Memeorandum To the US Government, March 2001

Literature 

A CLARION CALL BY THE PEOPLES OF SUDAN

1-     US Policy towards the Sudan had in many instances suffered from two weaknesses:

First: conceived as part of a region: Sometimes, Middle Eastern requirements, later Horn of Africa affairs.

Second: targeting an isolated aspect of the problem, for example, Humanitarian relief, terrorism, or even the Civil War.

Consequently, US policy towards Sudan was cool towards Sudan’s independence because it was expected to upset Middle Eastern Security arrangements, cool towards Sudan’s Third Democratic System for the same reason, and now Sudan’s peculiarities are being sacrificed because the country is required to be confined to the Horn of Africa.

2-     The outgoing Clinton Administration inherited all past weaknesses, and added some of its own.

The Peoples of Sudan appreciated US Humanitarian relief to Sudan. We highly regarded US concern for Human Rights in Sudan. US played a leading International role in isolating the Sudanese Totalitarian Regime for its role in International Terrorist activity, and for its policies of abuse of Human Rights, and religious intolerance. However, National resistance, Regional hostility, International Isolation, and the Regime’s failure to make any substantial achievement through its Islamisicst Ideological Agenda, forced the regime to reconsider its policies. From 1997 onwards, the Regime, theoretically, accepted what it takes to make Peace and Democratic Transformation, namely,

¨      Accepted citizenship as the basis for Constitutional Rights.

¨      Accepted Religious, Cultural and Ethnic Plurality in Sudan, and the need to co-exist between the different ascriptive identities.

¨      Accepted political plurality, and the need to respect internationally defined Human Rights, and Basic Freedoms.

¨      Indicated willingness to endorse a Regional mediation with International observation.

3-     We, in the opposition, and many in the Region and in the International Community, were slow to recognize these changes. The Khartoum Regime’s track record was so abhorrent and its deceptive tactics so pervasive, that everybody continued to see the tiger’s spots in the new skin. Further, the Regime’s old policies have mobilized Religious bodies, Human Rights’ groups, and Humanitarian Organizations, in a full swing counter attack against the Khartoum Regime. Many who have led this worthy campaign have gained reputations, and acquired interests, so that many of them, did not appreciate the change. Many loved to hate the Khartoum Regime, and loved to keep the ICON of their hate in its place.

4-     Far from seeing any change, US policy towards Sudan in the period (1999-2001) became more strict. It committed three basic mistakes:

·        To recognize no change for the better, and to further escalate pressure against the Sudan Government.

·        To deal almost exclusively with one Sudanese Party, the SPLM/A, as holding the key to Sudan’s Future. Their failures were ignored, and they were encouraged to continue with their policy of duplicity about the Peace Process.

·        To discourage any attempts to broaden the framework of the IGAD Process, and to confine mediation to Sudan’s Horn of Africa neighborhood. This US attitude, plus the unconditional supply of Humanitarian Relief, has helped to prolong the civil war in Sudan.

This Civil War is so tragic, its fall out is so hideous, and it is so unpopular in the North and the South, that its continuation for one more day is a Humanitarian catastrophe. Evidence of its unpopularity in the North is well established, for example, the length to which young men go to avoid conscription. The recent statement by the Comboni Missionaries working in the areas administered by SPLA, concluded:

“We have come to the unanimous conviction that the situation of War in Sudan at the present stage has become immoral and a tragic farce. It is not any longer a struggle for freedom of the Sudanese people and for the defense of Human Rights.

            The war has become a struggle for power, business and greed.. etc”

5-     The Sudanese Peoples look up to the US to wind up the policies of the outgoing Administration, to take a leading role in addressing the new realities, and to encourage all National, Regional and International efforts which seek to realize a just Peace Agreement, and establish a process of genuine Democratic Transformation. Only this role becomes the US strategic and moral International position.

6-     The following points make a Comprehensive Political Resolution of the conflicts in Sudan highly probable:

¨      There is a pervasive war fatigue in Sudan. It is also generally accepted by all parties concerned that any side to the conflict could not victoriously conclude the war.

¨      There is a pervasive demise of the extreme Ideological Agendas, in favor of more moderation and pragmatism.

¨      The basic ideas for a possible Comprehensive Political Agreement have been resolved by the opposition parties (The NDA) in the well-known ASMARA Resolutions of June 1995. They have since been more or less endorsed by the Government. They include a clear recognition of Southern and other marginalized Peoples of Sudan’s grievances and the need to address them as a National Problem. They stipulate:

·        That citizenship would be the basis of Constitutional Rights.

·        The recognition of Religious and Cultural plurality in the country.

·        Constitutional and administrative decentralization of the country. Central and Regional powers have been defined.

·        To restructure State Institutions to accommodate these reforms.

·        To effect a just distribution of the country’s wealth.

·        To establish a Transitional National Government for four years. Then the South would confirm unity or otherwise through a process of self-determination.

·        The resolutions also address the NUBA Mountains, INGASANA and ABEY areas.

¨      There is now a substantial and well-mobilized Sudanese public opinion, which constitutes a wave of powerful support for Peace and Democracy. A reality, which no political group can afford to ignore.

¨      All Northern urban areas host numerous Southern squatters. In fact the Southern population in the North today outnumbers the population in the South by 3:1. This phenomenon augurs well for peace-making because it indicates:

·        That the overwhelming majority of Southerners have voted against the war by their feet.

·        That they do not consider the Northerners as their enemy.

·        That they do not fear enslavement.

7-     In this respect, it is a basic mistake to isolate the process of Peace making from the process of Democratization. A just Peace Agreement should be enacted in the Constitution. A Democratic Constitution is a strong guarantee for the Peace Agreement. A Constitution, which is no more than the political wishes of an arbitrary authority, will be subjected to the whims of that authority. This is exactly what happened when the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 was signed with a Dictatorial Regime, and incorporated in the Dictator’s Constitution. When his political interests changed, he effectively tore the Agreement, and prepared the ground for a much worse civil war in 1983 than the one he ended in 1972!.

8-     The micro- approach to Sudan’s problems is seen to be inadequate, for example, the attempt to resolve the problem of Humanitarian relief, and the attempt to resolve the problem of Human Rights violations, such attempts will do no more than paint a cabin in a sinking ship. The situation requires a macro- approach to realize Comprehensive Political Resolution of the twin problems of war and Dictatorship, and achieve the two targets of Peace and Democracy.

9-     The IGAD initiative has reached the end of its tether. The Joint Egyptian- Libyan initiative has suggested a viable negotiating mechanism, namely, an All Party National Conference. This has been accepted by all parties to the conflict. It would become conclusively viable and provide a mechanism for the Comprehensive Political Agreement if it endorses the following suggestions:

¨      It invites Sudan’s Horn of Africa neighbors to participate as facilitators.

¨      It invites the IPF States as observers.

¨      It invites the Sudanese Parties to the conflict to convene and issue a Declaration of Principles for a Comprehensive Political Agreement. A Declaration, which would be arrived at, freely by the Sudanese Parties, and which all concerned in the Region and the International Community will bless. A declaration of Principles for a Comprehensive Political Agreement is required to replace the IGAD’s DOP for the following reasons:

·        The DOP is between two parties to the conflict, and gives each of them an unjustifiable veto on the future of Sudan.

·        The DOP postulates self-determination on a simple either or choice. However, in the ASMARA Resolutions, signed by all opposition Parties, self-determination comes after a Transitional reformist period.

¨      The initiative establishes institutions for the functions of mediation, facilitation, and observation.

¨      The establishment of a follow-up mechanism, which would ensure that what is agreed through the expected negotiations, will be implemented.

¨      When a Comprehensive Political Agreement has been reached, the International Community will convene a Round Table Conference to support the Sudanese reconstruction, rehabilitation, resettlement and development efforts.

10- The outcome of all these deliberations is the emergence of a National, Regional and International partnership for Peace and Democracy in the Sudan.

A U.S. support for this concept would be commensurate with its moral and strategic International position.

 The first step towards this commendable support is for US policy to put an end to sending conflicting signals, and articulate its considerable clout in a single Peace and Democratization bound direction.

The US should immediately end its isolated Diplomatic absence from Sudan and appoint a highly qualified Ambassador to Sudan. It should establish direct contact with all Sudanese parties to the conflict, and recommend to all immediate positive response to direct negotiations for a Comprehensive Political Agreement. All parties to the conflict should accept the necessary package of: respect for Human Rights, and Basic Freedoms, renunciation of violence, direct negotiations, and cease-fire accompanying them.

The US policy should accept the complex geopolitical Afro-Arab reality of Sudan, put an end to its boycott of the Joint Egyptian Libyan Initiative, and seek to win the support of the IGAD states for the alternative viable mediation mechanism described above.

The US should consult with the European Union States, Japan, Canada, China, Malaysia and indeed all States, which are interested in Peace and Stability in Sudan to work together towards that purpose.

This presentation is an update of our recommendations to US officials ever since we decided that there are new realities in Sudan, which should be addressed, viz, the Special Envoy Mr. H. Johnston, and the Honorable US Ambassadors to Egypt, Eritrea and Uganda, with whom we held regular meetings.

UMMA Party

Omdurman

14 March 2001

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