particularly the Sudan. Even without such future developments, Egyptian National security is affected positively or negatively by Peace and stability in the Sudan. Egypt is not a member of IGAD, it is not even a member of IPF.. This is unrealistic. Beginning with 1999, Egypt has established contact with the conflicting Parties in Sudan. They welcomed an Egyptian role in the Sudan Peace and Stability Process. During the first half of 1999, an Egyptian initiative on the basis of “slow but sure” emerged.

D)                Libya is another important neighbor excluded from the Sudan Peace and Stability Process. Its National Security is affected positively or negatively by Peace and Stability in Sudan. Recently, Libya has launched several Peace initiatives in Africa to resolve the outstanding armed conflicts. It expressed greater interest in Pan- African unity.. Such sentiments and ideas have no future if the current conflicts in Sudan continue. The Sudanese conflicts promise to bisect Africa into Sub- SAHARAN and Sur-SAHARAN regions. Therefore, Libya expressed interest in the Sudan Peace and stability process. Espousing a course of “who dares wins”, Libya addressed the latest Leadership Council meeting of the NDA in Tripoli on 28th of July 1999, with a specific initiative. Both Egypt and Libya recognize the importance of each other’s role. They both recognize that their roles should supplement not supplant the roles of the IGAD States.. After a summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries (Egypt and Libya.), it was agreed to merge their two initiatives into one. A joint committee worked out that merger and a joint peace mission was dispatched to Khartoum to receive the Sudan Government response to the joint initiative. It is quite clear in the minds of the two states that their initiative should link up with the IGAD initiative. The multilateral effort could take the form of a Sudan Neighbor’s Forum or an Afro-Arab Forum.

E)                 The auxiliary role of the IGAD Partners Forum is highly appreciated. It could be extended to include other States, which could contribute immensely to the Sudan Peace and Stability process, namely, South Africa, Nigeria, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Zambia. Three measures hold the key to a comprehensive political Resolution to the conflicts in Sudan:

I-                                                                                           To convene an all-Party Sudanese National Conference to address the outstanding National issues.

II-                                                                                         To harness all the good will of Sudan’s neighbors in the interest of the Peace and stability process in Sudan through a Sudan Neighbors’ Forum.

III-                                                                                      To draft a Declaration of Principles for a Comprehensive Political Agreement in Sudan. Consultations among the parties to the conflict and the facilitators are incumbent to draw a Road Map involving the following components:

a)                                                                                          To exact a series of measures needed to prepare the ground for serious dialogue.

b)                                                                                          To make contacts with all the Parties to the conflict to appoint a preparatory committee to be entrusted with:

(i)                                                                                                                              Putting together a blue print for the All Party National Conference. Its composition, its agenda, its venu, its administration and its timetable should be addressed.

(ii)                                                                                                                            Agreeing upon a draft of the Declaration of Principles for a Comprehensive Peace and Stability Agreement.

(iii)                                                                                                                           Specification of the roles of the S.N.F and the I.P.F.

F)                  The joint mediation delegation met with the Sudan Government authorities 20-24 August 1999. They reported to the NDA representatives on 25th August 1999 that:

·         The Sudan Government welcomed the joint initiative.

·         They spelt out their response to measures specified by the NDA for confidence building and preparing the ground for serious political dialogue. The NDA representatives promised to study the response and outline their position. The NDA representatives were assured that the IGAD states and IPF would be briefed, and consulted about the establishment of a coordinating mechanism.

The Sudan today is at a dangerous crossroads, which promises to make or break the country.

If we in the NDA and the rest of the opposition were bent on a political role, it would be advisable to mount pressures against the Khartoum Regime and prepare for its collapse. The signs towards that end are encouraging. The Regime is besieged by military attrition, which it cannot hope to overcome. The economy is failing to sustain the livelihood of the Population. The petrol pie even if it was large enough to sustain great hopes, which it is not, cannot be realistically entertained with the pervasive civil war conditions in the country. The leading figures of the Regime have publicly started a schismatic polemic, which involved the sensitive issue of corruption.

As politicians, we may wait in the hope of uprooting the Regime sackcloth and ashes. As Statesmen and Patriots there is another account to survey. The Sudan today is pervaded with the culture of violence. All organized political opinion is armed. Within the Regime and also the opposition, there is a prominent ethnic dimension, which linked with the culture of violence, could render the Sudan a large– scale Somalia.

The performance of the economy is another destabilizing factor. Our neighboring region is packed with actual and potential conflict, which would cross the borders and settle accounts in Sudanese territories. International intervention, which may appear a neat and limited surgical operation, may flare up into something beyond control.

Such doomsday scenarios for the Sudan are quite possible. Unfortunately, however far sighted we may be, there are several reasons which prompt the opposition to continue with pressure until there is a political Agreement in place. Three factors continuously erode the credibility of the Regime’s New Look. They are:

(i)                                          The perseverance of power centers within the Regime, which continue to propagate the Old Agenda.

(ii)                                        The continuation of laws, regulations and institutions which uphold the TOTALITARIAN State.

(iii)                                       The track record of the Regime, which made a habit of signaling Left and turning Right.

 

Considering the immanence of doomsday scenarios, we have no alternative to racing with the doomsday scenarios and overtaking them.

It is incumbent upon all Sudanese patriots, Sudan’s well meaning neighbors and friends in the International community to undertake this task and save the Sudan.

Regional and International concern for the Sudan and involvement in the pursuit of peace and stability in it, is most welcome. It should translate into facilitation, mediation and observation roles. If and when agreement between the Sudanese parties it reached, the Regional and International good offices could assure all involved about the proper implementation of agreements. Further, the Sudan will need Regional and International support for its reconstruction and development. However, any kind of International intervention, which flies over the heads of the Peoples of the Sudan, will not result in sustainable Peace and Stability in Sudan.

 

Al Sadig Al Mahdi

Elected PM of Sudan- May 1986, and

President of Umma Party

 

Attached:

1-                  A proposed comprehensive declaration for a political Agreement in Sudan.

2-                  Ten points’ National Cultural Charter.

 

 

C.T. IGAD STATES

C. T. IGAD PARTNERS

C. T. EGYPT

C. T. Libya

C. T. NDA MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS AND LEADERSHIP COUNCIL PERSONALITIES

C. T. UN SECRETARY GENERAL

C. T. OAU SECRETARY GENERAL.

C. T. S. AFRICA

C. T. SAUDI ARABIA

C. T. NIGERIA

C. T. UAE

C. T. ZAMBIA

  

 

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