Address Before EU Ambassadors, Cairo, 1st October, 2000

Literature 

To: The EU Member States

First October, 2000

 Dear Sir/ Madam,

 The Peoples of the Sudan are grateful for your humanitarian concern with the Sudanese Tragedy, and your interested pursuit of Peace and Stability in Sudan.

This is a brief memorandum on the current situation, which leads up to suggestions as to how your good will could be articulated. It begins with an introduction to put the matter into the appropriate perspective.

1-     The Nation/ State had a long history until it matured in Europe. Both the State and then he Nation developed through an uphill process. Then followed the two historic achievements. Economic Development, and the Democratic System.

2-     Current International Relations presume the three landmarks to be in place: The Nation/State, Economic Development. In several countries, they are not. Our basic problem in Sudan and elsewhere is, how to catch up on these fundamentals.

3-     Most "Third- World" countries suffer from this inadequacy and have reached some sort of stability through the authority of a dynasty or a military establishment. Sudanese Socio- Political relations rule out these options. Therefore, the only basis for legitimate Government in Sudan is Democratic.

4-     The Development of National Cohesion in Sudan is more advanced than in most of its neighbors. However, it is incomplete. Although there are other heterogenuities, the North/ South divide is the most fundamental.

A-    The British Administration in Sudan (1899-1956) was determined to keep the two regions apart. That was the basis of its Southern Policy (1918-1948). Six years before evacuating the Sudan in 1954, the British Administration in Sudan changed its mind and decided that to integrate the two regions was the least obnoxious alternative. There was not enough time to undo thirty years of work.

B-    The National  successor Regimes considered the issue under two assumption:

The First: that the North/ South divide is a British fabrication, which should be reversed.

The Second: That the basis of cohesion in the North, the culture of the center, would and should be the National culture.

Those two assumptions informed the policies of the six Regimes, which governed the Sudan since Independence (1956-2000).

There was one main difference: The Democratic Regimes, which governed for a fourth of the period espoused that policy of acculturation 

5-     However, by 1997, the Regime realized the hopelessness of its Ideological Agenda, and effected a volt-face. The ideological background of the Regime required it to camouflage is change of mind, but its internal schism helped expose the reality. Apart from the UMMA Party, the other N.D.A. groups failed to appreciate these developments, some of them lacked the necessary information, others were glued to Regional and International alliances, which made their positions flexible. This failure to accommodate new developments and the insistence on carrying on as if the 1995-1997 conditions still prevailed was the main reason for the break between UMMA Party and its N.D.A. allies (June 2000). However, recent developments indicate change, namely:

A-    The U.S.A. position had been sending conflicting signals. The recent non-paper (August 2000) is a sign of positive engagement.

B-    Eritrea's role in the N.D.A. MUSAWA Conference, and its aftermath signals Eritrea's unambivalent support for the process of a comprehensive political agreement in Sudan.

C-    The four States KAMPALA meeting of September 2000 represents a decisive step forward in bilateral relations between the Sudan and Uganda and would resonate positively in the process of the political settlement in Sudan.

D-    The UMMA Party's bilateral negotiations with the Government have objectively helped to narrow the gap between the positions of the Government and the opposition. The UMMA Party's activity inside the Sudan has helped the resumption of normal political activity, and provided a degree of reassurance.

E-    The ASMARA Declaration of September 2000 by ALBASHIR and ALMIRGHANI is a climb down from the previous hard line position and could further isolate support for the militarist alternative.

6-     However, the negotiating mechanisms to carry these developments to their logical conclusions are wanting:

A)    The IGAD initiative is impaired by several factors: It is confined to only two parties to the conflict, and relations between its member States prevent teamwork. The SPLA did not take it as a forum for serious mutual conciseness but used it as a cover for pious open declarations while engaging in a war agenda with some International and Regional support.

B)    The Joint Initiative (Egypt & Libya) suggested a comprehensive forum, the All-Party Conference, but in the eyes of many Sudanese participants, it is seen to limit their choice.

C)    The USA non-paper would transcend the Regional Character of the negotiations. It is quite clear that the most viable negotiating forum would be:

-          An All-Party Conference with a comprehensive Agenda.

-          The All Party Conference could be facilitated by the States of the Joint Initiative who would:

·      Declare that they would bless whatever the Sudanese Parties agree upon.

·      Involve the Horn of Africa States in their endeavor.

·      Invite the States of IPF as observers.

7-     What could the I.P.F. States do to support the Sudanese Peace and Democratization Process?.. They carry a substantial weight in International clout and good will. Their clout and good will could be articulated in the following terms:

A.     They can realize and broadcast the fact that there exists, potentially, the making of a Peace Agreement and Democratization Program.

B.     They could help the Joint Initiative organize the All-Party Conference and attend it as observers.

C.    They could organize a shadow conference under one of the UN Agents on the pattern of the UNESCO, culture for Peace Conference as a preface to the actual conference.

D.    They could press for freedom guaranteeing reforms in Sudan, for a comprehensive cease-fire to be observed by all sides during the process of negotiating, and press for the suspension of electoral process in Sudan until an agreement is in place.

E.     They could observe the negotiation process and witness its outcome.

F.     They could threaten sanctions against any party, which fails to respond positively to the Peace and Democratization process in Sudan and/ or fail to deliver on the Agreement when it has been concluded. The fact that the well-meaning Humanitarian effort is being used to perpetuate the war should be checked.

G.    They could offer to organize a Round Table Conference for Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Development in Sudan after the conclusion of the Peace and Democratization Accord.

UMMA PARTY

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