To Harry Johnston, Oct 1999

Literature 

27/10/1999

H.E. HARRY JHONSTON

U.S PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL ENVOY ON SUDAN

Dear Sir.

It gives me great pleasure to salute your continuous effort to help the peoples of Sudan overcome their tragic plight.

We appreciate your Country’s concern for our country, its generous contribution to Humanitarian relief efforts, and its continuous moral, political, and diplomatic support for peace and Democracy in the Sudan.

The current Regime in Sudan has become the source of multiple menance,to the peoples of Sudan, to the neighboring Region, and to the international community. The National Democratic Alliance has organized opposition to the Khartoum Regime so that the Regime is currently under political, diplomatic, and military siege.

The NDA has also succeeded, through a number of Conferences, culminating in the ASMARA Conference of June 1995, in outlining an alternative program for Sudan consisting of:

The terms for a peace agreement, the basis for Democratic Government, policies to reform the economy, to create Regional stability, and to reclaim Sudan’s positive position in the International Community.

Several mediation efforts sprouted to find a peaceful resolution to the conflicts in Sudan. The Khartoum Regime which continued its commitment to its radical Islamicist Agenda encouraged  these mediation efforts for two purposes:

¨                     As  a public relations  exercise.

¨                     To sow dissent among its opponents.

These were the Regime’s purposes when it sought to engage the IGAD States in a new mediation effort in 1993.

The perpetrators of the IGAD initiative sought to pin the parties to the conflict to an explicit Declaration of Principles in 1994. The Regime rejected the D.O.P.

The Regime faced mounting internal and external pressures. To attempt to contain them, the Regime changed its attitude.

·                      In July 1997, it declared its acceptance of the D.O.P.

·                      In April 1997 it signed International Peace Agreements with six resistance groups making apparent concessions.

·                      In 1998, it issued a New Constitution allowing  a limited freedom of association.

A comprehensive political resolution of the conflicts in Sudan will only come as a result of a concerted National, Regional, and International effort to  force   the Regime to accept a Just Peace Agreement, a real Democratic transformation, and the rest of the Program embodying the legitimate aspirations of the Peoples of the Sudan.

IGAD initiative is one means of articulating that pressure. However, in its present framework, the IGAD initiative characterizes the civil war as a regional war. It seeks to resolve “The Southern Problem”.

It recognizes the National Islamic Front Regime as sole spokesman for the North. It empowers the Khartoum Regime to dictate its terms for a United Sudan, when they are rejected, as expected, it concedes Self-Determination for the South, which, in the circumstances would lead to separation and the establishment of two hostile successor States.

This Scenario is a recipe for disaster, and even if it ends one war, it will saw the seeds of numerous wars in the near future.

That is why the NDA had, since 1997, coupled its support for the IGAD initiative with the need to up-date in these respects:

§                      To involve all the parties to the conflict.

§                      To extend the Agenda to include the issue of the constitution as well as the issue of the civil war.

On the 2^nd of April 1998, the NDA addressed the U.S. delegation to the effect that the Sudan problem is National in nature and indivisible, that necessitates:

a)                     The extension of the IGAD Agenda to include the future constitution as well as the Peace Agreement.

b)                     The full participation of all the parties to the conflict so as to achieve a just peace and a comprehensive settlement of the Sudan problem.

Our continuous efforts for the last two years and a half to sound the IGAD States, the IGAD Partners including the U.S.A have produced no results.

On April 1999 Egypt sounded the NDA on a plan to mediate between the NDA and the Khartoum Regime. Similar intentions were later expressed by Lybia.

In its leadership Council meeting in ASMARA in June 1999, the NDA welcomed both suggestions.

In September 1999, Lybia formally invited the NDA leadership Council to meet in Tripoli where it presented a specific initiative to resolve the conflicts in Sudan. The NDA unanimously accepted that initiative and signed the Tripoli Declaration in August 1999.

Since then Egypt endorsed that initiative which became the Joint Egyptian Lybian Initiative. The Khartoum Regime declared its acceptance of the joint initiative.

This initiative makes the following contribution:-

q                      It involves all parties to the conflict.

q                      It calls for a National Conference to discuss a comprehensive Agenda.

q                      For the first time it produced the Khartoum Regime’s acceptance to put its fate – its constitution- in the Agenda.

q                      It recognizes the need to work together with the IGAD States to realize the common objectives.

No one doubts Egypt’s credentials in matters concerning the future of the Sudan.

In addition to being a close neighbor of Sudan, Lybia has established strong relations with all Sudanese political parties and movements. Lybia armed the SPLA and established political relations with it from its inception. Lybia had also a regional grouping with the present Sudan – The Regional association of Desert and Coastal  States.

Both Egypt and Lybia have suffered from war and instability in Sudan. Both are required to guarantee any Agreement reached by the conflicting parties in Sudan.

In conclusion, we lookup to the U.S.A to realize the importance of the following principles and to accept them in good heart and to waive any conflicting  considerations.

    They are:-

1.                           A comprehensive political Resolution to the current conflicts in Sudan is possible only through a concerted National, Regional, and International pressure.                                                                             That pressure requires the unity of the NDA and all opposition forces.  It requires the cooperation of Sudan’s IGAD neighbors as well as its North Africa neighbors. Plus the support of the International Community as represented by the IGAD Partner’s Forum.

2.                           Any partial or bilateral Agreement will be counter productive and will simply lay the grounds for future conflicts.   There should be a comprehensive political settlement.

3.                           There is urgent need for an updated Declaration of Principles for a comprehensive political resolution which should spell out the terms for a Peace Agreement, for a democratic constitution, and including all the legitimate aspirations of the Peoples of Sudan.

4.                           The proper forum for the necessary political negotiations is an all Party National Conference with Regional and International observation.

5.                           The coordination of the mediation efforts of Sudan’s Horn of Africa neighbors and North Africa neighbors to achieve common aims.

6.                           The full realization of the good offices of the International Community as represented by the I.P.F in the effort to make peace and stability in Sudan

Any  deviation  from these principles, or attempts to impose solutions without the approval of the Peoples of the Sudan, is a recipe for more disaster in the Sudan. We hope that the U.S. President’s Special Envoy will be able to make a comprehensive survey  of the situation and help shape U.S. policy in ways most capable of helping the Peoples of Sudan realize just peace and Democratic stability.

Thank you.

 AL SADIG AL MAHDI,

Elected Prime minister of Sudan 1986

And President  of Umma Party.

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